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(Murray Bolton, Managing Director, 
Rural Banking & Finance Corporation) 
The Rural Bank is the leading financier to the New Zealand 
Primary Sector and as such our operations tend to mirror 
financial trends in the industry. Consequently, we are in 
probably the best position to gauge the environment in which 
our producers are operating. 
We know that farming has gone through a difficult 
restructuring period and there are numbers still in severe 
difficulties who will not survive. This situation has 
tended to disguise the fact that the Primary Sector is still 
the engine room of the economy, earning two out of three of 
our overseas dollars. 
With people like 
cannot survive 
earnings it is 
mechanisms which 
the Prime Minister saying that New Zealand 
without the sector's valuable overseas 
essential that we know the economic 
contribute to industry progress. 
You, as agricultural economists are in the best positions to 
carry out this sort of analysis and come up with a prognosis 
about the "patient". The Bank, in turn, can draw on its 
experience and sector acumen to put into place financial 
products which can promote farmer's business success. By 
doing this we can all help resist adverse upheavals which 
drag the industry down. 
Prudent, informed, financial management is a major control 
on farmer's sliding into difficulties and the more we 
understand about what is going on the better We will be able 
to help in this respect. 
With this in mind the Bank recently undertook an analysis of 
data on farm trading and capital structures of sheep and 
dairy farmers before and after the 1984 restructuring of 
agriculture. This has allowed us to draw some interesting 
conclusions about how these sectors reacted to the change. 
One significant factor was the change in productive value as 
measured by the capital turnover ratio between 1981 and 
(1) 
1987. This ratio measures gross income as a proportion of 
total capital employed and is shown below: 
Capital Turnover 
Debt: Total Assets 
Debt Gross Income 
Performance Indicators 
Dairying 
1981-82 1982-83 
13.7 16.1 
18.8 20.7 
1.42 1.52 
Interest: Gross Income 13.7 16.1 
Capital Turnover 
Debt: Total Assets 
Debt Gross Income 
Performance Indicators 
Sheep 
1981-82 1983-84 
11.5 12.2 
16.6 19.6 
1. 44 1.6 
Interest: Gross Income 13.33 16.5 
1985-86 
18.6 
28.65 
1.59 
18.6 
1986-87 
19.5 
27.5 
1.55 
20.3 
Dairying in 1981/82 had a ratio of 13.7% while in 1985/86 it 
was 18.6%. Sheep farming in 1981/82 was 11.5% and in 
1986/87 19.5%. However, with renewed confidence in 
dairying, in particular, this trend has been arrested by 
farmers bidding up the price of farm and stock assets. 
Dairy land prices, for instance, have risen recently from 
around $15 per kilogram of milk fat to around $20 per 
kilogram. 
In sheepfarming, while there have been only slight signs of 
income improvement, sheep farm prices are also showing a 
response. 
As a banker I view with some concern the erosion of the 
productive value of the asset, particularly if lenders are 
tempted to lend against these asset values rather than the 
cash flow of the business. Farmers seems have a great 
propensity to trade away benefits from improving returns and 
( 2) 
drive down the rate of return on assets to a level not 
accepted by other businesses. 
Recent experience should tell them that there are serious 
consequences when this is done, especially when you consider 
the amount of debt required to service those assets. Up to 
1985-86 we found debt relative to total assets increased, 
reflecting both declining asset value and a real increase in 
debt - but farmers are not reducing indebtedness and asset 
values are stabilising or improving. 
From our business experience this year we know that 20 per 
cent of the Bank's total repayments have come from surplus 
cash rather than the sale of land. This suggests a strong 
desire to reduce debt before other spending. 
From studying 1983-84 figures you find sheepfarmers' net 
term debt increased by $142 million whereas in 1986-87 net 
farm debt increased by $55 million. This trend is likely to 
continue. We know dairy debt reached a peak in 1984-85 and 
showed a subsequent decline but all indications are that it 
is now increasing again on the back of increased earnings 
and asset values. It appears that better times bring a 
willingness to spend across the board. 
It is interesting to note, however, that even though there 
have been large fluctuations in asset values and farm 
profits, the average debt of both sheep and dairy farmers 
has maintained a relatively constant ratio of about 1.5 
times gross income. 
Interest payments have absorbed an increasingly proportion 
of farm income and is particularly a function of increasing 
interest rates and in the early years of this decade, 
increased indebtedness. 
With that debt being cited as a major problem for farmers 
during the restructuring phase it is easy to lose sight of 
the fact that the average equity of sheep and dairy farmers 
is still more than 70 per cent of total assets. The debt 
problem is more particularly one of distribution of that 
farm debt. Both Rural Bank and other surveys show 
approximately 70 per cent of total farm debt is in the hands 
of 30 per cent of the farmers. For many of these farmers 
debt is an insurmountable problem. 
One of the tests the Rural Bank applies in assessing future 
prospects of an over-indebted farmer is to determine the 
interest rate at which he could service his indebtedness. 
It is not common in many of the more difficult cases to find 
that the situation requires an interest rate of 5% or less 
to achieve viability. 
Even with interest 
anything like 5 per 
for either the Bank 
rates 
cent. 
or the 
coming down we cannot foresee 
It therefore serves no purpose 
farmer to persevere and it is 
( 3) 
these cases on which Bank is focussing to achieve a 
dignified and controlled exit from the industry. 
An erroneous impression of 
Bank has been given by 
confidential bank business 
This has spawned a rash of 
published being: 
a wholesale farm sell-up by the 
those who have misinterpreted 
documents for their own ends. 
emotive reactions; some of those 
** D Day is coming for farmers. 
** There will be hundreds of foreclosures. 
** 500 farmers are going to be kneecapped by the Bank 
which is lighting fires under them. 
** Land values will crash as the market won't cope with 
the sales. 
** The Bank is callous and has not taken enough care or 
attention in its selling up of farms. 
Like any financial institution the Bank operates a policy of 
prudent management of its portfolio and will continue to do 
so. We have been functioning under the same policy 
regarding arrears for at least two or three years and the 
500 figure quoted has also been around for a similar time. 
Since March of last year our arrears management has meant 
dealing specifically with 280 severe arrears cases where the 
borrower has no prospects under any forseeable income or 
interest rate scenario. These cases can be broken down 
into: 
25 mortgagee sales; 
46 voluntary sales assisted by our $20,000 exit grant; 
86 voluntary sales by clients and without the grant; 
12 cases where the bank was a creditor but mortgagee 
sales were brought by other institutions; 
28 cases wher~ the client repaid the debt in full; 
83 cases where contracts have been completed, or we are 
awaiting settlement or final accounting. 
The degree of financial difficulty faced by the worst one 
percent of clients can be demonstrated by the fact they 
account for one-third of our dollars in arrears. 
With the way we handle cases we definitely cannot be accused 
of taking precipitous action when you consider that 72 per 
cent of cases currently in hand have been under negotiation 
between the Bank and the borrower for three to six months -
or more. 
As prudent Bankers we are certainly working to improve our 
arrears situation but not in the calamitous D Day manner 
indicated by fearmongers who are only aggravating stress for 
some farmers. We expect the rate of exits, and also the 
circumspect way we handle them, to be maintained. And I'd 
like to see proof of any drop in land values because of our 
(4 ) 
action. We have had support from a number of quarters for 
what we are doing. The Christchurch Press, in an editorial 
reprinted by some North Island papers, said "a sound 
business does not send 'good money after bad. The Rural Bank 
like any other business must be expected to cry enough when 
its debtors fall months behind in mortgage repayments and 
there is scant chance of recovering the Bank's investment." 
Hawke's Bay Federated Farmers' have said that the Rural 
Bank's action in handling insolvent clients makes a lot of 
sense and it has acted in a humane and professional way. 
Then we have Federated Farmers' National President Brian 
Chamberlin pointing out that it is no secret that a number 
of farmers have been in trouble for a long time and some 
people do not want to sell. In commenting on the Bank's 
exiting farmers, he said recently "the Rural Bank has a very 
real responsibility to deal with this in the fastest way 
possible." 
So you can see that, far from 
some of our detractors, we 
recognised within the sector 
untoward. FQrget that 500 
numbers are hard to define. 
realising the worst claims of 
have a programme which is 
as being realistic but not 
figure future foreclosure 
A continually changing sector environment subject to many 
different influences, such as strong dairy prices or the 
East Coast drought, means we have a constantly changing farm 
debt picture and that the action we take will be related to 
reigning circumstances. 
Whatever opinion you have formed of the Bank's 
can assure you our lending portfolio is 
collateralised with an estimated 67% of the 
secured by first mortgage over freehold or 
renewable lease land. 
position I 
very well 
portfolio 
Government 
When the" sector debt situation is taken into consideration 
many people conveniently over look the fact that there are 
many other financial institutions whose exposure is far more 
precarious than that of the Rural Bank. 
Coming back to our analysis, we have found that farmers have 
significantly increased the proportion of their assets which 
are invested off-farm. In 1981-82, on-farm assets comprised 
97% of the sheep farmer's total assets, but by 1987 this 
figure had dropped to 91%. 
While farmers are now dealing with their farm management by 
running things as lean as possible they are also less 
willing to be tied into just one area of investment and are 
looking to spread their exposure. 
The removal of tax deductibility for farm development has 
also had an effect and investment decisions are made free of 
the distortions of tax policy. 
(5) 
The Rural bank supports any strategy for farmers to create 
off-farm assets as it strengthens their resilience and their 
ability to cope with adversities such as droughts and market 
price fluctuati6ns. 
While interest absorbed a similar proportion of gross income 
on both dairy and sheep farms each sector adopted different 
strategies in dealing with the increasing interest bill. 
Dairy farmers maintained the proportion of gross income used 
to meet farm operating costs and tightened their own belts. 
Sheep farmers, on the other hand, reduced cash farm 
expenditure from 57% to 51% of gross income and diverted 
that income to meet interest. 
In looking at the reorganisation of the Primary Sector and 
the reorganisation of the Rural Bank over the last 18 months 
I can see parallels. Both were in need of reorganisation -
which was at some pain to both, too. 
The sector had been cosseted by Government policies such as 
concessional lending while the Bank was still going along as 
a Government Corporation in spite of direction to change. 
Both have been subjected to influences from outside their 
control, forced to change and have readjusted. 
Adjustment in the Primary Sector industry has impacted 
directly on the Bank. Where in the past we dictated the 
rural banking scene to some extent, we are now customer 
driven - as sector producers must be. 
It is a commercial reality that our business is servicing 
customer needs. It seemed inappropriate to me when I joined. 
the Bank that we had customers not knowing their rural 
banker and more importantly a rural banker not knowing his 
customers. Customers' needs reflect what has happened in 
the sector and where it is going and are now dictating how 
the Bank operated. Take farmers' financial management, for 
instance. As mentioned, they are looking at minimising 
interest rate charges, running lower cost operations and a 
minimum of maintenance. Tighter management practices are 
being implemented to ensure a reasonable living while 
servicing debt. This calls for carefully planned financial 
control. 
The Bank, in turn, has to provide financial services which 
fit into this environment. It can now provide a variety of 
flexible financial packages which include interest only and 
residual value loans, a credit line facility including 
seasonal finance and variable repayment options. 
In talking about getting messages out to the community I 
must say seasonal finance was a message directed at the Bank 
for sometime before it was heeded and made available. It is 
these messages from the sector that we have to - and will -
heed. There has to be dialogue between the Bank and the 
sector if we are to be responsive to trends and concerns. 
( 6) 
How well we all do in future in the new environment depends 
on out ability to recognise and respond to market forces. 
Interest rates are a current concern. I can say the Rural 
Bank has· done its bit, reducing our base rates from 18% in 
March 1988 to the current 15.75% (July, 1998). 
When the Reserve Bank Governor says that in the last two 
years interest rates have dropped by 7 percent it appears 
that criticism of interest rates is not so much about them 
coming down but the speed at which they decrease. 
You know better than I do interest rate determination 
involves consideration of a complex interaction of factors 
influenced by both Government, private sector, and 
international economic activity. We can't ignore the fact 
that Banks operate in a competitive environment and have a 
responsibility to show returns for their shareholders. We 
have to balance this fact of banking life against our 
customer needs. We have to differentiate our customers, to 
reflect their performances, financial status and ability in 
the interest rate charged. 
In the past, primary sector producers were insulated against 
this risk-based assessment by sector subsidies. 
There are good and bad farming areas, good and bad 
producers, good and bad products. For us, there is good and 
bad business. This dictates how we approach our lending and 
interest rate setting. It is no secret that interest rate 
policies must inevitably reward low risk clients. All banks 
operate on this basis. 
The reorganising of the Rural Bank has taken this into 
consideration. There has been much restructuring and 
planning but not at the expense of the Bank relinquishing 
its place as the major financier of the Primary Sector. 
There have already been benefits from the reorganisation as 
our recently announced six monthly financial statements 
show. 
Rural Bank - Half Yearly Financial Position 
Audited Profit after Tax to Sept 30, 1988 
(First commercial return for Bank in 15 Years) 
Government Loans Repayment 
Payment of dividends, interest and taxation 
to Government 
$51.087 m 
$ 200 m 
$ 228 m 
In addition, the Bank eliminated all taxpayer subsidies 
from Government 
(7) 
The restructuring of the Bank's balance sheet produced the 
first commercial return for the Bank in 15 years. In 
addition, we can point to eliminating any taxpayer subsidies 
to the Bank, repaying $200 million in Government loans, and 
paying Government $228 million by way of dividends, 
interest, and taxation during the last 12 months. 
The Bank will maintain a strong business relationship with 
all Primary sector industries and we see ourselves as a 
successful business supporting successful business. Being a 
business success though, is not helped by public disclosure 
of confidential and sensitive business documents. 
We have had the Opposition spokesman on agriculture, 
John Falloon, saying it is his "duty" to release 
commercially sensitive business information about the Bank. 
I am equally adamant that I have a duty to ensure the 
confidentiality of such information if the Bank is to 
operate successfully in a very competitive banking 
environment. 
We are aware, even now, of potential clients being put off 
approaching the Bank through uncertainty caused by Bank sale 
process controversy. And I have support for the 
confidentiality of the Bank's business from the conservative 
NZ Herald. Commenting on the Leader of the Opposition 
indicating that he would want to "open the books" on the 
Rural Bank the Herald said: "If the Bank is to be sold, "he 
will have to keep the cover closed on commercially sensitive 
information." 
Government has agreed the Bank is to be sold as a going 
concern and the sale process is underway now with Government 
and its advisors meeting prospective purchasers. There has 
been comment about the value of the Bank but the cold hard 
fact is that buyers will determine what it is really worth. 
Farmers have signalled strong interest in the future of the 
Bank and just how they view the need for a bank geared to 
their sector is summed up by the Chairman of the Southland 
Rural Bank Mortgagors Association. He said: "Farmers would 
prefer to purchase the Bank themselves but, if they fail, 
can live with any commercially based entity subjected to the 
market economy and an organisation formed to protect their 
interests." Looking to the future I would draw your 
attention to where goes the Rural sector, so goes New 
Zealand. You can't differentiate between the two. 
Cows earn more for the country than Fletchers and Brierleys 
combined - that's a fact. I make no excuse for stressing -
even to you the converted the importance of the Primary 
Sector and fully support recent calls for widespread 
positive promotion of the Primary Sector. Historically, 
rising commodity prices boost farm incomes and the resulting 
increased spending brings revival in overall business 
confidence. 
( 8 ) 
We have evidence of this in the fact that regional economies 
currently are actually looking stronger than those of many 
cities. That's due to the agricultural upturn as result of 
the world commodity boom prices and the lower exchange rate. 
We all have a mission to keep the sector moving forward and 
take advantage of any export opportunities. The sector is 
still going through change. Adjustments in meat and 
kiwifruit marketing, deregulation of the wheat industry, and 
waterfront reform are factors which will impact on our 
export potential. 
The new markets opening up are also capturing the attention 
of other international sellers and we face challenges in 
being able to meet consumer needs with competitive quality, 
price and delivery standards. 
Internally; we have to take into consideration energy 
pricing and also ensuring that there is an adequate labour 
force to cater for increased production demand. 
We still have problem areas with production and maintenance 
figures being down and affecting our export capabilities in 
a way which cannot be compensated for by other industries. 
The Bank is confident we can face up to these challenges and 
I am optimistic that the sector has the capacity to adjust 
and continue to lead the way in the country's economic 
recovery. 
In summing up, I would say the Rural Bank is determined to 
maintain its proud record of service to rural business -and 
also listening to what it wants. It is essential that the 
Rural Bank asks customers what they think of it. We intend 
being a customer-driven organisation with the purpose of 
enhancing the success of Primary Sector business. We are 
concerned that the sector's real growth, which is vital to 
New Zealand's economic well being, is sustained and that 
people outside the industry recognise and appreciate this 
factor. The Rural Bank is now well positioned to fully 
participate as the leading financier in the Primary Sector 
and will be a major participant in the sector's contribution 
to the future prosperity of New Zealand. 
(9 ) 

MEETING PEOPLES NEEDS 
Jock McKenzie 
National Co-ordinator 
NEW ZEALAND RURAL TRUST 
Background Comment 
Agricultural production incentives in the 1970s were accompanied by the development of 
confidence levels in the rural community, which resulted in a range of investment decisions, on 
and off-farm, which are now perceived to have been imprudent. 
Many farming families stepped away from their normally conservative positions and 
mortgaged their high equity farms to buy more land for family or semi-retirement; others 
invested in urban enterprises; some of them went off-shore for funds; many, in their 
expectation of continued buoyancy, but caught short when seasonal fmance was due, simply 
refmanced in the knowledge that the increasing value of their land easily covered their 
increasing hard-core debt. 
The.prevailing sense of security and indeed the clear opportunities for gain, resulted in an 
escalation of land values which went far beyond productive value, and which contained a 
component which recognised the expectation of capital gain. 
Concurrent with this capital expansion on many established farms was the influx, at high 
cost, of farmers and orchardists, prepared to go into traditional or new ventures with minimal 
equity. 
The Development of Needs in the Rural Community 
The loss of tax breaks, increase in the cost of money, and fall in prices, created 
unprecedented problems. With the rapid fall in land values, equity fell and exposure of 
creditors increased significantly. 
The Meat and Wool Board's Economic Service calculated that in June 1988,35% of 
sheep and beef farms had an equity level of less than 50%. About this time, the Rural Bank 
said it had 15,000 clients whose level of debt to all creditors exceeded 50% of the value of their 
assets. An estimate widely publicised at this time was that up to 2,500 farmers were either 
1 1 
insolvent or had levels of debt, and constrained income which made their viability 
questionable. 
Alarm and despondency created pressure on all sections of the community, and 
responsible groups began to mobilise activities which might be able to deal with a whole range 
of new problems confronting farming families. Naturally, the focus of much farmer comment 
was the Federated Farmers organisation, many senior local officers of which spent long hours 
in endeavouring to assist individuals with problems. 
It became clear that there was not any structure available that did not stand in danger of 
being perceived as acting from a base of politics, commerce or seasonal interest, and therefore 
at risk of being damned for prejudice. Discussions between Government, Department of 
Social Welfare, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, financiers and Federated Farmers 
determined that a public/private sector initiative be mounted, following the Government's 
statement that while it recognised the commercial realities and sensitivities, it did not intend to 
construct a package of assistance measures, and did not contemplate intervention of any sort. 
Formation of the Trust 
So, the New Zealand Rural Trust was born of the courage and enterprise of concerned 
individuals, with the desire to be independent, available at no cost, apolitical, compassionate 
and pragmatic. 
$1.5 million was raised from the public and private sectors, three Trustees including Sir 
Peter Elworthy as Chairman were chosen, and in the last week of September 1988, the Prime 
Minister launched the Trust, announcing the appointment of a national co-ordinator who was 
charged with putting together a network of personnel to carry out the Trustees' policies for the 
one year life of the Trust. 
A search began for regional co-ordinators throughout New Zealand. These individuals 
were required to draw together and effectively deploy all local resources to facilitate the 
rehabilitation and restructuring of rural families faced with problems. 
The Rural Trust made it clear that while its aims were to enable a co-ordinated approach 
to debt management, social and counselling services, it would not try to change the prevailing 
economic climate; would not make any funds available to solve on-farm problems; and would 
not coerce parties into acceptance of any particular option. 
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The fmite life of the Trust required that the network of co-ordinators be found quickly, 
particularly as the approach of the summer holidays would restrict access to agencies 
significantly. Quick visits to all provinces were made to identify existing structures and try to 
assess these. Advertisements were run nationally, and short lists drawn up as soon as 
sufficient quality applicants were perceived to be available at each point 
In 7 weeks, after more than 200 applicants had been screened, and more than 70 
interviewed and checked out, 18 co-ordinators had begun their work, with little more guidance 
than to make contact with all creditors, agencies and community groups in order to come to an 
understanding of the local problems; to identify individuals with problems; and to begin to 
build a case load. 
Not in all areas, however, did Trust co-ordinators have to make such a cold start. In two 
of the 18 regions, for example, co-ordinators were appointed who were already involved 
through Federated Farmers, in almost identical work. They simply carried on, with a 
redirection of management control, and a more assured income. In other areas, the co-
ordinators were able to pick up cases already being handled by local Federated Farmers 
leaders. 
In the following 2 weeks, an induction/training course has been run in each Island, so 
that by the beginning of December, 18 co-ordinators had begin serious discussion and 
counselling with farming families reached from major towns from Kerikeri to Invercargill. 
In mid-February, by which time all co-ordinators had some specific field experience, a . 
national training course was held when role playing of interviewing and discussion of 
experiences played a big part in consolidating the confidence of the co-ordinators. Opportunity 
was also taken, at this time, to redirect those who needed it. 
Trust Co-ordinators 
The co-ordinators come from a range of backgrounds. Half were farmers. Although 
such a high proportion was not planned, or even desired, the successful applicants were those 
who seemed best suited to each position, taking into account their current support/counselling 
role in their regions. Other backgrounds include several senior local management people from 
agencies such as MAP, Rural Bank and farm management consultancy. Most co-ordinators 
are over 40 years of age, and all have had considerable experience in community affairs and/or 
interviewing experience in their work. 
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Field Work of the Trust 
At the time the Trust was being created, MAFfech were putting together a package of 
measures to infuse into the more than 5,000 farmers severely affected by the drought in the 
East Coast of the South Island, and it seemed sensible to utilise the new independent structure 
which intended to become seriously involved with problems of individual farming families. 
Four Trust co-ordinators in the South Island, and our kiwifruit specialist co-ordinator in 
Kerikeri, are involved in monitoring and approving facets of the Government's inputs. Other 
co-ordinators may later become involved, should further measures be introduced in the East 
Coast areas of the North Island. 
Trust and MAFfech personnel have worked very closely to develop realistic guidelines 
for several of the drought measures, including Farm Appraisals, Farm Management 
Consultancy, Further Consultancy, New Start Grants and the new 80% rehabilitation loan 
guarantee scheme. 
Seven Rural Trust co-ordinators work on a part-time basis - usually 2 days per week. Of 
the full-timers, clients number 20-odd, to more than 350 per person. Seventy~five per cent of 
the total 1,500 cases are handled by 5 co-ordinators, and about 80% of total cases of 11 full-
time co-ordinators are handled by those same 5 co-ordinators. Four of these 5 are the co-
ordinators employed in the South Island drought areas, where their efforts are greatly 
influenced by the drought effects, and the fifth is employed in the Bay of Plenty, where there 
has been a history of organised rural support, and where about two-thirds of his cases relate to 
kiwifruit farmers. 
The factors influencing levels of problems discovered by Trust field staff include: 
(a) Involvement with Government measures applied for adverse climatic events 
recovery programmes. 
(b) Dominance of farming sectors in a region, e.g., kiwifruit, dairying, fine wool. 
(c) Regional characteristics: 
(i) physical, e.g., relative assurance of dry matter production as in Waikato 
(ii) conceptual, e.g., relative independence of farming families as in Hawkes 
Bay. 
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(d) Historical reliance on corporate support structures, e.g., Southland, South 
Canterbury and more recently, as a result of regional consolidation after Cyclone 
Bola, Gisbome. 
There may also be many problems not found by Trust co-ordinators, due to their own 
deficiencies, or to some lack of understanding or acceptance of the role of the Trust, or to some 
lack of communication in the regions, hard to define or overcome. 
Finding clients in a situation in which the client is perceived to be the party who should 
make the approach is sometimes difficult. Most co-ordinators work with some sort of liaison 
group - usually one which had been active, or a modified or restructured version of local 
groups. These provide field intelligence and referrals. Also, co-ordinators have now gained 
access to, and in some cases, confidence of relevant agencies such as Government 
Departments (MAFTech, Department of Social Welfare, Inland Revenue Department); 
creditors (Stock Firms, Trading Banks, Rural Bank); churches; Federated Farmers and. 
Women's Division of Federated Farmers; professional people (lawyers, accountants); and 
individuals whose work experience and inclinations make them useful contacts. 
Many of these people, in their dealings with farming families with problems, suggest 
during discussion that an approach be made to the Rural Trust co-ordj.nator. Clearly, where 
the Trust co-ordinators are the clearing house for written applications for assistance, contact 
with clients is more direct. 
Range of Duties 
To achieve the objectives of the Trust, co-ordinators need to get into deep dialogue with 
clients then follow up by referring on to appropriate local resources, or by doing further 
research themselves. This may involve talking with creditors or legal advisers, or perhaps 
where the co-ordinator is experienced, in going over the books and doing cash flow budgets. 
Either by their own efforts or with professional assistance, co-ordinators develop a range 
of options which they discuss with the farming family, in order for that family to make a 
decision on which alternative they wish to pursue. If and when this decision is made, the co-
ordinator endeavours to assist and expedite the circumstances required to implement the 
decision. 
Some of our co-ordinators have found considerable need for counselling and assisting 
families to acknowledge their need for some basic assistance, for example, for Special Needs 
Grants. 
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Some have found clients in extreme stages of mental stress, and have had to display great 
sensitivity and strength of character to work their way through problems with serious potential 
danger. 
In one region, with a history of great corporate strength in the rural community, and 
• currently exposed to severe economic pressures exacerbated by drought, the Trust co-ordinator 
has developed, in association with the powerful liaison group, a strong unit servicing 25% of 
all farms in the region, with the expectation of going to 50% in the next couple of years. There 
is a strong widely-representative group from the community, which controls and financially 
supports a team of rural guides, whose efforts are co-ordinated by a community worker paid 
for by the New Zealand Rural Trust, and reporting to the local Trust co-ordinator. Also 
employed by the Trust in this region, and reporting to the local Trust person, is a specialist 
restructuring person, who deals with the hands-on really significant physical and financial 
adjustments which are taking place in some situations. This person has gained the trust of 
creditors, and has achieved significant financial concessions for many of his clients. The 
development through the Trust of this type of experienced person, with a high degree of skill 
in communication and negotiation, acting from an independent position without charge, and 
making steady progress with farmers whose positions would otherwise by ever-deteriorating, 
is worthy of further consideration by Government and regional authorities. 
Involvement with the drought package has been the most significant role of Trust co-
ordinators, and in view of your inclusion in your programme of a paper by Alan Walker of 
MAFfech Policy Services on the dr<mght package, it is suffice for me to say that the Trust's 
involvement is as a clearing house for several of the Government inputs. Trust activities for 
the New Start Grant include responding to preliminary approaches; receiving applications; 
giving conditional eligibility; receiving advice that required cO!lditions have been met; and 
approving payment by MAF of the Grant. Farm Farm Appraisals, Trust co-ordinators approve 
eligibility and authorise approval to begin; ensure appropriate levels of competence of 
consultants; ensure needs of farmers are met; certify that quality standards of reports are met; 
encourage the use of the report in farm decision-making; and authorise payment by MAF to 
the consultant. 
Other roles have come to Trust co-ordinators, by virtue of their unique status in their 
regions. For example, some funds which were made available to a small location which had 
sustained considerable damage in a freak stonn, were put under control of the Trust co-
ordinator in that region. Another example is that in which publicity has identified drought area 
co-ordinators as being involved with the Government inputs. Even though the Trust was not 
involved in the Adverse Events Family Income Support, paid for by MAF and administered 
through the Department of Social Welfare, except to hold application fonns, the association 
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between the Trust and MAP resulted in up to 60 phone enquiries per day being handled by 
each Trust office relating to the Government measure. 
Another role for the Trust has been that of providing field intelligence for the Trustees. 
There have been several innovative ideas of greater or lesser practicability, handed on from 
groups and individuals to Trust co-ordinators for their support. 
While the Trustees have remained independent and apolitical, there have been efforts 
made to ensure that some of these ideas have not died without some chance for proper 
consideration. 
Systems for Control 
Because of the finite life, an immediate decision was to get a structure established as 
quickly as possible, with minimal administration and bureaucracy. Federated Farmers handle 
the payment of salaries and expenses from their Wellington office. Co-ordinators work in a 
relatively autonomous way, reporting by hand-written fax each week to the National Co-
ordinator, who provides a supporting role by responding to specific pleas for assistance, and 
by providing relevant information from the Trustees and agencies, as it becomes available. 
The National Co-ordinator reports to Trustees each month, and is in frequent contact 
with the Chairman regarding policy matters, and general progress. Close contact is maintained 
with the Prime Minister's Department, and Trustees report in person to the Prime Minister 
three times during the year. 
A vailability of Information 
MAP and Lincoln College have separately approached the Trust to encourage the 
collection and possible use of the special information which is available to the Trust. The 
Trustees were unprepared to divulge information gathered on the basis that it would remain 
confidential to the Trust. The drought area co-ordinators were adamant that they were unable 
to disclose any part of the Farm Appraisals, as these had only been accepted by the farming 
community after specific undertakings had been given that no other person would see them. 
For future reference, it should be part of any initial planning that de-personalised 
information of potential value should be captured and disseminated to relevant organisations. 
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Future of the Trust 
Much criticism has been made of the fmite life of the Trust on the basis that it has proved 
itself of value, and that problems in the rural community will not be over in the short term. 
Because the funds allowed it, the Trustees have decided that the Rural Trust will continue 
beyond the end of September 1989, which was the original term, and will operate until 31 
December 1989. 
By defmition, the Trust will then terminate. As the statements regarding ongoing rural 
problems are true, and as the withdrawal from the Government inputs monitoring role must 
create difficulties for MAF, some discussions as to possible initiatives for the future have been 
held. No decisions have been reached, and no efforts to retain staff or plan for funding have 
been mounted. 
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By: 
CHARGE 
IN THE If. Z • MEAT PROCESSING INDUSTRY 
A UNION PERSPECTIVE. 
A Paper presented to the Australian Agricultural 
Bcono.ics Society, N.Z. Branch, 30 June 1989. 
Roger Middlemass 
PRESIDENT, 
H. Z. MEATWORKERS UNION 
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ATTITUDES TO CHANGE 
People and institutions have a natural resistance to 
change. We are comfortable with the familiar, doubtful 
and wary of the untried or the unknown. The pace of 
change is always too fast, the timetable too compressed, 
the response" yes - but not yet." 
This personal reluctance to change is not allowed to 
others, on whose behalf we are readily prepared to accept 
the necessity for change. Thus, motivators of change 
such as politicians, planners, researchers and even 
economists, tend to be well paid and comfortably 
insulated from the consequences of their proposals being 
enacted •. 
Unlike workers, who have learnt from bitter historical 
experience that change is seldom designed for their 
advantage, that any trickle-down of benefits will be 
purely coincidental, and that they will neither influence 
nor be involved in planning the changes. 
However, it is indisputable that radical changes 
throughout the meat industry as a whole are necessary, 
overdue and inevitable. What is disputed is the method 
of implementation. Whether the changes should be 
planned, managed and participatory on an industry wide 
basis, or be left to the survival instincts of company 
directors buffetted by the swirl of market forces. 
This paper favours the former. But before looking at 
specifics, we need to be aware of some broad trends 
~uring the next few decades which we cannot influence and 
which tend to be ignored in the flurry of the here and 
now. All have a bearing on the New Zealand meat 
industry. 
SUPRA FACTORS 
* Change is not finite, in the meat industry or any other 
sector of society. It will be continual, accelerating 
and exponential. 
* The present population of the world will double. 
Arising from which it is probable 
* The role of governments will continue to expand 
nationally and internationally. 
* European cultural influences will diminish. 
* National racial mixes will alter dramatically. 
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* Political divisions may develop according to 
policies on environmental and ecological issues -
Greens versus greenbacks. 
* The percentage of meat eaters will diminish, 
causing the entire international meat industry 
to be targeted at niche marketing for the 
comparatively wealthy. 
* Meat production may be judged a most inefficient method 
of converting sunlight into protein and protein as 
a most profligate sUbstitute for carbohydrate. 
* Climatic changes may have a significant effect 
on the meat industry, in New Zealand and else-
where. 
* The export of agricultural products is likely to 
remain the mainstay of New Zealand's economy. 
HISTORICAL CHANGE 
The Industry has a tradition of conservatism and 
therefore a resistance to change. This applies to 
all sectors - exporters, processors, farmers, workers and 
their unions. 
For almost 100 years from its inception in·1882, it was 
the mainstay of a colonial economy dependent on a single 
guaranteed market in Great Britain. New Zealand supplied 
bulk, unprocessed agricultural commodities; meat, wool 
and butter. In return sole access was guaranteed to 
British manufacturers against foreign or local 
competition along with acceptance of British control over 
shipping, finance, insurance, marketing and foreign 
policy. The rules were made in London and obeyed in 
Wellington. 
In 1973 the combined effects of Britain joining the 
European Economic community and the dramatic rise in the 
price of oil, changed those rules forever. New and 
nearer markets needed to be developed, none of which 
would be guaranteed, and few desirous of bulk, commodity 
trading. 
New Zealand became a seller in an internationally 
competitive buyers' market for food, with a change in 
emphasis from quantity to quality and from selling to 
marketing. However, the structure of the industry and 
the attitudes within it, have changed little. 
Employment remains seasonal and insecure. The work 
boringly repetitive with a high division of labour and 
consequential deskilling. Industrial relations are 
confrontational in the extreme, the approach macho, and 
negotiating expertise rUdimentary. Health and safety 
standards are low and job training perfunctory. 
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In essence the industry is failing to come to terms with 
its own metamorphosis from a bulk commodity trader to a 
high quality, high technology, sophisticated food 
processing and marketing organisation. The rest of this 
paper is a brief resume of key aspects of the industry 
where change is urgently needed, and some suggestions 
regarding those changes. 
OWNERSHIP 
Since the first World War the meat industry has been 
controlled by a few big companies, operating large plants 
on a mainly regional basis, with some smaller operators 
on the fringes. The role of farmers has been to service 
that industry, not vice versa. 
Right now, the industry is in a virtual state of 
paralysis as the current owners jockey for positions of 
individual advantage in the carve up' of the carcase, with 
overseas interests hovering on the sidelines, Government 
leading from the rear, and meatworkers waiting to be 
declared redundant. 
What is required is an agreed, planned and orderly 
rationalisation of ownership and of processing capacity. 
The industry does not n~ed companies whose only 
commitment is to the annual dividend, nor small under-
financed quick-buck operators. Large, regional, farmer 
owned co-operatives employing skilled management and 
marketing professionals and selling on a single desk 
basis is probably the best option, with some provision 
for already well established and stable exporters and 
small niche market specialists. 
Any orderly transition of ownership and reduction in 
plant capacity should be on an industry wide basis and 
involve all participants - companies, farmers, Government 
and workers. Hard decisions have to be made with far 
reaching consequences. None of the participants should 
shirk their responsibilities. 
The unions are prepared to accept that responsibility. 
But if restructuring is to be defined as workers merely 
doing what they are told, and reduction in capacity is to 
be on the brutal basis of the Whakatu closure, then the 
transition will be neither orderly nor peaceful. 
MANAGEMENT 
Management in the meat industry remains tied to "command 
and control" systems. Management structures tend to be 
hierarchic and stratified. Attitudes to industrial 
relations and to the workforce are either paternalistic 
or authoritarian and punitive, with workers treated 
either as school children or as military conscripts. The 
master/servant relationship is made obvious and the 
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"right of management" promoted as a self-evident truth. 
The ratio of supervisors to workers is high. 
There is a perhaps understandable desire on the part of 
owners of property and possessors of status, power and 
authority, to hold what they have. In our view this is a 
mistaken belief. The changing nature of production, new 
control technologies, the demand for high and uniform 
quality and rapid changes in market requirements, make 
such attitudes obsolete. . 
The demand now is for a workforce which is flexible, 
adaptable and above all responsible. This presumes an 
intelligent workforce, no longer prepared to be treated 
as an extension of the machinery, nor to unquestioningly 
obey orders from on high. 
WAGE AND BARGAINING STRUCTURES 
The meat companies are in the forefront of those 
employers demanding labour market deregulation. The term 
itself is merely an example of the euphemistic business 
jargon currently popular as a substitute for the English 
language. Translated it means the removal of all 
barriers to the exploitation of workers. The main 
objectives are as follows: 
+ The abolition of the national award. Thus 
removing any minimum standard of wages 
and conditions in the industry. 
+ Replacing it with stand-alone plant contracts, 
subcontracting, or even individual contracts of 
service. These would be negotiated locally 
by the workers, but nationally by the 
employers. 
+ voluntary unionism and union contestibility to 
divide workers, fragment their organisations 
and diminish their resources. 
+ Replacement of the Labour Court with Civil Courts 
to enable employers to sue unions and their 
members for damages. 
+ Flexible ordinary time hours of work, followed 
by the abolition of penal rates for all over-
time and the introduction of shift work on the 
same wages and conditions as day work. 
+ The introduction of part time and casual work and 
the ability to dismiss and rehire whole 
sections of the workforce on a week by week 
basis. 
+ The removal of workers' ability, or even right, 
to strike but not the employer's right to lock 
out or close plants. 
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+ Ultimately to dismantle all effective union 
organisation throughout the industry. 
A yearning, backward glance to the industry of 60 years 
ago and recipe for anarchy and conflict. 
strong industries require strong democratic and 
responsible workers organisations able to speak 
authoritively for the collective workforce and with the 
resources and knowledge to enable them to participate 
positively in the decision making processes at all 
levels. 
The national award needs to be rewritten to more 
adequately reflect minimum standards for the industry. 
It should not be replaced with local agreements, but 
complemented by them to provide necessary flexibility for 
local conditions and changing market requirements. The 
two should operate in tandem, for the same term, with the 
same expiry date, and with the same constraints on 
industrial action. Most local agreements need to be 
rewritten as comprehensive, unambiguous documents 
replacing some of the scraps of paper and verbal 
understandings which at present only encourage industrial 
amnesia. 
Similarly with wage structures. Wage rates are too 
numerous (half a dozen rates for the whole industry would 
suffice) and differentials are absurdly wide, with some 
workers earning three times as much as others. Piece 
rates remain the prevalent method of payment. A system 
geared solely to the high speed production of carcases 
and therefore antagonistic to the uniformly high 
standards of quality and hygiene demanded by the markets. 
An elevatd hourly rate of pay supplemented by a 
quantity/quality bonus system on a ratio of 80:20 would 
be much more in tune with modern requirements. 
PRODUCTIVITY 
Productivity no longer refers to a certain tonnage, 
churned out in a certain time, at a certain cost. It now 
means a unit cost and standard of quality acceptable to 
the market, with quality overtaking cost as the primary 
requisite. Red meat can never directly compete with 
white meats on a cost per kilo basis - let alone 
challenge rice or pasta. 
contrary to some ill-informed opinion, meat industry 
productivity is high and rising. For years now real 
wages have been falling, hygiene and quality standards 
rising, work speeds accelerating (dangerously so), 
staffing scales have been slashed, and technology 
introduced. 
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There has been little corresponding improvement in safety 
standards, working conditions, amenities, skills 
training, job security, career opportunities or 
industrial democracy. All of which have a bearing on 
productivity. 
Arduous, boring and dangerous work methods coupled with 
financial insecurity, over-bearing supervision, dogmatic 
management and blank futures, encourage confrontation, 
not commitment. If workers are treated like machines, 
they will contribute like machines. If treated as dogs, 
they will bite. And the industry will bear the cost. 
It need not be so. The Seafield works extended shift 
killing agreement with Fortex Group Ltd., is a pointer to 
the future. It has increased production immensely, 
simultaneously raised productivity, profitability and 
wages, slashed weekly working hours, substantially 
increased employment, improved job security and provided 
a significant degree of industrial democracy. 
That is not to suggest that shift work is a panacea for 
all the industry's problems, nor that the agreement with 
Fortex can be transposed in its entirety to other plants. 
In fact its main significance may not lie in the detail 
of the agreement but in how it was accomplished. 
+ It was proposed and drafted by union negotiators 
+ Negotiated by a nationally representative union 
team. 
+ with a company prepared to consider and finally 
accept radical proposals while ignoring the 
shibboleths of the industry and the barrage 
of warnings and threats from their reactionary 
rivals and many farmers. 
+ It was also preceded by industrial action taken by 
both parties - New Zealand and the world 
managed to survive the experience. 
Roger Middlemass 
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THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE - LESSON FOR NEW NEW ZEALAND 
33,000 farmers lost their farms, broken marriages, dislocated 
families, countless suicides and bankers shot. How could this 
have happened? 
"!"he United States Government recognising its accumulating 
deficit in 1980 took steps to remedy the problem. Reducing 
expenditure to control the deficit became the Regan 
administrations policy. Agriculture felt the impact immediately. 
Lending policies allowed 85% of the value of the land to be 
advanced on mortgage. As land values fell 30 - 50%) banks lost 
their securities and proceeded to foreclose on mortgages. Some 
banks collapsed others were taken over and a number decided to 
get out of agriculture. Staff did not have the skills to analyse 
the viability of farming operations and were ill equipped to 
handle stressful situations. Hard-line policies were implemented 
with some degree of panic. 
New Zealand's avoidance of a total collapse of agriculture should 
be credited to the foresight of the Cabinet of the day and Ray 
Chappell then General Manager of the Rural Bank who were aware 
that a similar pattern was developing in New Zealand implemented 
the Discounting Scheme. This provided forums where all creditors 
met with the farmer collectively sharing the responsibility of 
resolving the debt problems and allowing the farm to continue on 
a viable commercial basis. A finite time was given for decisions 
too which avoided months and years of additional debt and stress. 
, New Zealand used commercial objectives whereas in the U.S. legal 
and administrative means to buy time or achieve settlements. 
The United States Farm Credit Bill of 1987 has put into law set 
procedures to be administered before a foreclosure can take 
place. This has given considerable protection for the farming 
family. 
U.S. farmers have traditionally expected and had financial 
support from the Federal Government, $US 26 billion this year 
plus an additional $US 5 billion for the drought. Agriculture and 
research has been production driven. Cost of production has never 
been a deterrent but rather a basis for lobbying congress. 
Extensive use of elaborate machinery, fertilisers and chemicals 
adds to the cost of production. 
Farming organisations are very professional and effective in 
lobbying their case to Congress. There is a realisation now that 
Congress intends to reduce the farm bill funding. 
"!"he U.S. economy has the advantage of a broader base than New 
Zealand, it still has growth and they addressed their problems 
earlier. New Zealand by contrast has negative growth, a smaller 
economy and agriculture is the main exporter with 90-95% of its 
major commodities being marketed internationally. 
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There is no doubt subsidies distort production. U.S. farmers wait 
for the farm programmes before planning their season. Then as 
with any targeted programme they look to maximise returns from it 
e.g. the criteria of $US 50.000 per family is soon bypassed as 
brothers and sisters families take shares in the farm enterprise. 
In New Zealand S.M.P's created distortions as the lamb kill 
increased by 43% between 1979 - 1985. 
Surpluses of a number of products are the Federal Government's 
responsibility which then gets channelled into school. poverty or 
aid programmes. Aid to third world countries can depress their 
agricultural economy. 
A lot is made of the "family farm". but I have yet to find an 
appropriate definition of the "family farm". They vary in size 
from 40 cows to 10.000 in the dairy situation yet the ownership 
is family but the management in the larger operation is on the 
corporate structure. Protecting the family farm is a common 
objective of many organisations and is a major lobbying strength. 
The adjustments on U.S. farms since the downturn are positive. 
Borrowing is now averaging 50% of the value of the land. 
Cash flows are now a requirement for debt servicirig. It was an 
uncommon practice previously as banks were more concerned with 
their security than the ability to service the loan. 
Machinery sales are down. 
A good university education is considered essential for all 
members of the family. Children are encouraged to graduate in a 
variety of disciplines even though they intend to join the family 
business. 
Sustainable agriculture (LISA Low Input Sustainable Agriculture) 
is commonly talked about. With consumer resistance to chemical 
usage and residues in food as well as environmental concerns of 
pollution public opinion may force farmers to face the issue 
sooner rather than later. Mountain or spring water is sold in 
gallon jars in supermarkets such is the fear of contamination. 
High inputs have a high cost in dollar terms and lower inputs 
would not only be less harmful to the environment but could 
increase profitability. 
Research and extension work has continued. 
Bankrupted farms have been purchased by existing farmers. 
Corporate ownership is increasing. Some farmers have chosen to 
retire their land from production and use the property as a 
family retreat. 
The 1988 drought was the worst in living memory yet farmers and 
their families coped extremely well. 
')0 
Some 
freed 
trade. 
individuals and farming organisations would prefer to be 
of Government regulation and programmes and promote free 
The lesson for New Zealand relates more to the off farm situation 
where costs have not yet been rationalised and opportunities 
maximised. 
Banks have been a little slow in being flexible with their loans, 
terms and conditions. Farmers need to present themselves and 
their proposal well and acquire negotiating skills. Just recently 
one dairy farmer re-negotiated his loan saving $8,000 per annum 
in charges. 
Environmental concerns are real. Farmers have a responsibility to 
the nation not to pollute natural resources for future 
generations. Production increases in the U.S. have been at the 
expense of the environment. Whilst we do not have a serious 
problem it is important to be aware of and prevent pollution. 
Nutritional value of food is important to the health conscious. 
Identification of vitamins, minerals, fibre, cholesterol, fat and 
calories appeals to the discerning purchaser. "Fresh and natural" 
will have an increasing market. While New Zealand does have a 
clean green image we do have a marketing edge. 
Consumers preferences are paramount. New Zealand has been slow to 
develop products and packaging to a variety of cultures and 
tastes. 
Americans look after their home market exceptionally well. While 
three million people may be small in world terms we are selling 
to tastes we understand, little transport is required and 
products should be fresh. Lamb for example could be sold in cuts 
suitable for quick cooking for career families and sophisticated 
entertaining. Currently the chances are tourists will only see 
lamb in the paddock not on a plate. 
New Zealand no longer feeds the hungry but sells to those who can 
afford the luxury of choice. Our future is in the gourmet or 
niche markets. Americans really service their clients, promotions 
and incentives to retailers ensure prime shelf space. The 
retailing chains demand quality, quantity and a price advantage. 
Farmers may have to seriously consider owning, processing and 
marketing their products from paddock to the table. An example of 
this is the 'Monfort enterprise in Colorado st ill a "fami 1 y farm" 
which fattens 300,000 head of cattle per annum on one feedlot 
alone, then processes through their own abattoirs and markets 
internationally. 
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The labour market has yet to be deregulated. The U.S. has 17% of 
its workforce unionised, work attitudes are notably different. An 
excellent example of this is Continental Airlines who faced 
bankruptcy some years ago - the staff were made aware of the 
situation went non union - worked hard to bring the business 
back into profit and growth - they say "the only difference 
between us and our competition is service." 
Use of capital and resources must be rationalised to achieve 
efficiency and cost effectiveness. New Zealand freezing workers 
work an average of seven and a half hours a day, 126 days per 
annum (Garway report) - each Island has an over capacity of 30% 
(Garway report July 1988). The Makarewa works in Southland could 
kill all the Southland catchment in eight months on a double 
shift. 
Research needs to be coordinated and prioritised. The Land Grant 
Colleges have an effective extension service based in the rural 
communities, New Zealand would benefit from a similar network. 
Our industry has to accept as given the tariffs and barriers that 
exist, simply stating it is not fair does not sell product. we 
are too insignificant in world trade to threaten. Political 
lobbying to reduce barriers must continue but we must ensure we 
are efficient and effective in New Zealand and in the 
marketplace. We still expect our sports people to compete at 
world level in spite of full funding and training support in the 
Communist block - agriculture is no different. 
There is a future for New Zealand agriculture but it will not 
eventuate if we do not make it happen. Everyone from the farm 
Cadet to the researcher has a valuable role and it behoves us all 
to maximise our strengths and resources. 
Margaret Millard 
PRESIDENT 
MANAWATU FEDERATED FARMERS 
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LESSONS TO BE GAINED FROM EXPERIENCES WITH FARM 
FINANCIAL STRESS IN NEW ZEALAND AND THE USA 
W.D. Dobson1 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Business 
Massey University 
Parallels exist between the "farm financial stress that existed 
in the US during the mid-1980's and the farm financial 
problems that have emerged in New Zealand. Although some farm 
financial stress remains in the U.S., the worst there appears 
to be over. Painful and costly lessons learned by u.s. 
farmers, farm lenders and government officials about credit 
management during the mid-1980's may be worth noting by those 
concerned about farm financial adjustments in New Zealand. 
This paper describes (a) the origins and similarities of farm 
financial problems in New Zealand and the U.S., (b) the 
problems experienced by u.s. farm lenders -- especially the 
cooperatively-owned Farm Credit System (FCS), during the mid-
1980's, and (c) mutually beneficial lessons that might be 
drawn from experiences of agricultural lenders in the two 
countries. 
Similarities of Farm Credit Problems 
Farming in New Zealand obviously differs from that of the u.S. 
in numerous ways including those relating to capital intensity 
of operations, degree of dependence on exports, nature of 
livestock enterprises, availability of off-farm employment, 
and the nature of government involvement in the sector. 
1 
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the New Zealand 
Branch of the Australian Agricultural Economics Society on 30 
June 1989 at Flock House, Bulls, New Zealand. Helpful 
background information used for developing the paper was 
obtained from R.J. Townsley, University Professor, Massey 
University; and Mr John Lambert of Hunterville, New Zealand. 
While their help is acknowledged, they are in no way 
responsible for any errors or shortcomings in the paper. 
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Despite these differences, the recent financial problems of 
farmers in the two countries exhibit similar origins. In 
particular, some farmers in both countries borrowed too 
heavily against rising equity in farmland and failed to 
anticipate adequately the impact of changes in government 
policies. It is recognised, of course, that the impact of 
changes in government policies in both countries were 
difficult for farmers to predict and factor into management 
plans in an optimal fashion. 
In New Zealand, the average nominal sale price of land 
increased by 240 per cent between 1976 and 1982 while incomes 
generated by the land inclusive of Supplementary Minimum 
Prices rose only 25 per cent (Pryde, p.6-10). Expectations 
regarding continued income support, double digit inflation 
during parts of the 1970s and early 1980s, negative real 
interest rates during 1971-72 to 1981-82 and rising land 
prices caused New Zealand farmers to borrow heavily against 
their rising equity. The removal of support structures, 
slower rates of de-regulation in parts of the nonfarm sector 
than in the farm sector, the rise in the New Zealand dollar 
relative to the currencies of some major overseas markets, the 
fall in farm incomes, and sUbstantial increases in real 
interest rates have left some New Zealand farmers who had 
purchased land and other production items in the 1970s and 
1980s with heavy and, in some cases, unmanageable debt 
burdens. 
There is no evidence, of course, that the New Zealand farming 
sector as a whole is at risk. Moreover, the near boom times 
being experienced by dairy farmers will help them carry debt 
loads successfully. However, as MAF Corp analysts point out, 
various farm groups in New Zealand are at risk. For example, 
in 1983-84, only 6 per cent of sheep and beef farms had less 
than 50 per cent equity, but by 1985-86 this proportion had 
risen to 24 per cent with 5 per cent of all farms (1,100 
farms) having zero or negative equity. On the 24 per cent of 
farms with less than 50 per cent equity, 41 per cent of gross 
income was going to debt servicing (MAF Corp., 1988, p.54). 
Farm debt servicing levels in excess of 25 per cent of gross 
32 
income are regarded by many lenders as indicating financial 
vulnerability. 
Figures released in May 1989 in connection with the planned 
sale of the Rural Bank show that about 16 per cent of the 
Bank's loans were in arrears on 31 March 1989 (New Zealand 
Farmer). The comparable figure on loans in arrears during 
1982-83 through 1984-85 was about 5 per cent (Rural Banking 
and Finance Corporation). On 31 March 1989, about 3800 
farmers were in what was characterised as a "foreclosure 
situation" by the New Zealand Farmer, being over 90"days in 
arrears or paying more than 60 per cent of gross income in 
debt financing (New Zealand Farmer). 
The percentage of farmers in arrears on Rural Bank loans in 
March 1989 exceeded the peak percentages recorded in a u.s. 
survey of Indiana farmers made during the depth of the u.s. 
farm recession in 1986. About 14 per cent and 9 per cent of 
Indiana farmers were in arrears on nonreal estate and real 
estate loans, respectively, during 1986 (Barnard, Dobson and 
Falck, p.4). 
How much more will farm financial conditions in New Zealand 
deteriorate? For reasons discussed later, it will be 
important for agricultural lenders and others to have the best 
available information regarding this key question. 
In the U.S., nominal average prices of farmland tripled from 
1973-82, fueled by strong grain and soybean exports, negative 
real interest rates offered by commercial lenders during the 
late 1970s, subsidised credit offered to farmers by the lender 
of last resort -- the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), 
larger than normal farm programme payments for dairy products 
and a few other commodities, and the belief that farmland 
represented an excellent inflation hedge. These were heady 
times for farmers in the U.S; the farm press carried many 
accounts of the new millionaires that had been created in 
farming communities by the land boom. 
As in New Zealand, many u.s. farmers borrowed heavily against 
their farm equity during the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Farmers' borrowing decisions were based partly on the 
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expectation that strong farm exports would continue and that 
officials of the u.s. Federal Reserve Bank would fail in their 
efforts to curb inflation in the u.s. They were proven wrong 
on both counts. u.s. farm exports fell 40 per cent in dollar 
terms from the 1981 peak to 1986. Moreover, the u.s. Federal 
Reserve's generally tight monetary policies -- which during 
1981-82 gave the u.s. its most severe post-world War II 
recession -- brought inflation down from the double-digit 
rates of the late 1970s to 3 to 5 per cent during much of the 
1983-88 period. Foreshadowing events that were to unfold 
later in New Zealand, the generally tight money policies that 
curbed inflation in the u.s. pushed real interest rates into 
the 4 to 8 percent range during the mid-1980s and pushed up 
the value of the u.s. dollar during 1981-85. 
For some U.S. farmers, the higher real interest rates plus 
heavy, undercollateralised debt loads spelled financial 
trouble. Harrington employed the debt-asset ratios (and 
corresponding debt-equity ratios) shown below to classify u.s. 
farmers according to the amount of financial stress they 
faced. 
Debt-Asset 
Ratio 
Under 40% 
40% - 70% 
70% - 100% 
Over 100% 
Debt-Equity 
Ratio 
status of Farmer 
o to .667 No apparent financial problems 
.667 to 2.33 Serious financial problems 
2.33 to ~ Extreme financial problems 
Minus values Technically insolvent 
Using this categorisation scheme, he concluded that about 
one-third of u.s. farmers faced serious or extreme 
financial problems or technical insolvency in 1985 
(Harrington). In this same year, about 10 per cent of the 
u.s. farmers were so highly leveraged that they had little 
chance of survival (Lee). 
Program~ed to rise when farm commodity prices fell, 
certain u.s. farm price support programme payments 
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increased during the mid-1980s, rising to a record $26 
billion in 1986. However, unlike conventional 
stabilisation payments, these payments were not targeted 
to help the needy. Instead, the payments simply went 
mainly to grain, soybean, cotton and dairy farmers in 
proportion to their sales. Hence, some large farmers who 
were in good financial condition received large price 
support payments (limits on payments per producer often 
can be legally circumvented in the U.S.). Moreover, since 
no price support programmes exist for U.S. producers of 
cattle, hogs and poultry, producers of these products 
received none of the payments. It is now widely 
acknowledged that raising price support payments 
represents an inefficient way to reduce farm financial 
stress; such blunderbuss approaches seem unworthy of 
emulation. 
U.S. farmers made numerous adjustments to deal with their 
financial problems. Major adjustments, ranked in 
approximate order in terms of frequency of mention by many 
farmers, included the following: 
* Reducing debt (when repayment ability existed). 
* Increasing off-farm work. 
* Reducing farm machinery purchases. 
* Developing and using more complete financial and other 
farm business records. 
* Engaging in other general "belt tightening". 
The "belt tightening" included reducing family living 
expenses, reducing rental payments for farmland, and 
reducing expenditures for fertiliser. Average yearly use 
of fertiliser by U.S. farmers was 13 per cent lower in 
1985-88 than in 1979-84 (US Department of Agriculture, p. 
10). This is smaller than the 35 per cent reduction in 
fertiliser use which was recorded in New Zealand during 
1979-84 to 1985-88 (MAF Corp., 1989, p.82). The smaller 
reduction in use of fertiliser in the u.S. probably 
reflects many factors, including the large yield payoff 
associated with maintaining the amount of nitrogen used in 
maize production. 
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Farm machinery manufacturers and dealers suffered losses 
during the 1980s as a result ot the u.s. farm recession. 
Sales of items such as tractors and combines dropped to a 
small fraction of 1979 levels by the mid-1980s in the u.S. 
Several machinery manufacturers -- e.g. International 
Harvester, Case and Allis Chalmers -- merged and/or 
diversified their product lines during the 1980s in an 
effort to regain profitability. To some extent, the 
decline in farm machinery sales during the 1980s was a 
world-wide phenomenon which was also apparent in New 
Zealand. For example, New Zealand tractor sales fell by 
66 per cent from 3470 in 1985 to 1185 in 1988, forcing 
consolidation and reorganisation of dealerships (Hassall, 
p.1). 
As a result of increased farm price support payments, 
government drought relief payments made to u.S. farmers in 
1988-89, adjustments made by farmers, the restructuring of 
farm debt which is discussed later, partial recovery of 
u.s. farm exports, and other developments, the worst of 
the farm recession appears to be over in the u.s. 
According to Eric Thor, President and CEO of the Farm 
Credit System Assistance Board, only 8 to 11 per cent of 
U.S. farmers remain financially vulnerable (Thor, p.4). 
An Indiana survey showed that the percentage of Indiana 
farmers in arrears on farm real estate and nonreal estate 
loans had dropped to about 6 per cent in 1988 (Barnard, 
Dobson and Falck, p.4). Moreover, about half of Indiana 
farmers who had loans made principal payments in addition 
to scheduled payments in 1987. 
Problems of u.s. Farm Lenders 
Some of the most pervasive and dramatic impacts of the 
u.s. farm recession fell on farm credit suppliers. u.S. 
suppliers of farm credit include banks, insurance 
companies, the FmHA (government lender of last resort), 
the Commodity Credit Corporation (an arm of the u.S. farm 
price support system), individuals, and the FCS. The 
largest supplier of farm credit in the u.S. is the 
cooperatively-owned FCS. This organisation includes 
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Federal Land Banks which supply credit to farmers for land 
and capital purchases, Federal Intermediate Credit Banks 
which provide farmers with production credit -- e.g., for 
purchases of feed, seed and fertiliser -- and Banks for 
Cooperatives which provide seasonal and term loans for 
agricultural cooperatives. The FCS obtains funds for 
lending mainly through the sale of debentures in financial 
markets which are the joint obligation of all banks in the 
FCS, stock purchased by borrowers, surpluses and retained 
earnings. Although never owned by the U.S. government, 
the FCS received an infusion of capital from the 
government during the Great Depression of the 1930s. The 
FCS repaid these government loans during the next three 
decades and became a fully private organisation. In 
1985-86 and 1987, the FCS again sought financial help from 
the U.S. government, which was provided mainly in the form 
of a $4 billion line of assistance from the U.S. Treasury. 
Three FCS banks had received assistance as of March 1989 
(Thor, p.6). It appears that less than $4 billion of 
assistance will be required to help the ailing FCS units. 
The expectation is that the FCS will repay the government 
assistance funds during the next 15 years (perhaps sooner) 
and once again become a fully private lender. 
The impression should not be left that the U.s. government 
has simply written big cheques to financially troubled 
banks in the FCS. Indeed, the Federal Land Bank of 
Jackson, Mississippi has been allowed to fail. Rather the 
assistance has been delivered parsimoniously to bank 
officials who have developed suitable long-term plans for 
putting their organisations in sound financial shape. To 
date, much of the assistance money has been used by the 
recipient banks to retire high cost debt issued during the 
1980s to obtain funds to lend to farmers. Also, a 
secondary market for farm mortgages was created as part of 
the assistance package for the FCS. This measure will 
increase the number of suppliers of farm mortgage credit 
in the U.s. , provide increased competition for the FCS, 
and help to provide replacements for the FCS if it cannot 
survive with the assistance it has received. 
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)w did the FCS get itself into the situation where it 
.equired government help? On 31 December 1987, the FCS 
had about $49 billion in loans outstanding to u.S. farmers 
and agricultural cooperatives (Barnard and Dobson). About 
65 per cent of this $49 billion consisted of farmland 
mortgages. Reflecting problems connected with its 
farmland mortgages and numerous other problems, the FCS 
share of total agricultural credit supplied in the u.s. 
declined from about 33 per cent in 1984 to 27 per cent in 
1989 (Farm Credit System Assistance Board, p.22). 
However, -this 6 percentage point decline in market share 
understates the problems experienced by the FCS during the 
mid-1980s. 
The FCS recorded losses of $2.7 billion, $1.9 billion and 
approximately zero for 1985, 1986 and 1987, respectively, 
and required government assistance in 1986-87 and 1988 in 
order to remain in operation (Farm Credit System 
Assistance Board, p.2). (The government assistance for 
1986-87 was a less than fully effective attempt to make 
the profitable units of the FCS share reserves with 
unprofitable units. The $4 billion line of assistance was 
provided in 1988). The reasons for the losses incurred by 
the FCS are many and, in view of the severity of the u.s. 
farm recession, perhaps the most careful planning and 
shrewd management decisions could not have prevented 
losses. But, equipped with hindsight, one can conclude 
that FCS losses were higher than necessary because 
financial signals were misinterpreted, plans for dealing 
with adversity were inadequate and questionable management 
decisions were made, as noted below: 
* The FCS commissioned a major study (released in mid-
1984) which was carried out by business consultants, 
university professors, and FCS employees to assess the 
financial conditions which the System would face 
during 1985-1995. This Project 1995 study, which 
served as a guide to FCS planners, substantially 
underestimated the severity of the economic conditions 
that faced the system. In particular, the study 
forecasted continued expansion in the amount of credit 
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that would be demanded by u.s. farmers during 1985-95 
. rather than the sharp contraction that began in 1985. 
* Loans made by the FCS during the first half of the 
1980s carried interest rates based on the 
organisation's average cost of loan funds rather than 
the marginal cost of recently acquired loan funds. 
Funds acquired by the FCS from financial markets 
during the late 1970s for lending had a lower cost 
than those obtained in the early 1980s. Because the 
System based its interest rates on the average cost of 
loan funds, interest rates charged by the FCS on farm 
loans averaged about two percentage points lower than 
those of major competitors during 1980-85. The 
relatively low interest rates helped the FCS to 
increase its share of u.s. farm real estate mortgages 
by about eight percentage points during 1980-85. 
Higher rates reflecting the marginal. cost of loan 
funds would have cost the FCS market share. But these 
higher rates also would have discouraged some FCS 
borrowers from obtaining loan funds which they later 
could not repay and could have produced reserves more 
adequate to deal with the harsh economic conditions 
encountered by the FCS in the mid-1980s. 
* Prior to the mid-1980's, many FCS loan officers had no 
exposure to operating under conditions of widespread 
farm financial stress. Indeed, some had received 
incentives to expand lending without adequate regard 
for the management skills of the borrower or the 
earning power of the assets being financed. 
Inflation, it was reasoned, would cover most damage 
that might result from extending too much credit to a 
farmer. Accordingly, some FCS lending officers were 
ill-equipped for the conditions they encountered in 
the mid-1980s. 
* FCS officials underestimated the sensitivity of farm 
borrowers to interest rate differentials among 
lenders. Eric Thor described the situation as 
follows: "Many financial institutions must survive on 
50 to 75 basis point margins. customers today will 
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switch institutions for 100 basis points or less. The 
Farm Credit System lost over $35 billion in assets 
from 1984 to 1988 in large measure because many good 
farmers -- over 100,000 borrowers -- walked out. 
Price is important" (Thor, p.8). The problem 
described by Thor occurred partly because the System 
used average cost pricing for farm loans after the 
cost of loan funds to the FCS had become relatively 
high and because the FCS passed along to borrowers its 
relatively high operating costs. 
* The FCS was criticised during· the mid-1980s for 
failing to communicate adequately with borrowers about 
the reasons for rising interest rates, the need for 
merger of local lending offices, the value of stock 
purchased by borrowers in the FCS and the viability of 
the System itself. Many creditworthy farm borrowers 
who took their business elsewh.ere apparently did so 
because of concerns about communications, stock 
values, and the previously noted interest rate 
differentials. Better communications undoubtedly 
would have reduced the desertions. 
* During the farm recession of the 1980s the FCS found 
it diff icul t to reduce operating costs. Indeed, 
total operating costs for the System remained 
appropriately constant from 1984 to 1987 although the 
volume of loans handled by the System declined by over 
$20 billion during this period (Thor). As a result, 
operating costs as a percentage of gross loans 
outstanding rose from 0.8 per cent to 1.7 per cent 
during 1984 to 1987. This result is probably not 
surprising in view of the additional work involved in 
handling problem loans and the disruptive 
reorganisations of the System that occurred during 
this period. 
While FCS officials made some mistakes, they did not 
select less creditworthy borrowers than other u.S. 
agricultural lenders. For example, in January 1985, 59 
per cent of outstanding FCS loans were in the hands of 
farmers with debt-asset ratios exceeding 40 per cent 
(Guebert). In this some month, an identical 59 per cent 
of the outstanding farm loans of all u.s. commercial banks 
consisted of debts of farmers with debt-asset ratios 
exceeding 40 per cent (Guebert). As noted earlier, 
farmers with debt-asset ratios above 40 per cent may have 
serious financial problems, severe financial problems, or 
be technically insolvent. Since the percentage of farm 
loans in the hands of farmers with debt-asset ratios 
exceeding 40 per cent was equal for both groups, the 
comparison suggests that, as a group, Fes borrowers were 
neither more nor less creditworthy than farmers who 
borrowed from commercial banks. However, the FeS 
apparently experienced more financial problems, because 
its loan portfolio was heavily devoted to farm loans while 
commercial banks typically had more diversified 
portfolios. 
Lessons for Agricultural Lenders 
Obviously one must be cautious about drawing inferences 
for New Zealand from the u.s. experience with farm debt 
since the farming sectors and agricultural lending 
organisations differ in the two countries. However, the 
situations appear to be sufficiently similar that the 
Rural Bank and other agricultural lenders in New Zealand 
might consider the following points: 
* As shown by the experience of the FeS, it is dangerous 
for a lender to underestimate the negative impact of 
farm financial stress on the ability of farmers to 
repay debt. Thus, New Zealand lenders might benefit 
from incorporating a sophisticated warning system 
which includes, in addition to information on debt-
asset ratios (or debt-equity ratios), information on 
borrowers net cash incomes and the composition of 
debt. Maybe such a system is already in place. If 
so, good. Such an early warning system would have 
been valuable to u.s. lenders, both for spotting 
problem loans and for identifying borrowers whose 
financial condition was better than aggregated 
solvency indicators suggested. On the latter point, 
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u.s. experience suggests that some farmers who were 
technically insolvent had positive net cash farm 
incomes and retained some, albeit limited, capacity to 
service farm debt. Similarly, some skilled managers 
who carried a relatively small proportion of their 
debt in the form of land debt were in satisfactory 
financial condition despite having debt-asset ratios 
which suggested that they would have serious financial 
problems. Collateral recovery values for loans that 
will be foreclosed upon also need to be correctly 
assessed. Estimates quoted in connection with the 
planned sale of the Rural Bank suggest that the Bank 
has recovered about 65 per cent of its investment on 
foreclosed loans. In the U.S., a more common 
collateral recovery figure on similar loans is 50 per 
cent. Moreover average recovery might decline in New 
Zealand as the number of farm foreclosures increases. 
* It may be advantageous for New Zealand lenders to 
restructure loans by writing off part of the principal 
and/or lowering interest rates if this action would 
cost no more than foreclosing on a farm loan. This 
type of restructuring, which was adopted by many units 
of the FCS prior to receiving government aid and which 
was later incorporated as a condition for government 
aid, proved to be useful to the FCS from a public 
relations standpoint. New Zealand lenders who have 
written off parts of or reduced interest rates on 
troubled farm loans in the last few years only to 
witness a partial recovery of lenders' repayment 
ability and collateral values may be understandably 
reluctant to consider such a prescription. However, 
the financial prospects of some farm borrowers still 
may be sufficiently grim that restructuring which 
costs no more than foreclosing may be worth 
considering. In any event, lenders probably need to 
apply more uniform standards in deciding whose farm 
loans get partially written off rather than foreclosed 
upon. The perception is widespread that major 
inequities have occurred relating to this point. 
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* Total operating costs of an agricultural lender may 
not decline in proportion to loan volume during times 
of farm financial stress. Partly this is because of 
the extra staff work entailed in working with problem 
loans. 
* communicate, communicate, communicate! Experience of 
the FCS underscored how important it is for lenders to 
provide full information during times of financial 
stress. For obvious reasons, investors, borrowers, 
and the government will desire a greater than normal 
amount of information about the financial condition 
and strategies of an agricultural lender during times 
of farm financial stress. 
The Rural Bank has diversified its loan portfolio to 
include more "off-farm" and "downstream" industries. For 
exampl~, funding for the off-farm and downstream industry 
initiatives increased to $32 million in 1986-87 (Rural 
Banking and Finance Corporation). While the $32 million 
figure is not large,expanding these loans would limit the 
vulnerability of the Bank to damage from declines in farm 
income, if the profits of the off-farm and downstream 
businesses are not closely correlated to those of farms. 
This strategy would be worthy of emulation by the FCS. 
Except for the Banks for Cooperatives, none of the FCS 
units make loans to off-farm or downstream businesses. 
This specialisation could spell trouble for the FCS when 
another downturn in the farming economy occurs. 
The discounting scheme used by New Zealand's Rural Bank in 
1986-87 might be employed by the u.s. government to 
encourage the most.creditworthy FmHA (lender of last 
resort) borrowers to "graduate" to unsubsidised credit. 
In 1985, the FmHA had $29 billion in farm loans 
outstanding and accounted for about 14 per cent of the 
total value of farm loans in the u.s. (Barnard and 
Dobson). The Rural Bank's discounting scheme involved 
substracting the present value of the concessional 
interest benefit from the farmers loan balance outstanding 
and, simultaneously, raising the interest rates on the 
adjusted loan to the market rate. While the scheme did 
not improve the cash flow positions of the New Zealand 
farmers who qualified for the plan, it did make 
refinancing of their loans more attractive to additional 
lenders who had incentives to refinance these loans under 
conditions which coqld reduce farmers' loan payments. 
Since installing a discounting scheme might be interpreted 
as the first step toward eliminating the FmHA (or at least 
the beginnings of a more businesslike approach toward 
collecting principal and interest payments), many FmHA 
borrowers would likely resist such a change. However, 
pressures to reduce federal budget deficits in the u.s. 
might make such a plan· attractive to policymakers. 
Summary and Implications 
During the mid-1980s, u.s. farmers and agricultural 
lenders experienced the most serious financial stress 
encountered since the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
Agricultural lenders in the u.s. -- especially the Fes --
were unprepared for the trauma. For lenders in New 
Zealand, the main lesson to be gleaned from the experience 
of the Fes is to avoid underestimating the effects of 
farm financial stress on £armers' abilities to repay 
loans. This rather obvious point is important since New 
Zealand's government seems inclined to manage failure of 
privately-owned financial organisations rather than bail 
out such firms, and New Zealand farmers have less access 
to off-farm income than in the u.s. Both factors have 
implications for an agricultural lender's ability to 
survive during times of farm financial stress. For the 
Fes in the. U. S., the lesson is to diversify the 
organisation's loan portfolio to reduce dependence on 
farming. A variation of the Rural Bank's discounting 
scheme also might be used to advantage to reduce the 
number of recipients of SUbsidised FmHA credit in the u.s. 
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AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN -NEW ZEALAND 
AND THE US - SIMILARITIES, DIFFERENCES 
AND LESSONS 
Ron A Sandreyl and Warren E J ohnstonZ 
The long slow dance of agricultural rationalisation and trade liberalisation will continue 
largely at its own pace. Like an army, it cannot advance too far beyond its support 
systems. Like a giant snake, it must rest and digest from time to time. 
(John A Schnittker and A P Van Stolk) 
1 Senior Financial Analyst, Policy Services MAFCorp 
Z Professor of Agricultural Economics, University of California, and member of the Giannini 
Foundation of Agricultural Economics. 
The authors acknowledge assistance from Dr Robert Reisel, ERS of USDA, for comments on an 
earlier draft. Errors and ommissions remain, as always, the responsibility of the authors. 
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ABSTRACT 
The agricultural sectors of New Zealand and the United States have experience Homerian decade-long 
wanderings with early states of euphoria (increased net incomes and asset values), followed quickly by 
deep depressions (poor economic returns, high levels of rural debt, and capital losses) in both 
countries. The speed and magnitude of requisite adjustments have been quite different, due in part to 
substantially different Government postures and/or policies. Are the two experiences similar enough to 
gain useful insights into the efficacy of widely different Government responses for assistance? This 
paper discusses similarities and contrasts between developments and Government responses since the 
1970's. Policy environments, while on philosophically similar grounds, are substantially different 
when seen in real light, but are the differences likely to persist into the 1990's? 
INTRODUCTION 
Agriculture and agricultural policies in New Zealand and the US have shown some interesting parallels 
and differences, with many of the differences relating to the timing of- policies, over the last 20 years. 
Paths during the 70's were similar, but started to diverge in the early 80's with a strong supportive 
policy environment in New Zealand while the US opened up to more market conditions. With the 
1984 Labour Government and the 1985 US Farm Bill, the paths reversed with emphasis on support in 
the US and market forces in New Zealand. Currently the US is evaluating its support policies with a 
view to both GAIT round positions and the next farm bill. This means there is some uncertainty 
about the next few years, and these few years are very important to New Zealand. Most studies 
indicate that we have a great deal to gain from unilateral liberalisation of agriculture, and like the 
small animals of the forest we are in danger of being trampled if the elephants of US, Ee and Japan 
continue to dance to the tune of protectionism. 
The specific objective of this paper is to develop an understanding of those similarities and differences 
with a. view to seeing what implications and lessons for the US there may be in our recent economic 
liberalisation endeavours. With an increasing awareness of both the costs and benefits of agricultural 
trade liberalisation there is a great deal of international interest focusing on the recent New Zealand 
experience, firstly to find out what has happened to the sector and, secondly, to see what lessons can 
be gleaned from the experience. As Schnittker and Van Stolk's snake of rationalisation and 
liberalisation uncurls from its hibernation., policy makers are becoming increasingly aware that any 
movement in GAIT must be linked to quite dramatic changes in domestic agricultural policies. 
I feel it is in New Zealand's interest to move that snake as far possible as quickly as possible, and to 
help this we have embarked upon a joint research project with the USDA to study the response of the 
New Zealand agriCUltural sector to changes resulting from economic liberalisation. Our temperate 
climate agriCUltural sector is technically advanced, export orientated and crucially important to a 
stable, developed democracy. Assistance to agriculture was relatively high prior to deregulation, and 
our adjustment path is likely to provide some insights into potential adjustment in the US should 
progress be made on the GA'IT round. This paper does not report on our research per se, but rather 
sets the scene for a small but vital part of the research - that of the applicability of the New Zealand 
experience for the US. Time will preclude a detailed examination of many interesting and relevant 
issues. 
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2 THE 1970'S 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980· 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
The seventies were good to both groups. In the US, net farm incomes (in 1982 dollars) average 
some $40.41 billion, an increase over the previous decades average of $36.15 billion (Table 1). Wor 
food demand grew at very high rates and, in particular, world grain trade increased more than 
percent a year between 1970 and 1980 with US exports growing at about 10 percent a year. The l 
was uniquely placed, as the world's residual supplier, to take advantage of this, and the decade was 
unequalled success for US grain farmers, although ~ome volatility did exist. Most other sectors al: 
shared in the boom. 
Table 1: US Farm Data 
Government Payments to Fanners 
(1967 US$'s) 
Net Fann Acreage 
Income Diverted Aggregate Average 
(1982 US $'s Bill) (million) Billion per fann 
34.2 57 3.2 1081 
33.8 37 2.6 893 
41.8 62 3.2 1105 
69.4 19 2.0 693 
50.5 3 .4 128 
43.1 2 .5 187 
32.0 2 .4 157 
29.5 0 1.0 370 
34.9 16 1.6 580 
34.9 11 .6 271 
18.8 0 .5 218 
28.6 0 .7 301 
23.5 11 1.2 516 
12.2 78 3.1 1331 
29.9 27 2.7 1164 
29.1 34 2.4 1050 
32.9 49 3.6 1400 
39.3 60 4.9 2340 
Source: Incomes - USDA Remainder: Gardner 1989 
Aggregate support to agriculture was reduced during the decade, reflecting the strong export demru 
Government payments to agriculture averaged $1.54 billion over the decade, or a per farm payment 
$546 (1967 dollars), compared to a $2.34 billion aggregate and $754 average for the previous deca 
(Gardner, 1989). During the years 1974 to 1976 aggregate government payments dropped to leVI 
seen only in the halcyon days of the 1950's period, reflecting the impact of the Russian grain de 
These factors, and the continued expectations of even better times, combined to rapidly increase fa 
values over the decade - a phenomena accentuated by rapid inflation and relatively low (and at tin 
negative) interest rates. This shown in graph 1, which uses US combelt real land prices 
representative of the US land values. Farm debt grew from $52.8 US billion in 1970 to $179 billi 
in 1980 as farmers expanded production and bid up land and other variable input prices. 
dQ 
Similarly, New Zealand farm incomes 
remained reasonably good during the 
decade, as measured by the Meat and 
Wool Board's Economic Service 
(MWBES) "All Farms Weighted Average" 
data. Instability existed, but only once 
(1974-75) did incomes really appear to be 
a problem Total assistance was probably 
relatively low, although MAFCorp has not 
analysed assistance in that decade as 
rigorously as it has the 1980's. 
Retrospectively, we know that commodity 
prices continued a long-term downwards 
trend notwithstanding the 1972-73 
commodity boom, a phenomena more 
apparent now than then. From the mid 
1970's onwards agricultural assistance was 
raised considerably to buffer the effects of 
us (Corn Belt) & NZ (Grazing) Land Value 
Index Comparisons (Real, 1980 = 100) 
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the 1974-75 income drop and first oil shock, and to expand farm output in general (Lattimore et al, 
1988). Although these measures may not have had the major impacts of the early 1980's, the 
important point was that measures were put in place which really started to "bite" later. Additionally, 
from 1976 Muldoon's "one sided" devaluation became important. These measures signalled to 
farmers that government of the day was prepared to underwrite the sector. Farmland prices rose 
during the period, in nominal terms by almost four times and in real terms by a third as shown in 
graph 1. Most of the increase, in real terms, took place between 1972 and 1974, and thereafter 
stabilised. These farmland values were undoubtedly. held up by the negative real interest rates enjoyed 
by those taking up mortgages throughout the entire period. 
As a generalisation the two sectors, New Zealand and US agriculture, enjoyed prosperity during the 
decade of the 1970's, although this was tempered by instability. Farmland values increased, especially 
in nominal terms in both countries. There were, however, some disquietening signs in New Zealand 
that all was not well at the end of the decade - assistance was increasing while incomes decreased 
from the decade's average, and product prices continued to trend downwards. 
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Table 2: New Zealand Data 
Year (March) 
1970-71 
1971~72 
1972-73 
1973-74 
1974-75 
1975-76 
1976-77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
1979-80 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
Real Net Farm! 
Income Index 
(1980-81=1000) 
887 
994 
2,471 
. 1,706 
569 
1,239 
1,596 
1,038 
1,217 
1,321 
1,000 
850 
822 
623 
1,031 
408 
589 
519(e) 
561(P) 
Interest % 
Gross Farm Interest 
8.9 
9.4 
5.9 
7.0 
10.9 
8.6 
7.3 
10.2 
9.2 
9.6 
10.8 
12.7 
14.0 
15.6 
13.4 
20.2 
19.3 
20.2(e) 
18.2(p) 
1 Source: MWBES All Classes Average adjusted to 1980-81 March year. 
3 THE EARLY 1980'S 
The period 1979-80 was a major turning point for world and New Zealand agriculture as the terms 
trade fell as world food surpluses grew and nominal interest rates started to rise. During this peri 
New Zealand fanners were largely isolated from these changes, as the exchange rate was fixe 
interest rates were both heavily subsidised and artificially capped for many lenders and SOl 
commodity prices were heavily supported above world prices. 
Assistance, . measured as a percentage of output, increased dramatically during the period, w 
Lattimore et al (1988) showing an increase from 12 percent in the 1979-80 farming season to 
percent in the 1982-83 farming season. Much of this assistance was concentrated on sheepmeats 
the SMP and MISA schemes began to transfer large sums to farmers. Incomes of the MWB 
Average Fann Index declined by 50 percent from the 1979-80 figure (and the 1970's average) to ~ 
in 1983-84 (table 2). These declines were in spite of the increasing assistance, and accentuated by 
increasing percentage of farm income being needed to meet interest costs. 
However, the salient feature of the period must be the land price increases. Nominal index pril 
more than doubled from the 1979 to 1982 figures, and when inflation is taken account, the real in( 
increased by about a third - this is demonstrated in graph 1, using the Grazing Land index. Lo: 
outstanding to the sector doubled over the period, although MWBES data suggests much of these n 
'), 
have gone to non-traditional agriculture. The important point is that agricultural debt was not 
considered a problem during the early 1980's, although real interest rates for mortgages finally become 
positive after a prolonged period of negative values. The New Zealand agricultural sector was in a 
dangerously vulnerable situation - prices continuing to decline, incomes falling in spite of assistance, 
debt increasing and interest rates, both real and nominal, increasing. Retrospectively, we know that 
farmers were reacting to the signals which they were receiving, but those signals were bluning market 
realities. This is highlighted by the graph showing land price increases over the 1979 to 1982 period. 
The 1972-74 property boom was in response to commodity prices, the second one was not. 
In contrast, US farm incomes and asset values started to fall early in the decade in response to similar 
signals. The difference was that American farmers were exposed to these signals. The American 
turning points were defined by macroeconomic variables of higher real interest rates, a global 
commodity recession and. retrospectively, the beginnings of a dramatic cycle in the value of the 
American dollar. For the 1980 year real net farm incomes were one third lower than any year since 
World War n. and although they recovered somewhat for the next two seasons, real incomes fell again 
in 1983. As shown in graph 1, real land values started a downward decline as it became obvious that 
future expectations would not be fulfilled and farmers stopped bidding for land. Market interest rates 
soared (to 18 percent for the short-term), and this increase drove up the value of the dollar as foreign 
monies poured into the US. No acreage reductions were applied in 1980 or 81, and direct support to 
agriculture stayed low until the large Payment in Kind (PIK) programme of 1983. 
The recession began to be felt on farms in 1982 as these effects started to bite and banks began to act 
on problem loans, highlighting the differences between the US and New Zealand. Adjustment took 
place via farm liquidations. with an estimated 3 to 4· percent of total farms above the normal one 
percent a year being liquidated in the early 1980's due to the conditions of the time (USDA, 
Bob Reinsel, pers com). 
1bree farm lenders were most affected: commercial banks lending to agriculture, the co-operative 
Farm Credit System (FCS) and the Govemment lender of last resort to agriculture. the Farmers Home 
Administration (FmHA). Agricultural commercial banks are generally local banks, with the proportion 
of farm loans to total loans greater than the average for all banks (e.g. 16.13 percent in '1988). 
Non-performing loans (overdue 90 days or more) increased from 2.5 to 7.7 percent of total loans at 
commercial banks from 1982 to 1986 with the 1986 figure being the highest since the 1930's 
depression. Profitability declined as a result. A number of banks failed (270 in 5 years), and 
although as a percentage the bank failures were not high their plight became a much publicised sign 
of the farm crisis. 
The FCS is the United States' largest farm lender, holding some 40 percent -of real estate and 15 
percent of non-real estate debt. Its exposure was especially high, as it is a strictly agricultural lender. 
Delinquent loans increases from $2.1 billion in 1984 to $7.1 billion in 1986, some 14.4 percent of the 
loans outstanding in 1986. The crisis faced by FCS was alleviated by a rescue package of 
Government assistance and over the. 1984-86 period $3.2 billion in loans were written off. As lender 
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of last resort the FmHA experienced the sharpest deterioration in its loan portfolio. It faced a twofo 
problem of an increase in its portfolio simultaneously with a deterioration of the qUality. By 198 
$8.3 billion of its $26 billion portfolio was delinquent, and analysts consider that a third of the $8 
delinquent will need to be written off (at taxpayer expense). 
4 THE LATE 1980'S 
The United States Post-1985 
Increased direct payments under the 1985 Act and tighter world markets have combined to increa 
farm incomes in the United States, and fannland values bottomed out in most states in 1986 and 19: 
in response to these higher incomes. Both macroeconomic and farm policies combined to II 
agriculture on its recovery road. Lower interest rates, lower dollar values and the gene] 
strengthening of the world economy and tighter world markets stimulated the recovery, while the 19: 
Farm Bill ensured a turnaround in the agricultural economic climate. The primary difference from t 
1981 Act to the 1985 Act is the source of the income transfer. Support in the 1981 Act was to . 
through higher prices, thus transferring income from consumers, while the 1985 Act draws a larg 
share of the support from the Treasury in the form of direct payments to farmers. Governme 
payments to agriculture were, in 1987, the largest recorded in the previous 50 years - in both nomir 
and real terms (Gardner, 1989). Federal spending in the form of commodity programme outla 
constituted nearly half of United States net cash farm income in 1986 and nearly 40 percent in 19~ 
Direct payments were about $17 billion in 1987 and constituted roughly 10 percent of gross ca 
receipts. Additionally, the 1987 Agricultural Credit Act provided direct fmancial assistance to t 
troubled FCS. Farm incomes have risen to record levels, land values have begun to increase, de 
problems have receded and exports are rebounding. The rise in land values is probably not 
favourable sign given the high level of support still coming from the Government, as New Zeala 
farmers have discovered to their chagrin. 
The encouraging signs are that farmers are using this new-found income to repay debts as farm d( 
fell from $206.5 billion in 1983 to under $140 billion at 31 December 1988. This resulted from d( 
repayment ($56 billion of the $66 billion) and liquidations of perhaps 3 to 5 percent of the farm« 
and consequential write-downs in asset portfolios of agriCUltural lenders ($10 billion of t 
$66 billion). Much of this write-down was borne by the United States taxpayer. However, t 
fundamental problem remains, with United States agriculture continuing to rely on subsidies. Rec( 
surges in the value of the US dollar will accentuate those problems, although higher commodity pri( 
will balance this to some extent. 
New Zealand Post-1984 
By 1984 it was becoming increasingly clear to most analysts that New Zealand's economic polie 
were not sustainable. A snap election held in July 1984 resulted in a change of Government, and 1 
economic policies of this new Government were dominated by a strong Minister of Finance dedical 
to a sweeping new market driven economy. Agricultural subsidies, put in place by the previ( 
Government, were removed or their removal signalled. The New Zealand dollar was devalued 
some 20 percent, and six months later floated with the expectation this floated dollar would foIl 
purchasing parity downwards. The 1985 farming season was a good one for agriculture as· 
shon-tenn effects of devaluation, good climatic conditions and the lags associated with reducing 
subsidies raised farm incomes. In the following year, however, real net farm incomes dropped as the 
abrupt policy changes really staned to bite. International commodity prices remained low, subsidies 
were largely removed and real exchange rates appreciated since the 1984 devaluation. 
Since the 1985 farming year incomes have stayed low. Sheep fanners have been hit especially hard, 
as the previous assistance levels to sheepmeats were high. The continually declining land values have 
had an effect upon debt-equity ratios, a phenomena accentuated by increased interest rates. and with 
the need to service the debt on both a lower income and asset base. Dairy farms have not fared as 
badly, with debt/equity ratios only slightly higher than the early 1980's and considerably lower than 
the early seventies. This reflects both increased commodity prices in the last season and a lower level 
of protection during the early 1980's. 
As a result of these changes many observers consider that 10 or 15 percent of farms will have to be 
sold or restructured. To date the response has been slow, as few forced sales have taken place. There 
are a number of contributing factors which may explain this. These include a discounting scheme by 
the Rural Bank, the large (estimated 16) percentage· of debt held by family loans, farmers' action 
groups and the resultant publicity, the desire by fanners (and lenders) to "hang in there" and hope, 
delaying the psychological factor of facing a new life. There are signs that lenders are taking a harder 
line and more liquidations are taking place. In the two years to March 1988 the Rural Bank realised 
on only 19 properties in total, and now, after these years of inactivity, it is faced with some 3,795 (6 
percent of tctalloans) fanners in a "foreclosure situation" (NZ Fanner, 1989). Action has been taken 
in the previous 12 months, but a considerable degree of restructuring is yet to work its way through 
the system. Additionally, after its large corporate losses of the previous year, the Bank of New 
Zealand has discovered its rural exposure. The actual or de facto sale of both of these institutions is 
mean that both the Rural Bank and the Bank of New Zealand will continue (or even increase) the 
degree of commercialisation lately being adopted in their rural portfolio management. 
Associated with the liberalisation programme of the late 1980's has been the resultant supply response. 
Sheep numbers have declined, and some product switching to increased emphasis on wool growing 
has taken place. Beef numbers are increasing due to the relative improvement in commodity prices 
following the removal of sheep meat dominated price supports, although the recent drought is affecting 
this shift. An increased interest in dairying is becoming a feature of the pastoral sector and interest in 
deer (and to a lesser extent goats) continues to expand 
Overall, New Zealand agriculture is now in a similar situation to the American prior to the 
introduction of the 1985 Farm Bill, namely, a financially stressed sector burdened by excess debt and 
asset values losses. The adjustment which took place in the United States from 1982 to 1986 was due 
to somewhat different factors than will impact on New Zealand. This adjustment has largely yet to 
take place in New Zealand, but the signs are increasingly pointing to an adjustment occurring. 
Indications so far are that the private sector will be expected to bear a large percentage of this 
adjustment cost, although the debt has yet to work its way through the system. Adoption of an 
American type 1985 Fann Bill "solution" to the "problem" is precisely what took place in New 
Zealand with the assistance regime of the early 1980's. This caused the sector to come out of 
synchronisation with market realities, and would be a policy reversal from the present environment. 
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This time New Zealanders are facing market realities while their American counterparts continue 1 
rely on Governmental assistance. The snake of Schnittker and Van Stolk had moved much faster tha 
"a slow dance" in New Zealand since July 1984, although much of the structural adjustment has yet 1 
take place. The next relevant question is what is likely to happen in the United States in the 1990's. 
5.0 THE 1990'S 
There is increasing awareness in the US that commodity programmes are not working for a variety ( 
reasons. These include the distributional effects, whereby most of the monies go to an ahead 
well-off group of farmers, increasing doubts about the validity of "food security" as a legitimate polie 
objective, the schizophrenic nature of the American rhetoric on GAIT and reality on agricultur 
policies, and general budgetary pressures (Gardner, 1989, Paarlberg, 1989, Pasour, 1988). These aJ 
forcing a re-evaluation of the objectives of farm policies and what actually has happened, and, j 
Sanderson and Mehra (1989), point out, "some, although not all, of the declared objectives a: 
political smokescreens", while others are "mutually inconsistent". Income generally takes preceden< 
over other objectives. 
High support prices in US (and EC as well) represent a double-edged sword to New Zealand. Mark 
access is restricted and consumer prices are increased by the original programs, reducing consumptio 
Marginal farmers remain in production, and surplus production is dumped onto the decreasing numb 
of "free" markets, adding insult to the original injury. Although the magnitudes of benefits vary, , 
almost proliferation of trade models and subsequent analysis indicate that most countries would ga 
from liberalisation. These gains come about by the reduction or elimination of the dead-weight effe 
of current policies and reduced food prices leading to consumer gains substantially in excess I 
producer losses. Significant welfare gains for all countries would result if all liberalis( 
simultaneously (Blanford, 1989). Almost embarrassingly, New Zealand is shown to be a big gainer 
most of these multilateral trade liberalisation studies. This results because (a) dairy and red meats (v 
a change in grain prices) are big "winners" - our major export· commodities; and (b) because 0 
producer losses are negligible as we are liberalised. The point that American liberalisation is probab 
only likely to happen as part of multilateral trade liberalisation highlights how much we have to gain 
Is this likely to happen, and if so, what lessons can the US learn from us? Firstly, the signs 
liberalisation are much more promising than they have been for a long time, and others will discu 
the GAIT situation in more detail later in this Conference. As Paarlberg (1989) points out, twice 
this century the US has missed the opportunity to scale back farm programs - the first during W OI 
War II, the second during the relative prosperity of the 1970's when a scaling down almost took pIa 
prior to the 1985 Farm Bill. He considers that a series of events in place now have given the US 
third chance, and hopes they will do better this time! Assisting in placing pressure on US reform 
the Graham Rudman Hollings Act requiring Congress to be serious about reducing the budget deficit 
A major liberalisation of American agricultural policies is unlikely to have the same impact upon t 
sector as the New Zealand experience post 1984. This is for a variety of reasons, including: 
(a) the New Zealand experience was very much an economy wide liberalisation with changes 
macroeconomics including the floating of New Zealand dollar . and a freeing of interest re 
controls. Both have had major impacts in New Zealand and neither are appliciable to the 1 
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situation. Additionally, many of the efficiency driven changes such as a movement to SOE's 
and privatisation of previous Government Departments which affected are New Zealand 
agriculture are not a factor in the US; 
(b) there are differences in the policy instruments and delivery mechanisms of American assistance 
compared to New Zealand's prior to 1984. This means the transfer efficiency or percentage of 
actual monies going to farmers would be less in the US than New Zealand. Blandford (1989) 
estimates the transfer efficiency of American programmes (when estimated in a multilateral 
'liberalisation framework) to be about 40 percent, compared to Canada's 16 and Japan's 63 
percent. Although we do not have estimates of New Zealand's transfer efficiency prior to 1984, 
using the same technique as Blandford it is most likely to be close to Japan's. This means that 
relatively less of an impact would be felt on American farms in the short nm, but I acknowledge 
that this ignores the cost excess faced by New Zealand farmers in the medium to long tenn; , 
(c) a major liberalisation of American agriculture is most likely only to occur 'with a multilateral 
liberalisation. This is linked to (b) above and highlighted in Blanford (1989), where he 
estiamtes from 1984 data that American producers would lose annual benefits of $10.1 Billion 
US for multilateral liberalisation, as world prices would increase to compensate some of the 
transfer payments. In contrast, with a US unilateral liberalisation, the US producers would lose 
$20.6 Billion but consumers would see prices decrease instead of the increase with multilateral 
liberalisation; 
(d) American liberalisation, even using the most radical scenario, is unlikely to either proceed as far 
or as fast as New Zealand's. For example, the Americans are unlikely to change R&D 
expenditures, adverse events policies or taxation structures as has occurred in New Zealand; 
(e) it is unlikely that the US would face major infastructure changes in allied industries such as the 
meat processing sector. This reflects a more efficient processing sector; 
(t) both land prices and agriCUltural debt have already made major adjustments in the US, placing 
the American sector in a much stronger position to face liberalisation than New Zealand was in 
1984/85. Graph 1 shows the relative changes in US combelt versus New Zealand grazing land 
prices. From 1982 they have paralleled each other downwards, with the major difference being 
the 1980-82 increase in New Zealand. As discussed in the text, the US debt has been squeezed 
by adjustments prior to liberalisation; 
(g) currently American farmers (especially grain farmers) are facing higher world prices. This is in 
contrast to New Zealand sheepmeat f~es, who entered an economic liberalisation phase when 
, returns were being heavily supported, and more comparable to our dairy farmers. 
Consequently, the American liberalisation debate is likely to focus more upon direct income 
measures than a whole raft of changes such as occured in New Zealand. The supply response 
from price changes will continue to be an issue, and it is here that New Zealand can offer some 
lessons. SriRamaratnam and Reynolds, in another paper to this Conference, discuss the work 
which Policy Services MAFCorp is undertaking in addressing that question - is the supply 
response in New Zealand as we would have anticipated? This potentially may answer one of 
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the most useful questions for American policy makers. 
The successor to the 1985 Farm Bill will signal to others the willingness or otherwise of th 
Americans to seriously participate in agricultural liberalisation as outlined in some yet-to-be 
defined GAIT agreement. If progress is to be made in the Round, these two factors (the ne\ 
Farm Bill and GAT!) must have a large degree of commonality and compatibility. Gains frOf 
multilateral liberalisation are attractive, and especially so for us. However, it will require 
genuine committment from the US to achieve both of these goals. As Webb and Dixit (1989 
point out, less government intervention in agriculture is a sufficient conditions for satisfying bot 
Graham-Rudman - Hollings and GAIT, but reduced intervention is not a necessary condition fc 
either. Budget constraints can be met by taking the intervention off-budget and transferring th 
costs to consumers, with the US dairy supports a good case in point. Similarly, GAT 
objectives· can be met by using creative "non trade distorting" supports of agriculture, althoug 
most of these measures (decoupled, income support for example) require budgetary expenditur( 
Herein lies the problem, and our mutual potential gains· in a genuine multilateral liberalisation. 
Initially the economic reforms in New Zealand had the support of the agricultural sectol 
Farmers welcomed the exchange rate changes on the expectation that the NZ dollar would reflec 
our on-farm terms of trade and the withdrawal of assistance on the expectations that cm 
excesses would be removed and "the playing field would be level". Neither of these ha 
happened, and Nivema has not been reached. Neither of these will be factors in a U: 
liberalisation, although the US dollar would have some reaction to a liberalisation. Meanwhil( 
the New Zealand agricultural sector is badly exposed awaiting further liberalisations at home an 
abroad. 
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ABSTRACT 
Farmers in the Pongaroa district were surveyed in 1989 as part of an investigation into 
adjustment strategies used by hill country farmers. Stocking rates for a group of progressive 
farmers had reached 10.3 su/ha in 1988, and 9.0 su/ha for 30 farmers replying to a postal 
survey. Diversification had made little contribution to gross farm incomes. Future increases in 
production would be based on fine tuning of existing systems and would be financed out of 
income. The majority of farmers were optimistic about the future economic viability of their 
farms. 
Keywords: Farm survey, development, hill country, diversification 
INTRODUCTION 
As part of an investigation into adjustment strategies used by hill country farmers in response to 
changing economic conditions since 1984/85, a survey of the Pongaroa district was carried out 
in early 1989. The overall objective was to collect information which would be of assistance to 
individual farmers and to those responsible for formulating and implementing Government 
policy. 
The Pongaroa district was chosen because of an information base extending back to 1949/50 
when MAF carried out a comprehensive survey of the then Akitio County (Woods, 1951). The 
County was surveyed again in 1978/79 by MAF (Shepherd and Arthur-Worsop, 1980) and in 
1985 was included in an extensive survey of Southern Hawkes Bay carried out by MAF and 
Federated Farmers. This latter survey (unpublished) was part of an exercise designed to alert 
farmers to problems likely to arise from deregulation of the economy and the removal of 
support structures for agriculture, and to advise them of measures that should be taken to deal 
with these problems. 
The 1989 survey extends the information base for the Pongaroa region to 40 years. Analysis of 
the data is still in progress and full results will be published elsewhere. In this paper farm 
development since 1949 is briefly reviewed and some of the survey results relating to farm 
development are reported. 
THE SURVEY 
There were estimated to be about 125 sheep and beef farms in the region corresponding to the 
original Akitio County covered in the earlier surveys. Twenty-two farmers identified as 
"progressive" at the time of the 1985 MAF /Fcderated Farmers survey, were visited in early 
1989. Information was obtained on 1987/88 levels of production and profitability, on 
management changes made since 1984/85, and on intended changes from 1988/!N. Twenty-one 
farmers provided full physical and financial information for the period of interest. One farm 
was considered to be a special case because of its size and has nol been included in the 
quantitative analyses. 
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Following the interview survey an abbreviated questionnaire was mailed to all other farmers in 
the region that could be identified, and 30 completed questionnaires were returned. In total, 51 
farmers representing about 45% of farmers in the area participated in the survey. Basic details 
of the survey farms are shown in Table 1. Further details about the farms included in the 
interview survey have been published elsewhere (Nicholls~, 1990). 
Table 1: Average data for survey farms 
Number of farms 
Area (ha) 
Stocking rate (su/ha, 1988) 
Breeding ewes per farm 
Breeding cows per farm 
% dry cattle su 
% dry sheep su 
Interview survey 
2~ 
563 
10.3 
3230 
81 
63 
28 
DEVELOPMENT 
Postal survey 
30 
547 
9.0 
2591 
99 
51 
31 
The 1949/50 survey was carried out in order to gain information about "the problem of marginal 
land," and the results contributed substantially to the formulation of policy for the development 
of marginal lands in New Zealand. In 1949/50 the farmed area of 80270 hectares was carrying 
365000 stock units (4.5 su/ha). With the development of every farm it was estimated the county 
could run about 586800 stock units (7.3 su/ha), an increase of 60%. However, it was considered 
that 92% of farms would need technical advice and financial assistance to develop, and 70% of 
the farms needing finance would be unable to offer security for loans (Woods, 1951). 
Development did proceed during the 50's and 60's aided by relatively profitable conditions for 
farming. By the time of the 1978/79 survey total stock units had increased to 592400. The main 
features of development had been scrub clearance, pasture improvement through aerial 
topdressing and subdivision, and control of pests (rabbits, grass grub and porina). Most 
development had been financed out of income. 
Although stock numbers had reached the potential as estimated in 1950, justification for the 
1978/79 survey was "the apparent gap between what technologists indicate should be possible to 
produce from hill country sheep farms, and what farmers are actually achieving." 
The objective of the 78/79 survey was to discover what was holding back further development 
and expansion of production. The farm labour situation (Arthur-Worsop S<.L..ru, 1981; Gillies, 
1980) and the Pongaroa water scheme were also under investigation at the time. Development 
was seen to be primarily a case of bringing all farmers up to the level of production being 
achieved by the top farmers. This represented an increase in average stocking rates from 8 to a 
"readily attainable" 10 stock units per effective hectare. The potential under existing technology 
was seen to be around 12.5 stock units per hectare. The importance of having associated 
advisory inputs was noted. The survey indicated that over 70% of farmers intended to 
undertake further development. While there was a strong preference for development out of 
income, 35% intended to use Rural Bank development loans or the Land Development 
Encouragement Loans. Twenty-nine percent of farmers were under the Livestock 
Improvement Scheme or were considering applying. 
60 
The data in Table 1 show that in 1988 farms in the interview survey had achieved an average 
stocking rale of 10.3 su per effective hectare. Farms in lhe postal survey had achieved an 
average of 1).0 su per effective hectare. A number of farms in the region have thus achieved the 
readily attainable stocking rate identified in lY78. Only two farmers reported a a stocking rate 
of 12.5 su per hectare or more in 1Y88, and one of (hese was a short term situation associated 
with buying additional land. 
Nine farmers in the interview survey had made use of the LDEL scheme, ten had used the 
Livestock Incentive Scheme and three had taken out development loans. The increase in stock 
numbers on those farms involved in development averaged about 1250 su per farm. Most 
farmers felt the LDEL and LIS schemes had been useful to them, and these schemes, together 
with an effective extension service, had obviously been important in motivating and facilitating 
farmers to increase production 1. 
There has probably been little if any overall increase in stock numbers since 1984/85. While 
farmers in the interview survey had achieved a slight increase up to 1Y87/88 (Nicholls S<!....al, 
1990), fifty percent of farmers in the postal survey indicated that they had made no change to 
stock numbers over the last five years. The remainder had either reduced overall numbers or 
changed policies, with emphasis on less breeding ewes and cows, and more dry stock. Seventy-
three per cent of farmers in the postal survey were not planning any changes in stock numbers 
or policies over the next two years. Land development activities in the future will be focussed 
on improving existing pastures, particularly on flats, through renewal, fertiliser, subdivision and 
drainage, and will be financed out of income. Only one farmer in the interview survey was 
prepared to borrow to finance development. 
DIVERSIFICATION 
In a circular to farmers at the time of the 84/85 survey, MAF advised that opportunities for 
diversification were limited, costly, long term and therefore inappropriate to farmers hard hit 
by the current economic conditions. The value of this advice is borne out by farmer experience 
since 1984/85. Nineteen of the 51 farms surveyed had tried at least one form of diversification 
as indicated in Table 2. Establishment costs were less than $30000 per farm except where deer 
facilities were involved. They were mainly financed out of income or through seasonal finance. 
Table 2 
Bull beef 
Deer 
Goats 
Forestry 
Fitches 
Merinos 
Number of farmers trying new enterprises 
Interview surVey 
5 
3 
4 
1 
1 
1 
Postal survey 
1 
2 
5 
1 
1 
With the exception of bull beef and merinos, which perhaps should be regarded as variations of 
existing enterprises, diversification had made little contribution to farm income up to 1987/88, 
and there was little confidence in future prospects. Three farmers received income from goats 
in 1987/88, averaging only $4.83 per goat stock unit, or about $1350 per farm. Deer contributed 
less than 5% of total farm income for the one farmer still running deer in 1987/88. Several 
farmers who had introduced goats commented that a major objective was weed control rather 
than an alternative source of income. 
IFarmers in the interview survey were not asked a specific question about advisory services, but 
many volunteered their views on the effectiveness of the local MAF extension service. 
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DEBT RESTRUCTURING 
Thirteen farms in the interview survey had debt written off under the Rural Bank discounting 
scheme. The average amount was almost $110,000 per farm and in terms of 1987 stock 
numbers, ranged from $9.45 to $77.30 per stock unit. Four farms also had from $20000 to 
$85000 of debt "parked" for two years as part of the restructuring package. Nine farms had 
annual charges reduced by $2000 to $8000 as a result of restructuring, while the remaining four 
farms had similar or slightly increased charges. All farmers who did not have debt discounted 
were ineligible to participate in the scheme, with six having no significant debt. 
Six farms in the postal survey had debt written off, averaging $119000 per farm for the four 
farms providing details. 
While discounting reduced the debt loading of individual farms it did not increase income 
earning capacity as might be achieved for example, by increasing farm area. Farmers who 
participated in the discounting scheme were asked about their preference for reduced debt 
versus additional land if these had been aIternatives2. Features of the farms choosing each 
alternative are given in Table 3. 
Table 3 Features of farms choosing extra land versus reduced debt 
Number of farms 
Effective area (ha) 
Total stock units (87/88) 
Gross farm income ($/su) 
Interest payments ($/su) 
Farm surplus* 
Extra land 
6 
276 
2978 
$31.00 
$8.90 
$24440 
*Gross farm income - farm working expenses - interest 
Reduced debt 
7 
622 
6230 
$29.04 
$5.97 
$66000 
Extra land is clearly the preferred option for smaller farms which are potentially at risk from 
falling production or prices. Further analysis of an expanded data set is needed to draw 
conclusions about adjustment strategies useful to small versus large farms. 
FUTURE OUTLOOK 
Farmers in the interview survey were asked to give their views on the future outlook for farming 
in the Pongaroa region, and on what changes in Government policy are needed to facilitate 
growth and survival of farms in the region. Over 90% of the farmers believed that the outlook 
for farming was good, providing that present Government policy was successful in reducing 
interest rates and inflation. The slow progress in reducing interest rates was of concern to all 
farmers. About a third of the farmers suggested that further deregulation (e.g. of the labour 
market) was necessary to help reduce off-farm costs, and 20% questioned the benefits of an 
uncontrolled exchange rate. A number of farmers felt that policies were needed to encourage 
young persons into farming. They believed that the farming population in the Pongaroa region 
was decreasing and aging, and that inadequate equity could create problems for farmers 
wanting to retire. 
Farmers in the postal survey were asked for their opinions about improvements in income in the 
next two years, and about the future economic viability of their farms. Relative opinion was 
assessed on a scale from 1 (very pessimistic) to 5 (very optimistic), and the results are 
summarised in Table 4. 
2This option was suggested by R J Townsley. 
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Table 4 Summary of farmer opinion on income prospects and farm viability 
An improvement in next two years 
in gross wool income? 
An improvement in next two years 
in gross sheep income? 
An improvement in next two years 
in gross cattle income? 
An improvement in next two years 
in "other" income? 
Future economic viability of your 
farm? 
Pessimistic 
(1-2) 
4 
8 
4 
13 
4 
(Not all farmers gave an opinion for the last two questions) 
Neutral 
(3) 
18 
11 
9 
9 
8 
Optimistic 
(4-55) 
8 
11 
17 
17 
The results indicate a degree of optimism about the economic viability of theirfarms that is a 
little surprising given current economic conditions, and the fact that the data were collected 
during the peak of the 1989 drought. 
CONCLUSION 
Since Akitio County was first studied as a typical example of marginal lands, there has been a 
thirty-five year period of land development and expansion of production up to the mid-1980's. 
This has been due to new technology such as aerial topdressing, to periods of farming prosperity 
in which incomes were sufficient to finance development, to Government policies such as 
LDEL which helped to change farmer attitudes towards borrowing, and schemes such as the 
Pongaroa rural water supply. 
At the present time there are no new technological developments in sight but better use of 
existing technology could have a significant impact on production. There is much greater 
economic uncertainty following deregulation of the economy and the withdrawal of support for 
agriculture. 
Unlike the previous surveys of 1949/50 and 1978/79, we cannot identify a potential for 
increased production. In the immediate future, farmers will be concentrating on fine tuning 
their farm systems to improve performance of existing enterprises, to seek greater flexibility to 
respond to market signals, and to achieve greater control over costs and debts. The next few 
years (from 1988) are likely to be ones of consolidation rather than growth, but the farmers at 
least, are confident about their future. 
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ADJUSTMENTS TO DAIRY FARM MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
AND LIFESTYLES BETWEEN 1985 AND 1988 IN RESPONSE TO 
CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT POLICY AND MILKFAT 
PAYOUTS IN THE MANAWATU REGION OF NEW ZEALAND 
A.H.Hughes1), H.D.Jose2), W.J.Parker1), F.M.Anderson1). 
1. Dept. Agricultural &Horticultural Systems Management, Massey University 
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SUMMARY 
A mail survey of dairy farmers supplying the Manawatu Cooperative Dairy 
Company was carried out in May 1988 with the aims of determining the 
adjustments dairy farmers made to their farm and financial management 
practices in response to changes in the economic climate from 1985 to 1988, 
and of identifing sources of information used by dairy farmers, and quantifing 
how their personal lifestyles had been affected during this period. Respondents 
adjusted by attempting to diversify, reducing costs, increasing off-farm work 
and herd size, and by taking greater care in managing their finances. 
Key Words: Adjustment, Dairy, Management, Lifestyle. 
INTRODUCTION 
New Zealand dairy farmers, in the five years prior to 1989, confronted the 
greatest challenge to their livelihood since the Great Depression. The major 
factors responsible were changes in domestic government policies and world 
economic conditions, particularly declining agricultural commodity prices. The 
effects of these were compounded by high domestic interest rates and an 
increase in the value of the New Zealand dollar relative to the U.S. dollar. At 
the same time Government support to the agricultural sector was, with the 
possible exception of adverse events relief, sharply reduced (Douglas, 1984). 
The result was significantly lower and less certain farm incomes and greater 
risk of business failure for all types of farm firms. Reduced profitability 
precipitated a sharp drop in the value of farm assets, the magnitude of which 
was unprecedented in the past 50 years. While the number of farm foreclosures 
and forced sales has been limited, many farmers were placed in a precarious 
fmancial situation (Moffat,1985;MAF,1985). 
To survive, farmers had to learn to cope effectively with the existing and the 
longer term implications of a dynamic and at times volatile production and 
market environment. They had to be able to assess a constantly changing 
situation, estimate the implications and impacts for their business and then take 
appropriate strategic action. For many, there was, and will continue to be a 
need to learn how best to restructure their farms financially, and how to design, 
implement and control both business and production systems in a more risky, 
uncertain and deregulated environment. 
During the last five years, farmers' financial predicaments, together with their 
associated stress loads have been described and widely reported in the popular 
press, and at conferences (Tisdall,1986; Alexander,1986; Owen and 
Williamson,1987). Not so widely researched and documented are the 
management strategies farmers adopted; their sources of new or revised 
information; the learning styles they adopted and the barriers they had to 
overcome to remain solvent. 
This paper summarises the main results of a May 1988 mail survey of dairy 
farmers supplying the Manawatu Cooperative Dairy Company (MCDC) in New 
Zealand. The survey had the primary aim of determining the adjustments dairy 
farmers had made to their farm and financial management practices in response 
to changes in Government policy and financial returns from 1985 to 1988. 
Secondary aims were to identify the sources of information used by dairy 
farmers in the MCDC supply region, in reaching decisions to effect change and 
to quantify how their personal lifestyles had been affected during this period. 
SURVEY l\1ETHOD 
A census survey approach was adopted because of the anticipated wide 
variability between farms and farmers. The most practical and economic way 
of obtaining responses from the 942 owners and sharemilkers supplying the 
MCDC was by mail questionnaire (O'Donnel, 1969). A 30 question, 13 page 
questionnaire was designed and pre-tested in April and mailed out in May 1988. 
The first section solicited details on farm and herd size, type of supply, 
ownership and management structure in 1985 and changes in these factors 
between 1985 and 1988. Subsequent sections asked for details of changes to 
management practices over the three year period; where farmers had sought 
information about changes made and the influence that information had on 
decisions to change; and changes that had occurred in respondent's lifestyle 
during the study period. Later sections sought information on respondent's 
beliefs about the likelihood of improved profitability of dairying in the forthcoming 
1988/89 season and in three to five years time. Details were also sought on 
respondents' discussion group membership. Although not reported here, 
respondents were also asked for their image of the Faculty of Agricultural and 
Horticultural Sciences at Massey University as a source of information and 
learning opportunities, the learning strategies they had adopted, the obstacles to 
learning they encountered and the level of stress associated with their learning 
to cope with the changing agricultural environment. 
Ordinal scaled questions (1-5 scale). were used to allow respondents to rank the 
relative importance or intensity of answers (Stevens,1946). No attempt was 
made to obtain details of either individual debt servicing or equity levels of 
respondents as, at the time of the survey, both issues were considered too 
sensitive for a survey of this type. Responses were coded numerically and 
analysed using the SPSSX (1983) statistical package. 
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RESULTS 
Response Rate 
Over a period of six weeks completed questionnaires were returned by 372 
(44%) of the suppliers. Survey respondents represented 350 farms (22 owners 
and sharemilkers submitted returns for the same property). These included 90 
town milk and 260 seasonal supply farms. Of the 372 respondents, 216 (58%) 
described themselves as owners, 73 (21 %) as sharemilkers and six (2%) as 
managers. 
Age of Respondents 
Sharemilkers averaged 32 years of age, and partners/owners averaged 45 years 
of age. Respondents ages ranged from 21 to 77 years (Figure 1). The mean age 
of seasonal and town milk suppliers was similar (41.5 vs 42.3 years). Less than_ 
15% of all suppliers were under 30 years of age, some 65% were between 31 
and 50, and the remaining 20% were 51 years and over. This age distribution is 
similar to that reported by Moran and Anderson (1988) for Northland dairy 
farmers. 
Figure 1: Age Distribution of Survey Respondents. 
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The age distribution of 239 of the respondents summarised by their position on 
the farm is shown in Figure 2. This shows that most sharemilkers are less than 
30 years of age and suggests that the common goal of farm ownership had been 
achieved for most, between 30 and 40 years of age. 
Figure 2: Percentages of Respondents Holding Different Positions on the 
Farm by Age Groups. 
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The number of years that respondents reported being on their present farm 
averaged 16.1 years. Sharemilkers averaged 6.5 years on their present farms 
while partners and owner-operators averaged 17.6 and 19.3 years respectively. 
At the time of the survey. 12% of all suppliers had been on their present farm 
less than four years; 28% between four and eight years; 17% nine to fourteen 
years; 21 % fifteen to twenty four years and 22% for more than twenty four 
years (Figure 3). These data suggest that movement between farms or entry 
into dairy farming has slowed down from 1984 to 1988, at least relative to the 
period 1980 - 1984. 
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Figure 3: Number of Years Owners and Sharemilkers Had Been on 
Their Present Farms. 
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The average number of cows in milk on respondents' farms in 1985 and in 1987 
was 154 and 156 respectively, with average dairy herd sizes for seasonal 
suppliers of 157 and 158 cows and for town suppliers of 146 and 149 cows 
respectively in the two years. Seasonal supply farms averaged 88.3ha in area, 
and town- supply farms 117.5ha. The distribution of herd sizes is presented in 
Figure 4. 
Figure 4: Aggregate Distribution of Herd Sizes. 
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Younger suppliers tended to be associated with larger herds and, conversely, 
older suppliers (especially those over 50) tended to be associated with smaller 
herds, as is illustrated in Figure 5. 
Figure 5: Age of Respondents by Dairy Herd Size. 
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Changes in Fanning Practices 
The extent and direction of changes in management practices between the 
1985-86 and 1987-88 seasons reported by respondents are summarised in 
Table 1. Overall, respondents are shown to have reacted to reduced income by 
reducing discretionary expenditure, especially on repairs and maintenance, herd 
testing, amount of fertilizer applied and the amount of hired labour. Increased 
expenditure on supplements was probably due to increased feed requirements 
from increased stocking rates. The high profitability of bull beef during this 
period (MAF 1986) and their lower labour requirements encouraged dairy 
farmers to rear and retain more bull calves for beef production.There was a 
marked change in financial management, with 55.7% of respondents indicating 
that more time was spent monitoring cashflows and preparing budgets. 
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Table 1: Percentage of Respondents Changing Practices 
Between 1985-1988. 
Direction of Change 
Farming Practice Decreased Increased 
Expenditure 
Repairs and maintenance 52.6 
Frequency of herd testing 33.4 
Fertilizer application 31.4 
Amount of hired labour 28.6 
Annual pasture renewal 18.9 
Proportion of h~rd artificially bred 17.7 
Amount of supplements purchased 12.9 
Stock Policy 
Change in stocking rate 
Number of heifer calves reared 
Number of herd replacements 
Number of heifers grazed off 
Number of bull calves reared 
Financial Management 
Budgeting including cashflows 
Off-farm employment 
Males 
Females 
15.7 
16.9 
17.7 
8.3 
7.7 
3.4 
4.3 
5.4 
a) 17.9% of farmers kept more bulls over one year of age. 
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12.0 
9.4 
11.7 
9.1 
24.3 
14.9 
24.0 
34.6 
25.1 
14.9 
16.3 
36.0a 
55.7 
15.1 
22.3 
Qptimism For Improved Profitability Of Dairying 
Of the 366 suppliers who replied to the question on their optimism for improved 
profitability in the next season (1988/89), 27.1 % reported that they were very 
pessimistic or pessimistic, while 37.7% reported they were optimistic or very 
optimistic. The remainder (35.2%) were neutral. 
With respect to the situation in three to five years time, 14.2% reported they 
were either very pessimistic or pessimistic, while 55.0% reported they were 
either optimistic or very optimistic and 30.8% were neutral. The different 
optimism ratings by various groups of respondents is shown in Figure 6. 
Discussion group members were more optimistic ( < 0.01) than non-members 
about the longer term profitability of dairy farming. Differences between owners 
and sharemilkers, and between seasonal and town supply farmers were not 
significant 
Figure 6: Respondents'Long Term Optimism Ratings by Type of Supply, 
Discussion Group (DG) Membership and Position on the Farm. 
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The contrast between short term and long term optimism can be related to the 
May 1988 situation in the dairy industry. The $2.25 per kg advance milkfat price 
for the 1986/87 season would still have been fresh in their memories, interest 
rates on borrowed money were still high (20-22%) and the European butter 
mountain was only just beginning to melt. A more optimistic response would 
have been anticipated if the same questions had been asked again in December 
1988 by which time milkfat prices had increased. 
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No statistically significant relationship was found between the degree of 
optimism respondents reported for an improvement in the profitability of 
dairying three to five years ahead and the number or extent of changes they 
had made in their management practices between 1985/86 and 1987/88. Data 
on equity and debt servicing costs would have helped elaborate on this complex 
issue. 
The number of suppliers reporting they were either very optimistic or optimistic 
about improvement in the longer term profitability tended to increase with 
increasing herd size (e.g. mean score for herds of less than 60 cows = 2.66; 140 
to 170 cows = 3.69; 300+ cows = 3.88). This relationship could be due in part 
to the potential economies of size offered by large dairy herds ( Wright et al. 
1989). Optimism about improvement in the long term also tended to decrease 
with increasing age ( e.g. mean score for farmers less than 26 years of age = 
4.00; 41 to 45 years = 3.53; over 60 years =3.23). Decreased optimism with 
increasing age may have been linked in the memories of older respondents to 
earlier milkfat price recessions and the relative stability of the industry in the 
1960's and '70's. All of the herds of less than 60 cows and 38% of herds with 
60 to 109 cows were owned by farmers over 45 years of age. These farms 
would have become increasingly uneconomic if the cost price squeeze had 
continued ( Wright et al. 1989). 
Changes In Lifestyle Since 1985 
Increases in off-farm employment, listed earlier in Table 1, were reported by 56 
(15.1 %) of suppliers and by 83 (22.3%) of their spouses. Decreases in off-farm 
emplo~ent were reported by 16 (4.3%) of suppliers and by 20 (5.4%) of their 
spouses - most decreases were explained by the arrival of additional children in 
the family requiring the mother to give up off-farm work or the husband to give 
up off-farm work in order to perform farm work previously undertaken by the 
wife. Changes reported in personal drawings (probably associated with changes 
in lifestyle) between 1985 and 1987 are shown in the Table 3. 
Table 3: Changes in Personal Drawings Between 1985 and 1987. 
Change in Personal Drawings 
Increased spending by more than c.P.I. a 
Increased spending equal to C.P.I. 
Increased spending but by less than C.P.I. 
No change in actual spending 
Decreased actual amount spent 
a) C.P.I. = Consumer Price Index 
73 
Number 
34 
104 
60 
63 
lQl 
362 
% 
9 
29 
17 
18 
21 
100 
The 38% of respondents reporting increases in spending equal to, or more than, 
increases in the CPI suggests that not all dairy farmers had experienced 
hardship since 1985. Those with high equity and larger and more productive 
farms may have had the flexibility to adopt low cost strategies to counter the 
cost price squeeze and so preserve their lifestyle. Some of those reporting 
either increases or no change in their spending mentioned that off farm income 
had allowed them to maintain their lifestyle despite lower farm returns. 
A total of 217 responses were received to the question regarding other changes 
in lifestyle between 1985 and 1987. Of these 217 responses, 30 suppliers 
reported no major changes except increased care in both personal and farm 
spending. A representative verbatim selection of the remaining 187 responses is 
presented below: 
..... no holidays for 4 years and no weekends off for 3 years ..... 
.. ... no boarding school for kids ... " 
.... .less entertainment less eating out but more on kids education ..... 
.. ... house improvements on hold ..... 
" ... cheaper holidays ... with relatives and friends ... .. 
.. ... sold car, ute now only means of transport ... .. 
" ... reduced spending but family holidays still first priority ... " 
II ••• employed weekend milker to allow some leisure time ... II 
" ... diversified out of dairying .... 
II ••• no change thanks to other income ... II 
These verbatim responses were grouped into eight categories and are 
summarised in Table 4. 
Table 4: Number and Percentage of Reported Lifestyle Changes. 
Lifestyle Change Number % 
Reduced personal spending 18 9.6 
Reduced eating out 6 3.2 
Reduced recreation/entertainment 36 19.1 
Reduced holidays/vacations 84 44.7 
Reduced cost of childrens' education 8 4.3 
Reduced home improvements 8 4.3 
More careful planning 4 2.1 
Increased on-farm workload 23 12.7 
187 100 
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Reduction in recreation, entertainment and holidays was the most commonly 
reported change in lifestyle. These reductions may have prompted in part the 
pessimistic outlook of some respondents. Staying home on the farm, together 
with a reduction in recreational activity may have intensified introspection and 
worry over production, financial or lifestyle/family problems, and hence led to 
despondency for some respondents. 
DISCUSSION 
The survey reported here provided a data base on the managerial responses of 
dairy farmers to decreased product prices and removal of Government support. 
The analysis suggests that dairy farmers responded quickly to a changed 
economic environment in three main ways: by decreasing expenditure on 
discretionary farm inputs (repairs and maintenance, fertilizer, herd 
improvement); increasing stocking rate (both dairy and bull beef); earning 
additional income off the farm (mainly through wives seeking off-farm 
employment); and improving financial planning and control. A similar result was 
observed by Nicholls et al. (1990) in their study of hill country sheep and beef 
farmers. 
Major sources of information for planning and implementing these changes were 
other farmers (e.g. discussion groups), non-paid advisors(e.g. Dairy Board 
Consulting Officers), paid consultants (e.g. private and MAFTech consultants) 
and farming magazines. The medium term outlook of younger dairy farmers in 
the survey was surprisingly optimistic, given the trauma of the recent past and 
their likelihood of having relatively high debt servicing commitments. 
Discussion groups and opportunities for interaction with other farmers were 
reported to be most helpful in coping with the stress associated with changes in 
farm policy. Although a direct cause and effect relationship was not able to be 
established from the survey data, discussion group members were found to be 
significantly more optimistic about the future of dairying and achieved 
significantly higher average levels of milkfat production than non-members (not 
reported in this paper) over !he study period (Hughes et al. 1989). 
Dairy farmers in the survey population indicated a willingness to pay for advice 
from consultants. However, no differentiation was made in the questionnaire 
between types of consultant and it is likely that paid consultants included 
accountants, who may have been required to provide advice on the introduction 
of the Goods and Services Tax and other changes in tax legislation. 
The increased level of off-farm employment and greater attention to financial 
management provide an indication of higher levels of stress experienced during 
the study period. These two factors are likely to to have had a greater impact on 
the lifestyle of farm wives, more of whom had to find paid outside work. In 
many cases they also accepted greater responsibility for managing the farm's 
finances. The measurement of the stress associated with such changes in 
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farming practice and lifestyle is difficult (Rathge et aI. 1988). However, the 
magnitude of the management changes and the low optimism scores of some 
farmers recorded in the current study indicate that many dairy farming families 
were placed under considerable stress. With respect to off-farm employment, 
Acock and Deseram (1986) in an American study suggest that this would not 
necessarily result in increased marital instability where couples had an 
experienced farming background. They were less certain that this applied to 
relatively new and inexperienced entrants to farming. 
Many of the comments included with the returned questionaires indicated the 
determination of dairy farmers to survive financially. This study has provided 
evidence that farmers and their families are willing to change farming practices 
and to make considerable personal sacrifices to achieve this goal. 
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THE EFFICIENT PRICE OF ENERGY 
Ralph Lattimore 
Introduction 
Energy is an important component in industrial, household and agricultural use 
in New Zealand. Accordingly, the price of the various energy products need to 
be efficient if these sectors are to exploit market opportunities to the 
fullest. In a neoclassical framework efficient product prices are the 
opportunity cost of the resources they embody at world or border prices in a 
.. small country environment. 
Over the past fifteen years world energy prices have twice moved significantly 
upwards (1974 and 1979) and once downwards (1986). These market movements 
together with the continuing high degree of Government intervention makes the 
degree of pricing efficiency in the energy market less than fully transparent. 
As is shown in Graph I, energy prices in New Zealand have shown some 
interesting trends over this period. In the graph, petrol and electricity 
prices are compared in equivalent energy units, megajoules, MJ (where 1 KWH =. 
3.6 MJ). In 1971, domestic petrol prices were more than double world or 
equivalent border pri~es while electricity was considerably more expensive per 
MJ than petrol. As international liquid fuel prices rose from 1973, domestic 
fuel prices rose but at a slower rate and were even lower than world prices 
for times in 1979, 1981 and 1984. Electricity prices were regulated till 1988 
and fell below domestic petrol prices in 1974 and did not recover parity until 
1988. After 1984, both domestic energy product prices moved in the opposite 
direction 'from world energy prices. 
(1) Paper presented at the Annual meetings of the NZ Branch of the 
Australian Association of Agricultural Economists, Flock House, June 
1989. The author is Reader In Agricultural Economics at Lincoln 
College, Canterbury. 
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make preliminary estimates of the efficiency price of one traded energy 
product, petrol, and a non-traded product, electricity. 
The subject of this paper, in reality is a broad and complex issue that 
encompasses tax revenue and pollution 
the present analysis to focus directly 
energy asset sales. 
considerations. These are ignored in 
on the efficiency pricing issue and 
To the extent that energy prices are found to be above their efficient levels, 
policies and institutions ought to be altered if the energy industry to 
maximise their contribution to job creation and economic growth. 
Efficient Price of Petrol 
The efficient price of petrol is defined here as the opportunity cost of 
imported fuel at the wholesale level. It is estimated as the potential import 
price of premium grade petrol in foreign currency converted to NZ dollars at 
the opportunity cost of foreign exchange (the equilibrium exchange rate). 
The import price is derived from published world traded prices for petrol. 
The equilibrium exchange rate is derived from work carried out by Bascand and 
the official exchange rate is 
(1974 to 1984). Since the 
Carey (1985) which covered the period when 
thought to have been significantly overvalued 
currency was floated in 1985, the exchange rate is assumed to have been in 
equilibrium. 
The efficient wholesale price 
reported wholesale margin to the 
Table 4 for the period 1971-88. 
the border equivalent wholesale 
is then estimated by adding the officially 
import price. These results are reported in 
The efficient price is given in the Table as 
price. The efficient price may be compared 
with the actual wholesale prices for the same period. The border equivalent 
wholesale price is also presented at the market exchange rate for comparison. 
In 1971 the estimated efficient price of petrol was less than half the market 
price. As the world price rose throughout the 1970's the domestic price 
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tended towards the efficient price and 
period 1979 to 1984. Since then the two 
1988 the gap was slightly wider than it 
they virtually coincided over the 
prices have diverged again and in 
was in 1971 before the oil shocks. 
The taxation of petrol was at least 25 percent of the domestic price 
throughout the period, Table 2. The domestic-border price gap closed over the 
1979-84 period because the taxes were nullified by the effects of the exchange 
rate overvaluation. 
In 1988 the efficient price of petrol is estimated to have been around 32 
cents per litre at the wholesale level as compared to the actual market price 
of 76.6 cents per litre. This implies that the nominal rate of protection (or 
assistance) was 135 percent. This estimate is higher than the equivalent rate 
estimated by Syntec Economic Services for the petroleum refining industry for 
1987/88 (7 percent), Treasury (1988). However, the Syntec estimate does not 
appear to include the effects of taxes and special trade arrangements on 
petroleum products (p 45). The Syntec measure appears to measure supply side 
distortions only and ignores the demand side. 
The efficiency price estimate is probably biased in a number of ways. The 
import price is based on elF quotations, Suva which is related to particular 
volume and unloading considerations. The import price is biased downwards to 
the extent these factors are not offsetting. The wholesale margin used is 
thought to be biased upwards as it was regulated over the period. On balance, 
the efficient price is likely to be a slight over-estimate. 
The Efficient Price of Electricity 
The efficiency price of electricity must be estimated in the market for an 
essentially non-traded product. The market is represented by Figure 1. The 
curve D repr~sents the demand curve of electricity and S the supply curve. 
Demand is influenced by the degree of technical substitutability between 
alternative energy sources and their relative prices. Supply is influenced by 
the rising marginal cost of electricity generation. In equilibrium, supply 
must equal demand in NZ. Algebraically, the market can be represented in rate 
of change form by the following equations (1}-(): 
n1 
S = n1 *p 
D = -n *p + n *C 2 3 
S = D 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
where: D, Sand P represent the quantity demanded and supplied, and the 
price of electricity (rates of change). 
The ni are the behavioural parameters in elasticity form. 
C represents the rate of change of the price of substitutes for 
electricity. 
If the substitutes for electricity are traded goods, the efficient price of 
electricity will occur at the intersection of the competitive supply curve and 
the 'demand curve when the electricity substitute price is set at its 
opportunity cost. This can be shown algebraically by rearranging the above 
equations: 
(4) 
From equation (4) P will represent the efficient electricity price when C is 
the opportunity cost of its substitutes. 
I have been unable to find a complete set of longrun demand parameters for , 
electricity in New Zealand but they are available for other countries. 
Chapman et al (1972) found that own price elasticities of demand for 
electricity use in the US ranged from -1.7 for industrial use to -1.3 for 
household use. They also estimated that the cross price elasticity of demand 
for electricity was 0.15 with respect to natural gas in various uses. 
Furthermore Taylor (1977) in an extensive survey of energy demand parameters, 
noted wide ranging economic sUbstitution possibilities between electricity, 
gas, coal and liquid fuels in the longrun. For this reason, n1 and n3 are 
assumed initially to be -1.5 and 0.15, respectively where the substitute is 
taken to be petrol. 
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Bertram (1988) presents data on electric power output for all generating 
stations in NZ in ascending order of operating and management cost (Table 4). 
The costs of operating the hydro plants were in the range 0.09 to 2.71 cents 
per kilowatt/hour in 1983/84. The next cheapest ~lant cost 6.26 cents. The 
segment of the industry cost curve just prior to this plant, the first of the 
high cost units, was chosen to estimate the elasticity of the cost curve. 
That is, plants with costs between 1.31 and 2.71 cents/KWH. Lower cost plants 
generated 20.282 GWH. All plants with costs less than or equal to 2.71 
cents/KWH generated 24.54 GWH of electricity. The elasticity of this segment 
is around 0.2. Beyond this segment the cost curve becomes considerably more 
inelastic of the order of 0.05. The second reason for choosing this segment 
is that the supply price in 1983/84 of Electricorp was 3 cents which is close 
to the end of this segment. 
Using these initial parameter estimates in equation (4) and the 57.6 percent 
gap between the market and efficient price of petrol in 1988 (previous 
section) it is estimated that the electricity price in 1988 was above the 
efficiency price by 5.1 percent. 
The gap between the actual electricity price, Table 5, and the efficiency 
price is sensitive to the parameters chosen. The more inelastic are nl and n2 
and the larger is n3, the greater the difference between the actual power 
price and its efficient price level and vica versa. For example, in a New 
Zealand study the own price elasticity of demand for electricity was found to 
be -0.3 even in the longrun, Treasury (1989). If the price elasticity of 
demand is actually this lower figure -0.3, and the other parameters are the 
same (0.2 and 0.15) then the efficient electricity price is 17.3 percent lower 
than the current price. 
Summary and Conclusions 
To the extent these preliminary estimates are correct the use of electricity 
in New Zealand is too high and the price being charge is too high. 
Accordingly industrial and primary sector output is too low as are the number 
of jobs generated given our resource base. Furthermore the market value of 
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assets owned by the energy sector are also .higher than they would be at 
efficient energy price levels. 
This situation could potentially create a dilemma for a Government attempting 
to simultaneously reduce inflation and 
of resources and growth in the energy 
chosen to reduce the fiscal deficit to 
providing for an efficient allocation 
using industries. The Government has 
reduce inflation, in part, through 
project assets are higher, the higher 
are energy product prices, for electricity, natural gas, coal and liquid 
fuels. However, if energy product prices are significantly above their 
efficient levels, job and economic growth in the energy using industries will 
be lower than otherwise. 
asset sales. The value of the energy 
84 
00 
U1 
Graph I: ENERGY PRICES 
Cen tl/YJ Energy Equivalent 
lO~---------------
8 
6 
4 
2 -
o -l-- ¥ 
1971 ~---r----r---'--
1973 1975 1977 
T-
1979 1981 
YEARS 
-- Electricity -f- Domestic Petrol 
1.1 fl~. OF nUl aGY AnD WORLD IAN&: 
\. 
1983 1985 
* ... *. - ,I, 
~ 
1987 
*_. Border Petrol 
1989 
Figure 1: Efficient Price of Electricity 
Price 
Electricity 
Market 
Price 
Efficient 
Price 
86 
S Supply 
D1 (Domestic Prices> 
D Demand (Border Price) 
Quantity 
Electricity 
Tabie 1: International Prices of Petroleum Prices1 (USS/tonne) 
Petrol Diesel 
Year 91/92 Octane 95 Ron 53 Index 48/52 Index 
FOB Rotterdam CIF Suva FOB Rotterdam CIF Suva 
1971 25.1 30.5 
1972 30.4 26.8 
1973 87.8 83.6 
1974 131.1 103.3 
1975 120.3 100.0 
1976 137.9 107.4 
1977 131.6 117.8 
1978 160.0 128.6 
1979 335.0 310.9 
1980 358.0 307.1 
1981 354.1 298.7 
1982 323.6 289.7 
1983 283.2 248.2 
1984 257.4 238.3 
1985 255.2 326.02 239.8 244.66 
1986 146.0 178.39 142.3 98.83 
1987 222.35 182.67 
1988 187.49 148.41 
Source: lBRD (1988) Commodity Trade and Price Trends, The John Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore and IBRD, pers comm. 
1/ 1 tonne petrol and diesel of this specification is equivalent to 1340 and 
1160 litr~s respectively. 
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Table 2: New Zealand Petroleum Prices and Margins (cents/litre) 
Year NZ Import 
Price Petrol 
96 Octane 
Wholesale 
Margin 
Petrol (96) 
Total 
Petrol 
Taxes 
Wholesale 
Price 
Petrol (96) 
Retail 
Price 
Petrol (96) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1971 1.791 4.0 10.57 
1972 1.791 4.0 10.79 
1973 1.791 4.0 10.57 
1974 7.027 1. 788 4.66 13 .09 15.19 
1975 10.468 2.595 7.53 18.56 22.00 
1976 13 .005 2.953 9.36 25.22 27.00 
1977 13.991 3.000 10.11 26.94 29.60 
1978 13.515 3.712 12.13 28.50 31.60 
1979 17.646 4.321 13 .46 33.77 40.70 
1980 28.986 5.631 13.46 47.34 54.00 
1981 36.664 6.598 13.72 54.52 61.00 
1982 40.198 7.510 16.41 61.88 71.00 
1983 39.8-17 7.565 19.69 65.59 71.00 
1984 40.249 8.209 22.62 72 .41 89.20 
1985 44.054 8.964 30.51 87.10 90.00 
1986 35.107 10.827 33.22(6) 76.18 83.60 
1987E 27.746 10.844 43.70 82.37 92.00 
1988E 44.70 76.60 88.20 
Footnotes: (1)-(4): Ministry of Energy, Wellington Rex Young, pers comm. 
(5): Consumer Price Index, Department of Statistics, 
Christchurch, for November. 
(6): For 1986 includes GST of 1.945 c/litre, 1987, 7.585 
c/litre. 
88 
Table 3: Exchange Rates 
Market Exchange Rate Equilibrium 
Year Exchange Rate Overvaluation Exchange Rate 
(US$/NZS) (percent) (USS/NZS) 
(l) (2) (3) 
1968 1.1121 0 1.11 
1969 1.1198 0 1.12 
1970 1.1161 +1 1.10 
1971 1.1952 +10 1.08 
1972 1.1952 -1 1.21 
1973 1.4284 -11 1. 59 
1974 1. 3155 .-5 1. 38 
1975' 1.0437 +23 0.80 
1976 0.95 +19 0.77 
1977 1. 0197 +9 0.93 
1978 1.0666 +19 0.86 
1979 0.9862 +11 0.88 
1980 0.9623 +10 0.87 
1981 0.8244 +18 0.68 
1982 0.7325 +18 0.60 
1983 0.6546 +23 0.50 
1984 0.4776 +22 0.37 
1985 0.4985 +4 0.48 
1986 0.5235 0 0.52 
1987 0.6575 0 0.66 
1988 0.6423 0 0.64 
Source: (I) International Financial Statistics, IMF, Washington DC various 
issues. 
(2) From Lattimore (1987), Table 3. 
(3) Column (1) * (1 - Column (2}/100). 
89 
Table 4: Nominal Rate of Protection for Petrol 
Year Domestic 
Wholesale Price 
cents/litre 
(l) 
1971 8.47 
1972 8.69 
1973 8.47 
1974 13 .09 
1975 18.56 
1976 25.22 
1977 26.94 
1978 28.50 
1979 33.77 
1980 47.34 
1981 54.52 
1982 61.88 
1983 65.59 
1984 72.41 
1985 87.10 
1986 76.18 
1987 8~.37 
1988 76.60 
Border Equivalent(4) 
Import Wholesale Wholesale 
Price Margin Price 
centres/li tre 
(2) 
1. 94 1. 79 3.73 
2.36 1. 79 4.15 
5.69 1. 79 7.48 
9.23 1. 79 11.02 
10.67 2.60 13 .27 
13 .44 2.95 16.39 
11.95 3.00 14.95 
13 .89 3.71 17.60 
31.45 4.32 35,.77 
34.45 5.63 40.08 
39.77 ·6.60 46.37 
40.91 7.51 48.42 
40.06 7.57 47.62 
49.90 8.21 58.11 
47.40 8.96 56.37 
25.8~ 10.83 36.65 
25.05 10.84 35.89 
21.62 10.84 32.41 
Nominal Rate 
Protection 
Market Equilibrium 
Exchange Exchange 
percent 
(3) 
127 115 
110 111 
13 23 
19 24 
40 12 
54 29 
.80 67 
62 36 
-6 -15 
18 8 
18 -1 
28 8 
38 9 
25 0 
55 50 
108 107 
129 130 
136 135 
Source: (I) The wholesale price of 96 Octane petrol extrapolated from 1973 
to 1971 using the retail margin for 1974, Table 2. 
(2) From Table 1 and 3, the international price of petrol f.o.b. 
Rotterdam converted to NZ dollars, raised 25 percent for ocean 
freight and unloading changes and raised 2.7 percent to equalise 
the energy rating of 96 Octane (34.5 MJ/litre) with 92 Octane 
(33.6 MJ/litre), Energy Data and Conversion Data, NZERDC, Report 
No 100, University of Auckland. 
(J) Column (1) - (2) I (2) . 
(4) At the market exchange rate. 
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Table 5: Retail Electricity Prices (cents/KWH) 
Year Large Government Power Territorial Weighted 
Users Departments Boards Authorities Average 
1970 0.674 1.604 1.228 1.606 1.176 
1971 0.653 1.459 1.221 1.573 1.154 
1972 1. 617 1.248 1.572 1.306 
1973 1.446 1. 253 1.570 1.306 
1974 1.488 1.222 1.582 1.278 
1975 1.535 1.252 1.626 1.308 
1976 1.621 1.309 1. 748 1. 375 
1977 2.218 1.844 2.413 1. 928 
1978 0.673 3.354 2.547 3.384 1. 658 
1979 1.001 3.463 2.635 3.530 1.877 
1980 1. 382 4.860 3.799 4.871 2.655 
1981 1.549 5.452 4.062 5.292 2.917 
1982 1.698 6.164 4.438 5.774 3.200 
1983 1. 957 6.880 5.132 6.544 3.640 
1984 2.099 6.983 4.971 6.561 3.538 
1985 2.261 6.518 5.066 6.371 3.665 
1986 2.602 8.324 6.161 7.580 4.459 
1987 3.072 8.252 7.374 7.893 4.929 
1988 3.072 9.101 7.983 8.441 5.171 
Source :" Mr D O'Neill, Ministry of Energy, Wellington pers camm. 
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PRIVATISING WATER: AN ANALYSIS OF INITIATIVES 
TO SELL COMMUNITY IRRIGATION SCHEMES 
AND TO CREATE WATER MARKETS 
Walter Moore & Murray Arthur-Worsop* 
Policy Services, MAFCorp 
PO Box 2526, Wellington 
ABSTRACT 
As part of its asset sales programme, the Government is transferring 
Crown interests in irrigation schemes to the irrigators. These sales are 
predicated, in part, on the grounds that economic efficiency will be 
enhanced by granting irrigators financial and management independence 
from Government. Although at an early stage, number of efficiency and 
equity concerns have been raised by the transfer process. These include 
asset valuation, the effects of the transfer on resource allocation and 
exclusion of non agricultural buyers. This paper discusses the 
mechanisms of the irrigation sales and the general economic implications 
of the transfer process. A recent sale of the lower Waitaki irrigation 
scheme is used to highlight the sales process. 
A separate but related issue is the possible use of transferable permits 
to allocate water resources in New Zealand. This policy change, 
proposed by the Resource Management Law Reform, would give regional 
governments the right to create and govern water markets within their 
'jurisdiction. The relevant economic and institutional issues of 
creating water markets are reviewed and several recommendations are 
offered. 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not 
necessarily those of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, The 
Treasury, or the Ministry for the Environment. 
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1.0 INTRODOCTION 
In 1988 the Government announced its intention to sell its shares 
of 52 1 community irrigation schemes. This directive was a marked 
departure from previous high levels of Government involvement in 
both the funding of scheme development and the management (conduct) 
of the schemes on behalf of agricultural users. Principal reasons 
for the asset sales were to recapture a proportion of past 
expenditure and to allow more efficient pricing of irrigation 
services and water resources to occur. While the asset sales 
programme is only partly completed, several precedents have been 
set which may affect the overall efficiency of the resource 
transfer. 
Concurrently, the ongoing Resource Management Law Reform (RMLR) is 
attempting to legislate better definitions of water rights and to 
rationalise regional systems of water allocation. This allocation 
process is a relatively inflexible one, existing of semi-permanent 
"rights" issued by regional water boards. The RMLR has indicated 
its approval for regional systems of transferrable water permits to 
be introduced. This would give better definition of property 
rights, account for changing water demands and account for third 
party effects. This system of tradeable rights and appropriate 
regulations, if implemented correctly, could add an important 
mechanism to promote effic·ient water use in New Zealand. 
The purposes of this paper are: 
(a) to review past irrigation and water rights policies; 
(b) to outline prospective changes in policy; and 
(c) to discuss the efficiency and distributive implications of the 
asset sales and RMLR proposals, both separately and in 
relation to one another. 
For five of these schemes it appeared the Crown. had no interest and 
therefore they dropped out of the sale process. 
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2. 0 PREVIOUS POLICY AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
Government has extensively controlled both the delivery and 
allocation of water. This has been done by owning much of the 
means by which water is abstracted {irrigation, municipal supplies, 
electricity} and by controlling the allocation of water 
resource/rights. Historically this is broadly consistent with 
water policies in other countries such as the USA or Australia, 
where water has generally been considered a "special" or public 
good, despite its obvious economic values {Watson et aI, 1987; 
OECD, 1987; Gardner and Huffaker, 1988}. 
Given the relative abundance of water resources through most of 
this century, water management has concentrated solely on supply 
issues rather than on the demand side. This system has sufficed 
given relatively little conflict of water use and allocation. 
However, the allocative wrangle over the Rakaia River in the early 
1980's indicated that the old system had difficulty coping with new 
demand and increasing opportunity costs of water use. In areas 
where water is fully allocated pressure exists for water to be 
transferred to other consumptive and also in-stream uses, but the 
current regulatory system lacks the means to do so. 
2.1 Irrigation Policy 
2 
Government has been the principal agent in developing all community 
irrigation schemes. To date it has assisted in the development of 
492 community irrigation schemes to water over 160,000 hectares on 
roughly 2,500 properties, about 3% of current farm holdings and 
about 60% of total the irrigated area in New Zealand. The 40 South 
Island schemes supply water mainly for pasture and crops while the 
9 North Island Schemes are solely for horticulture. The first 
scheme was completed in 1916, with the majority of present schemes 
developed since the 1960's. Several schemes still have off-farm 
works that are incomplete. Current capita~ replacement costs for 
Crown backed Schemes are valued at over $500 million {Audit Office, 
1987} . 
Government has funded the majority of costs required to develop 
schemes, including investigation costs, costs of headworks, 
distribution systems and in some case even on-farm delivery systems 
(Audit Office, 1987; Lewthwaite and Martin, 1987). While the share 
of Crown funding of these schemes has varied over time, the 
majority of community schemes were built with over 50% of off-farm 
capital costs borne by the taxpayer (table 1). In addition, 
on-farm irrigation expenditure was eligible for concessional Rural 
Bank development loans with capital and interest repayments 
commencing after 3 years under the policy of the early 1980's. For 
example, the Amuri Plains Irrigation Scheme had an estimated 
private rate of return to irrigators in 1978 of 33% with all 
available subsidies and 14% without the on-farm subsidies (Greer, 
1984). Once completed, the former Ministry of Works and Development 
(MWD) would manage the schemes and enforce water charges. The MWD 
The number recorded in the Report of the Audit Office (1987); three 
schemes were excluded from their total. 
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has effectively subsidised delivery costs and water charges to 
irrigators, as most schemes have operated at a loss. As a manager, 
the MWD was unable or unwilling to recapture the majority o~ the 
unpaid irrigators share of construction costs with the consequence 
that $60-$80 million worth of irrigator debts are still 
out standing3 • 
Table 1: Government Share of Irrigation Scheme CaEital Costs 
(indicative years only) 
.. 
1960/61 1973/74 1978/79 1984/85 1988/89 
% 
Headworks 100 100 100 35 0 
Distribution Works 100 50 50 35 0 
On-farm Works 0 33 50 0 0 
On-going Capital and 
Maintenance 
Expenditure ($million) NA 6.7 5.5 20.9 12.6 
Source: Audit Office (1987), Estimates of Expenditure. 
2.2 Water Allocation Policy 
3 
, 
Traditionally the right to abstract water has been administered 
through the Water and Soil Conservation Act and allocated through a 
system of water rights' issued by regional water boards. Rights 
are granted under a beneficial use criteria (RMLR, 1988) and 
established through administrative and sometimes legal decisions. 
Water allocation policy follows the riparian doctrine that 
considers water a public resource, held in trust by the Crown 
(Verdich, 1987). Property owners; say with an irrigation permit, 
do not have ownership rights to water resources but only a right to 
withdraw water by virtue of its attachment to a property. Use 
permits under this system are granted t~ provide security to 
existing permit holders (Checchio and Colby, 1988), and to prevent 
gross misuse from occurring. 
With the dissolution of Ministry of Works and Development in 1988, 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) has undertaken the 
interim management of schemes. With the exception of several 
schemes in Central Otago, schemes that have completed their 
development period are now meeting full operating and maintenance 
costs. 
The consents to withdraw water have been called "rights" in the 
past, but in fact rights are held by the Crown. Thus the term is 
somewhat misleading as it implies legal ownership. The new 
legislation will use the term permit rather than right to more 
accurately reflect the status of the right. 
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2.3 Effectiveness of Past Policies 
5 
While never having an explicit irrigation policy, outside of 
general guidelines in various Public Works Act, it can be concluded 
that a de facto policy existed whereby irrigation was subsidised as 
part of a general assistance framework for agriculture. It appears 
that special targeting for irrigation development occurred as 
assistance rates were considerably higher than for other 
agricultural projects (The Treasury, 1984). This has meant a 
sizeable resource transfer to the agricultural sector. without the 
high subsidy rates it is doubtful that a large number of pastoral 
irrigation schemes would ever of been developed on private grounds 
(Audit Office, 1987)5 although Greer (1984) found that private 
benefits in some cases were s~gnificant. 
While the large transfer of taxpayer monies to irrigators "does not 
result in major net welfare losses in itself, the subsidies and 
regulatory environment can cause resource misallocation and misuse 
of water resources to occur. This happened as national resources 
were locked into investments which in some instances had low or . 
negative returns. Hence the rising demand for scarce capital and 
water resources has exposed the need to account for the opportunity 
costs of these resources and the inherent flexibility of this 
system. 
This system also inhibits short-term volume transfers, as in the 
case of drought, causing further efficiency losses. Tenure was 
often granted for periods of 40 years. The only transfer of rights 
that could occur was between successive owners of land or if the 
Crown revoked and reissued a permit. Market forces were 
effectively ignored under the administrative ("supply management") 
allocation scheme. 
The resultant efficiency problem is that the water delivered to 
irrigators in community irrigation schemes has been undervalued. 
While water charges, to recover operating, maintenance and some 
financial costs have been in place since the 1960's, actual 
revenues have not always met average delivery costs, let alone any 
opportunity costs of the water. This promotes inefficiency in 
water consumption, with subsidy benefits captured only by initial 
landowners (The Treasury 1984). Resources were not allowed to 
move to areas of highest return, lowering national returns from 
water use programmes. Taxpayers have, in general, got very poor 
returns on their investments. These policies are no longer deemed 
affordable or justifiable given the move to treat sectors more 
neutrally within the economy and the increasing demand for water 
resources. 
For major investments involving Government Subsidy, an economic 
report is normally required to show that the investment meets 
certain economic criteria set by Government. However, the 
experience of MAP has been that even when these criteria were n9t 
met, decisions were sometimes made on political considerations. 
Also in predicting investment returns, Government has tended to be 
over-optimistic. 
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3.0 THE NEW POLICY EMPHASIS 
3.1 Rationale for Sale of Irrigation Schemes 
The combination of management inefficiencies (as discussed in 
Section 2.0), and scheme cost overruns has imposed high costs on 
the taxpayer and caused concern and frustrations for Government 
and irrigators. This concern led to a series of policy 
announcements over the past two years in which the Government 
stated its intention to: 
(a) seek to place all community irrigation schemes on a fully 
commercial basis including full operating cost recovery; 
(b) remove Government from ownership and management of 
community irrigation schemes and to eliminate all 
Government funding. 
Transferring the ownership and control to a party with strong 
incentives to improve the management and efficiency of the 
schemes was seen as the best answer to the deficiencies of past 
scheme operation and development. Therefore, new institutional 
arrangements are needed to provide incentives for the greatest 
commercial benefits from the schemes. 
3.2 The Sale Process 
Government recently agreed to the sale of the first scheme (the 
Lower Waitaki Scheme). This followed the completion of 
negotiations and the preparation of a Sale and Purchase 
Agreement. Agreement in principle has been reached with a 
further 11 of the remaining 46 schemes. 
Several options were considered for future scheme ownership, 
including the irrigators, a State Owned Enterprise (SOE) to be 
created from the commercial arm of the Ministry of Works and 
Development, and territorial local authorities. Although the 
first two options were considered to meet the objectives of 
least cost commercialisation, it was felt that irrigator 
ownership would provide greater incentive for efficient 
operation and maintenance of the schemes through direct 
involvement and therefore greater accountability. Schemes 
owned and operated by the SOE or a territorial local authority 
would be in a position of monopoly supply with rent-seeking 
potentials. 
A further consideration was one of fairness or equity. 
Community irrigation schemes have been a joint undertaking 
between the Crown and irrigators, and it was considered fair to 
offer irrigators the first right of refusal for the Crown share. 
The Government therefore decided to offer existing users (lithe 
irrigators") the first opportunity to purchase the Government's 
interest. 
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3.2.1 
3.2.2 
Benefits to Irrigators 
The transfer of ownership to irrigators is expected to benefit 
irrigators by removing central government from the operation of 
the scheme. This should lead to more efficient operation, 
greater flexibility, more security and long term investment 
incentives. Additionally irrigators would have direct 
representation before and in negotiation with regional water 
boards. 
Water should now be priced at its marginal delivery costs, with 
a greater emphasis on conservation and generally improved 
operational efficiency. There are many examples of privately 
owned irrigation schemes operating successfully in New Zealand. 
There is ample precedent that schemes can be privately owned and 
managed. (Touche Ross, 1988). 
Benefits to Central Government 
As already noted, the primary objective of transferring 
community irrigation schemes is to improve the efficiency of 
irrigation management in New Zealand. Such a transfer of 
ownership provides a clear opportunity to restructure the 
existing debt as recorded in the Government's accounts for each 
scheme. Additional, benefits to Government include a reduction 
or elimination of the current operating deficit, revenue from 
the sale of the Crown's interest, and the transfer of 
responsibilities, and liabilities for refurbishment and 
development of schemes to the new owners. 
3.3 Transferable Water Permits: Rationale 
A system of well defined and tradable property rights would have 
·a number of advantages over the current water allocation scheme. 
These include greater flexibility and security, better 
information on resource values, minimal transactions costs and 
the ability to accommodate new resource values (Checchio and 
Colby,' 1988; Hide, 1987). Flexibility comes from being able to 
allocate water in accord with demand and changing use values. 
Security is to be gained by actual ownership of the right, as 
opposed to Crown ownership. The allocation process has the 
potential to be more transparent as resource values will emerge 
through bidding amongst alternative users. Given a well defined 
statutory and regulatory environment, information regarding 
transfer arrangements and possibilities are also available, 
limiting uncertainty and ultimately transactions costs. As 
Coase has theorised, tradable resource rights will lead to an 
efficient allocation of resources, regardless of the initial 
distribution of these rights. This conclusion is based on the 
key assumptions that transactions costs and wealth effects are 
minimal (Coase, 1960). It should be noted that the transaction 
costs under the current system would be almost infinite. 
The Resource Management Law Reform (RMLR) is a fundamental 
review of New Zealands natural resource laws with an objective 
of bringing various Act's up to date to reflect current 
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management needs and issues (including the Treaty of Waitangi) . 
and to make the laws governing resource use more equitable and 
consistent. In the view of the Land, Water and Minerals Core 
Group of the RMLR, the current system of water management has 
several major deficiencies relating to the definition and 
allocation of water use rights. Their findings conclude that: 
(a) uses such as recreation, conservation and spiritual values 
(in stream uses) are often provided for only implicity in 
the granting of water rights; 
(b) some water use rights do not specify clearly what t~e right 
holder is entitled to, or place inadequate restrictions on 
the right holder to protect t.he interests of other water 
uses; 
(c) the present system of allocating water may not be the most 
cost-efficient way of enabling water to be used where it is 
valued most highly (RMLR Core Group, 1988). 
The first criticism indicates that the growing in-stream uses 
have not been explicitly valued while the second highlights the 
problems of an inflexible and publicly administered allocation 
system. Alternative uses and third party effects are 
effectively ignored in granting rights and the current system 
does not explicitly allow for liability of users as there is 
little the water users can be liable for. The existing system 
is felt to be inequitable to "new" users, and the lack of 
defined use rights can lead to problems with administering 
quality standards. The third criticism applies when there are 
competing interests in water use as the existing system does not 
allow for valuing of alternative water uses. Third parties and 
competing users can easily overstate the value of water 
resourceS to them as they do not face actual costs, while 
existing users have no incentive to forego some or all of their 
rights as they would not be compensated. This creates very high 
transaction costs in water allocation policy. 
3.4 Proposed Changes 
The move to creating a system of transferable water permits 
(TWP's), will occur at two levels. A national Act will approve 
the legality of TWP's and set down basic requirements for their 
implementation. The bulk of the responsibility will then fall 
upon the regional councils to design regional resource 
management plans in order to establish the new water allocation 
framework and the rules of water rights and transfer. The 
establishment of the regional plan's will be consultative in 
nature and will dictate the constraints and opportunities for 
TWP's. The councils would need to determine: 
the amount of water reserved for in-stream uses 
management (allocative). approaches for periods of low water 
flow 
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the regulatory agency to register all permits and 
transfers, as well as handling the notification, hearing 
and appeal process (for transfer) 
that adequate information (including decision criteria) for 
participants in a TWP scheme is available so the parties 
can decide whether a proposed transfer can occur 
the conditions and liabilities of the permit. This would 
include the exclusiveness, transferability, volume, 
possible external effects, and enforceability of the right. 
The terms and conditions attached to the permit will ultimately 
influence their value. The greater the certainty and 
information available for TWP's, the more likely this scheme is 
to be successful in creating trade and efficient pricing of 
water resources. While this may appear a major undertaking for 
regional bodies, it is felt that they possess the expertise to 
implement the TWP scheme. Much of the process is to make the 
existing water allocation process more explicit and transparent. 
The principal tasks for regional government will be to establish 
the legal and regulatory framework, and to establish the 
allocative framework for granting in-stream rights. 
Experience from South Australia indicates that with resource 
scarcity and effective regulations, water markets can achieve 
better water allocation. On the other hand, uncertainty over 
the tenure of water rights in Victoria and New South Wales meant 
that markets were slow to develop (Verdich, 1986). A cautious 
approach in implementation needs to be taken so as not to create 
significant uncertainties amongst current resource users. The 
Australian experience does show that participants have warmed to 
the process as the potential for the TWP scheme is realised and 
incorporated into their investment strategies. 
3.5 TWP's and Agriculture 
The TWP scheme, if successfully implemented, has considerable 
benefits and some potential costs to the agricultural community. 
Active markets in water rights can create opportunities to 
respond to changing economic and climatic conditions. Water 
transfers can augment water supplies to municipal and industrial 
uses, precluding the need to invest in new dams and diversion 
systems. Money flowing into the agricultural sector through the 
sale or lease of water rights can be reinvested to improve 
irrigation efficiencies or other applications and flow on to 
rural communities. 
Water transfers within the agricultural sector can also offer 
significant benefits as the potential exists to move water to 
its highest value use. This is especially important during 
periods of water shortage and would help to promote short-term 
adjustment (Verdich, 1986). 
The principal adverse consequence of intra-sectoral water 
transfer is in the area of 3rd party effects. Withdrawals 
reduce in-stream flows, leading to constraints on aquatic values 
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and water available to other users. To alleviate these problems 
the regulatory framework governing TWP's must include provisions 
which will protect 3rd parties from damage due to water 
transfers. Whether a compensation criteria can be added in the 
approval process to satisfy 3rd part effects is yet to be seen. 
A common but myopic criticism of TWP's is that future local 
income may be reduced through capital disinvestments. This is 
purely a distributional issue though as national benefits can be 
improved through market transfer resulting in a net welfare 
gain. 
A possible initial constraint on developing water permits 
markets is the ownership of the irrigation schemes mentioned 
above. It is likely that the scheme itself would hold a single 
right qver the water supplied to all properties. Irrigators 
merely purchase water and delivery services from the company and 
would have no rights to transfer water per se. If irrigators 
are unable to transfer their "share ll of the water right, a major 
impediment to ~ater transfer within agriculture may develop. 
This could be overcome if irrigators are allowed to IIbid ll for 
water supplies from a company, who creates a market within the 
limits of its permit. However, potential irrigators outside the 
physical supply network of the scheme may be precluded from 
gaining rights as they would may have to bid for the entire 
permit, rather than marginal quantities. This is akin to the 
wealth effect discussed by Coase in his property rights theorem. 
This could only be resolved if the lIoutside l1 irrigator could bid 
for a portion of the scheme's right, eg a volume transfer. 
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4.0 TRANSITION PROCESS - CASE STUDY OF A SALE 
4.1 Sale and Negotiation Process 
It is proposed to go into only brief details of the process 
involved in the transfer of schemes as details are provided in 
the Appendix. 
To assist the irrigators possible ownership structures for each 
scheme were investigated by consultants (Touche Ross, 1988). 
Following this, a fair market value is to be set by negotiation 
between the Crown and the, irrigators, with differences between 
assets and liabilities being settleq by a cash payment. 
One of the key issues in the whole process is the extent of 
Crown ownership in irrigation schemes. For five of the original 
52 schemes it appeared the Crown had no interest and therefore 
they dropped out of the sale process. For the remaining 47 
schemes it was conc1uded that the legal ownership position is 
clearly that the Crown has 100 percent ownership, as in the case 
of a mortgage. However, it was agreed that in any settlement it 
would be fair and reasonable to recognise the capital 
contributions made by the irrigators. 
Government also agreed to a final offer arbitration procedure, 
to facilitate a quick settlement to negotiations. While the 
Crown would be obligated to sell at the arbitrated price the 
irrigators would be under no obligation to buy. In order to 
avoid a monopoly buyer situation, it was considered desirable 
for irrigators to be aware the Government is not prepared to 
sell "at any price", and that if irrigators do not exercise 
their option to purchase at the arbitrated price other parties 
would be invited to purchase at that price. 
Determining a fair market value provides a basis for the parties 
to agree on the terms of transfer and a means to ensure that the 
interests of both parties are given full consideration. The 
first step of the valuation is to calculate the value of the 
water to irrigators based on its realisable value productivity. 
This value represents the potential revenue from the sale of 
water to irrigators. The valuation model (developed jointly by 
MAF and The Treasury) then takes these revenues together with 
any other revenues and the expected operating and maintenance 
costs to produce pre-tax and post-tax cash flows. The post-tax 
cashflow is discounted at the required post-tax discount rate to 
produce an economic value for the scheme. Further details are 
provided in the next Section and the Appendix. 
4.2 Lower Waitaki Example 
As noted in Section 3.2 the Lower Waitaki Scheme was the first 
scheme the Government agreed to sell. Details of the sale and 
purchase agreement, including the sale price, remain 
confidential at this stage. However, the sale of this scheme 
still provides a good case study. The scheme assets include the 
physical assets (land, buildings, water races, plant and 
machinery, etc), water supply agreements and water rights. 
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The valuation of the scheme was derived using production data 
provided by MAF, discount rates of 11% real pre-tax and 7.5% 
real post-tax', and 'estimated operating and management costs. 
The discount rates and cost estimates were agreed with the 
irrigators. This information was then used to estimate the 
gross margins for each of the current land uses in the scheme 
and produce a value which would represent the "economic" or 
productive value of the scheme to the irrigators. 
" . 
This figure was then adjusted (downwards) to recognise that as a 
normal commercial product, water can be used as an input for a 
wide range of products on-farm. Therefore it cannot be sold to 
individuals at different prices reflecting land uses in narrowly 
defined areas. Because in the Lower Waitaki Scheme the 
predominant land use is sheep farming (approx 60 % of irrigated 
area), the valuation was recalculated assuming that the gross 
margins for sheep applied to the full scheme area. Other land 
uses include dairying, which has a higher marginal value, and 
therefore obtains some economic rent. The adjustment to the 
methodology therefore produces a significantly lower scheme 
value, but one which is considered to be representative of a 
"realistic" economic or market value. This is really the 
marginal value to the sheep farmer and not an average value per 
se. 
4.3 Irrigator Equity 
Although the Crown's legal position on the ownership of the 
Schemes is clear, the Scheme'S value derives from past 
investment both by the Crown, in the form of construction costs, 
grants, subsidies and accumulated scheme debts, and by the 
irrigators in the form of on-farm development costs. This was 
dealt with by recognising that the two sets of investments are 
equivalent to shares in a partnership, with one partner now 
having the opportunity to buyout the other. In the case of the 
Lower Waitaki Scheme this results in about 60 percent/40 percent 
irrigators/Crown split. 
4.4 Commercial Value 
, 
The next step was to derive a commercial value for the scheme, 
based on expected after tax cashflows derived from a capital 
structure with a debt/equity ratio that is considered "normal". 
To value an irrigation scheme on this basis it was necessary to 
determine the cashflows. This was done using the expenditures 
agreed with the irrigators plus realistic revenue assumptions 
for water charges and other sources of revenue (sales of water 
to users other than irrigators). The average water charge to 
irrigators was derived taking into account the irrigation gross 
margin for sheep farming, farmers ability to pay, and charges 
The required scheme post-tax rate is the rate of return that 
would be required by an investor in the irrigation company. It 
is based on Treasury's analysis of longterm rates of return on 
equity investment in New Zealand and current rates of return on 
rural investment. 
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from other schemes. Water is also supplied to Waitaki 
International and Oamaru Borough, and revenue from these sales 
was derived using current (cheap) prices. 
The offer that was finally accepted from the irrigators was 
below Treasurys' estimate of the commercial value of the scheme. 
The price offered by the irrigators was constrained by their 
method of financing (no equity and therefore 100% debt 
financing) . 
The irrigators intend to operate the scheme on a co-operative 
basis with the objective of delivering the water at least cost 
to each farm rather than operating it as a business with the 
objective of maximising net returns to the (irrigator) 
shareholders through profits and dividends. 
Acceptance was recommended because: 
(a) irrigators were unlikely to improve their offer for the 
above reason; any higher price would need to be obtained 
from an alternative purchaser with the attendant delays, 
and opposition from the farming community. 
(b) the offer removed the Crown from any ongoing liabilities 
for the schemes. As noted in section 5.1 below, this is 
now the ma~n objective of the exercise rather than 
maximising sale price; and 
(c) agreement to this sale would serve as a useful signal to 
the remaining schemes about the Crown's determination to 
dispose of these schemes. 
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5.0 SOME OBSERVATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
5.1 Outcome of the Transfer Process 
Very few schemes are expected to realise a significant sale 
price, and where liabilities exceed assets, as with some 
schemes, they may be a net payment to irrigators. 
Some of the reasons for not realising a significant sale price 
are highlighted in the Lower Waitaki case study in Section 4.0. 
Most important is the divergence between the economic or market 
value of a scheme and its commercial value based 9n irrigator's 
ability (and therefore willingness in the absence of alternative 
bidders) to pay for water. Government is therefore placing a 
high value on removing the Crown's ongoing liability to fund 
schemes, rather than to achieving a large sale price. Issues of 
equity and irrigators' ability to pay are likely to override any 
immediate economic efficiency gains. Nevertheless, it is 
expected that some efficiency gains will be made in the longer 
term for reasons indicated earlier. However, to achieve 
efficient pricing, the opportunity cost of water should be 
included. This will only occur with the establishment of 
tradeable property rights for water. 
5.2 The Need for a New Regulatory Framework 
It is apparent that the current system of water rights 
allocation is not flexible enough to handle the growing demands 
upon water resources. A new regulatory framework is needed to 
bring water resource management into the era of resource 
scarcity and to ensure maximum efficiency. While it is likely 
that water allocation and resource use efficiency would benefit 
from a tradeable rights scheme, there needs to enough confidence 
and transparency in the process for it to succeed. The biggest 
impediment to this scheme is the establishment of an appropriate 
legal and regulatory framework. This must be done in a way that 
maximises transparency of the allocative process. The Regional 
Councils must disseminate information about the scheme and 
transfer process to minimise uncertainty and transactions costs 
among parties. These aspects are critical to the success of 
TWP's and lessons from Australia and the United St~tes can be 
incorporated to ensure the scheme works in areas where competing 
water demands exist. 
The other principal area of concern regards transfer options. 
Current wordings of the RMLR proposal do not include the option 
of short-term or volume transfers. As found in Australia this 
is an important aspect in creating resource use efficiencies and 
in establishing the credibility of a market for water rights 
(Verdich, 1986). It would be preferable to include the option 
of water rights leasing in the National Act rather than leave it 
to regional discretion. 
Finally, the possible wealth inequities of permits held by 
irrigation schemes may have to be addressed. The rights of 
individual irrigators vis a vis the scheme itself will need to 
be spelled out. It would be preferable if individual irrigators 
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could transfer their share of scheme water, even if only on a 
lease basis. Otherwise the irrigation permit becomes an all or 
nothing asset, with few distinguishing features from the current 
water rights tenure. 
5.3 Concluding Comment 
Clearly the Lower Waitaki scheme has been undervalued in 
economic terms, while both the market value and a commercial 
value were established, the agreed price is less than even the 
commercial value. This results in an effective subsidy to non 
marginal users. Howeyer, this was inevitable given the strong 
equity considerations (the price was considered to be all that 
the irrigators could pay) and the absence of competing bidders. 
Both these constraints have been imposed by Government to a 
greater or lesser extent. The sale process has been largely 
governed therefore by political considerations. 
Nonetheless, it is still expected that most of the within scheme 
benefits will be obtained through privatising. However, the 
opportunity for major efficiency gains rests with the 
introduction of the TWP scheme. This will allow better economic 
values, particularly opportunity costs, to be placed on water 
resources. This will force water users to consider the full 
value of the irrigation and water resources with a consequent 
improvement in allocation as values are equated with benefits. 
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APPENDIX: ASSET VALUATION ISSUES 
1 Assets/Liabilities 
1.1 Crown Assets 
The Crown assets generally comprise: 
(a) The future net earning capacity of the physical assets and 
associated rights either at market prices or as specified in 
existing legal agreements (alternatively the break up value) . 
.. (b) The present value of the supply agreements and minimum payment 
requirements gazetted as part of the scheme. 
(c) The debts owed by the individuals within the scheme on account 
of both capital and maintenance costs. 
1.2 Crown Liabilities 
The Crown liabilities generally comprise: 
(a) Implicit scheme insurance (contingent liabilities). 
(b) commitments to supply water. 
(c) operation and maintenance costs. 
2 Crown Ownership 
Several issues arose in relation to the determination of Crown 
ownership: 
(a) Schemes built since 1975 have required irrigators to pay 
contributions (of varying amounts) to the capital cost of 
schemes. Some irrigators argue that this contribution vests 
them with a proportional share of the scheme'S equity. 
(b) Some irrigators argue the Crown contribution to capital costs 
of the scheme is an unencumbered grant, so that once the 
irrigators have paid the specified portion of capital 
(sometimes as low as 30 percent of total costs) they own 100 
percent of the scheme's equity. 
(c) The provisions of the Public Works Act, the Crown's liability 
to pay compensation, the insurance risks and the basis of 
setting charges all strongly support total Crown ownership. 
3 Valuation Methods 
The valuation model was developed jointly by MAF and Treasury, and 
set up initially using data provided by MAF. 
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Factors which have the most significant impact on the valuation 
include: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
the assumed long term gross margins from various types of land 
use; 
the assumed future changes in land use; 
the post-tax discount rate; 
the availability and security of water supplies; 
future operation, maintenance and refurbishment costs; 
risks and liabilities associated with: the scheme; 
the costs of surveying and registering easements. 
The approach adopted was to construct a combined economic and 
financial model of each scheme. 
Irrigation schemes have value for several reason: 
(a) they allow production increases in both quality and quantity; 
(b) they enable some land uses that would not otherwise be 
feasible (for example; dairying in Canterbury and North Otago, 
horticulture); 
(c) they provide an insurance against disastrous or debilitating 
losses from drought. 
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THE NEW ZEALAND PASTORAL SECTOR 
SUPPLY RESPONSES: 
PRELIMINARY MODELLING RESULTS 
S SriRamaratnam and R G Reynolds 
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This paper reports early results of an on-going study into supply and investment response in the New 
Zealand pastoral sector. 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official 
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NEW ZEALAND PASTORAL SECTOR SUPPLY RESPONSES: 
PRELIMINARY MODELLING RESULTS 
ABSTRACT 
The objectives of developing the model are two-fold. Firstly, MAFCorp wishes to extend its in-house 
forecasting capabilities and secondly, to answer some questions with respect to the effects of the 
economic liberalisation programme upon the agricultural sector. This paper will focus upon the former 
objective. The hypothesis that the supply response was consistent during the slow growth period from 
1960 to 1978, during the assistance build up of 1979 to 1984, and the post liberalisation period since 
1984 is also proposed to be tested. The model will provide the framework in the future to analyse the 
impact of exogenous shocks (such as drought), and market developments, such as the expansion in the 
live exports of sheep and lambs. 
A, pastoral sector livestock supply model is developed on a micro-computer using data from 1960 in the 
case of sheep and from 1972 for the cattle sector. The model is conceptually similar to the model 
developed by Laing and Zwart at Lincoln College on the main frame, but a richer data source updated 
to 1988 and re-specified equations are used. The model specification differs from Laing and Zwart in 
that behaviourial equations for all natural increase and turn-off activities are estimated, while changes in 
inventory is then derived by identity to ensure consistency. This approach is consistent with that 
adopted in the Australian livestock models developed at ABARE. All prices are treated exogenouSly, as 
'is farm investment. Total livestock units will be constrained, and the new livestock (deer and goats) 
along with live exports of sheep and lamb introduced exogenously. The TSP software is used to 
estimate and subsequently be used to simulate the model on a micro. , 
The natural increase and turn-off behaviourial equations introduced provide a good fit. The responses tc 
exogenous price variation, in particular to wool relative to lamb and beef relative to milk fat prices, was 
shown to be important in the enterprise mix decisions. Mutton prices were not relevant and confirm the 
postulate that it is a salvage value. Dairy calf retentions for bull beef production was found to be 
important. Ewes retained for breeding and lambs marked were driving forces in the sheep flock 
dynamics whereas on the cattle side it is the changes to cow and heifer inventory which lead to overall 
numbers and slaughter responses. Supply response was consistent throughout the entire period and the 
farmers responded to actual farm gate returns. and cost factors which adequately captured the effects of 
the growth in assistance to outputs during 1979-84. 
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NEW ZEALAND PASTORAL SECTOR SUPPLY RESPONSES: 
PRELIMINARY MODELLING RESULTS 
I INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Rationale for the study 
The pastoral sector is of critical importance to the New Zealand economy as it accounts for a 
significant part of both agriCUltural production and total exports. Past attempts at modelling the 
pastoral sector (Laing and Zwart, 1983; Shaw, 1986) and their updates (Grundy, Lattimore and 
Zwart, 1988) have provided valuable insights into the factors determining the nature of supply 
response and its dynamics. This work provided the impetus for the modelling exercise at 
Policy Services MAFCorp reported in this paper. We intend to use this model in the analysis 
of policy impacts, including th~ economic liberalisation programme, and as an in-house 
forecasting and monitoring device of production, productivity and changes in the inventory of 
various classes of livestock. 
1.2 Framework of the Modelling Exercise 
The pastoral sector livestock supply model is developed on a micro-computer using data from 
1960 in the case of the sheep sector and from 1972 for the cattle (beef and dairy) sector. The 
model is conceptually similar to the model developed by Laing and Zwart (L&Z) at Lincoln 
College on the main frame but a richer data source updated to 1988 and re-specified equations 
are used. Behaviourial equations for all natural increases and tum-off activities are estimated, 
unlike in the L&Z model, while changes in inventory are then derived by identity to ensure 
consistency. 
The approach taken in this study is consistent with that adopted in the Australian Livestock 
models (Reynolds and Gardiner, 1980; Reynolds et al, 1981), including the EMABA model 
(Dewbre et al, 1985) at ABARE (BAE). But, importantly the need to derive more than one 
series of data as residuals in the inventory equations has been avoided by limiting the 
disaggregation of male and female as well as the different age classes of livestock, to the extent 
data is available. All prices and farm investment are treated as exogenous, while total livestock . 
units are constrained by the available pasture base. The influence of new livestock industries 
such as deer and goats along with live exports of sheep and lamb are introduced exogenously. 
The TSP software is used to estimate and will be used subsequently to simulate the model on a 
micro. 
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1.3 Outline of the Paper 
The paper is organised as follows: 
Some background information on policy measures and market developments affecting the 
pastoral sector and historical trends in the New Zealand sheep, beef and dairy numbers are 
outlined in section 2. A description of the conceptual model and the econometric specification 
arising from it, including the dynamic features of the model, and the data sources utilised are 
summarised in section 3. In section 4, the results of estimation of the behaviourial equations 0: 
the model relative to inventory adjustments or natural increases, tum-off (slaughter), and per 
unit production are reported and discussed. 
The fmal section summarises the main focus of the study, the major findings of the estimated 
model and the important policy simulation experiments which are possible using the model. 
IT NEW ZEALAND PASTORAL LIVESTOCK INDUSTRIES 
2.1 Historical Perspective 
Traditionally, the pastoral sector of New Zealand has consisted mainly of the sheep industry, 
producing lamb, mutton and wool, the beef industry responsible for both prime and 
manufacturing beef production, and with the dairy industry outputs being primarily milk fat and 
transfers of cattle for use in production of beef. This later area is significant in New Zealand 
and has risen in importance in recent years. Other new livestock industries (goats and deer) in 
the pastoral sector, in spite of their tremendous growth, still account for only a small portion of 
the total output. 
While sheep and beef farming has been the mainstay of New Zealand agriculture for a long 
time, changing fortunes for beef and sheep production has been equally characteristic over the 
last 30 years. Both activities saw a steady growth throughout the 19608 when beef nwnbers 
rose by about 50 percent from under 3 million and sheep numbers by about 25 percent from 
about 48 million in 1960. During the early 1970s, beef nwnbers continued to rise to over 6 
million while sheep numbers fell back by about 6-8 million. Beef numbers fell since 1975 to 
below 5 million at a steady rate, (except for a brief period of stability in 1979 and 1980) and 
then since 1983 there has been a mild recovery taking the beef nwnbers back up to almost 5 
million in 1986 (figure 1). During the period since the mid 70s, sheep numbers rose consistent!; 
and were over 70 million in 1982 and 1983. They then fell back in the post 1984 period to 
below 65 million in 1987. 
Dairy numbers, on the other hand, rose from about 3 million in 1960 to almost 4 million in 
1969, but then fell below the 3 million mark during the mid 70s. The dairy numbers recovered 
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somewhat in the mid 80s to be almost 3.5 million in 1986. In 1987 sheep, beef and dairy 
numbers all fell but have recovered slightly during 1988 (figure 1). 
This period of almost three decades has seen some major changes in the domestic assistance 
levels, developments in the international markets and the effects of adverse climatic conditions 
on seasonal pasture availability. Among the overseas market developments, the accession of 
UK into the European Community (EC) in the early 1970s and the expansion of the US, Middl 
East, and third world markets have had major impact on the pastoral sector production levels 
and livestock numbers. 
In the domestic scene, the period of growing assistance to the rural sector in mid 1970's 
culminated in the supplementary minimum prices (SMP) scheme for all three main pastoral 
activities during 1979-84. Their subsequent elimination along with major changes in the macrc 
economic environment in New Zealand since 1984 are likely to have had still greater impacts 
on the pastoral livestock industries. Besides the market related and policy oriented impacts on 
the pastoral sector, weather induced effects arising from soil moisture deficits were pronounced 
during the drought years of 1964, 1973, 1978, 1983 and, most significantly for the sheep sectol 
in 1988 and 1989. 
2.2 Recent Developments of New Industries 
Among the newer pastoral industries of New Zealand, both deer and goat numbers have seen 
tremendous growth during the last 4-5 years. Total deer numbers estimated to be around 
600,000 at present are expected to reach the million mark by 1991. Goat numbers, estimated a 
around 1.3 million in 1988, will approach the 2 million level by 1991 with strong demand 
prospects for velvet, venison and goat fibres in general (SONZA, 1989). These dramatic 
increases reflect the emphasis on herd build up and velvet and goat fibre production~ while the 
levels of venison and goat meat production have not been as spectacular. 
ill PASTORAL SUPPLY RESPONSE MODEL 
3.1 The Conceptual Model Specification 
The main focus of this model is to capture the changes in the inventories and the level of 
aggregate production of the major outputs from the traditional pastoral livestock industries. 
These changes are modelled as responses to the incentive environment (price and cost) arising 
from the domestic policy measures, both direct and indirect, the international market 
developments and also weather and their exogenous influences. In this respect, this model is 
analogous to the livestock numbers and production sub-model developed by Laing and Zwart 
(1983). A flow diagram of the conceptual model is provided in figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Conceptual Model of 
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3.2 Disaggregation. Dynamics and Data 
The producers' decisions at the aggregate sectoral level are modelled first with respect to the 
enterprise mix vis a vis sheep, beef and dairy activities, and then the supply response further 
dis aggregated by outputs. . These are prime and manufacturing beef from the beef and/or dairy 
sectors veal and milk fat from the dairy sector, and the joint products of lamb, mutton and woe 
from the sheep sector. The inventory of breeding stock (ie, ewes, beef and dairy cows) are the 
determining factors of next period's birth of lambs and calves, both beef and dairy, which in 
tum determine lamb and veal production in the same period and beef, mutton, wool and milk 
fat production in the subsequent period. Here the time periods are years ending 30 June. 
3.2.1 Sheep Sector 
New Zealand sheep flock as counted at census time consists of the adult sheep flock and the 
ewe and wether hoggets being promoted. The lamb crop of this season contributes towards a 
build up of the adult flock next season through promotions as hoggets. Alternatively, the flock 
is rundown through deaths and slaughter of lambs and/or adult sheep respectively (figure 3). 
Breeding ewes are an important component of the adult flock and the breeding decisions of 
sheep farmers this season determine the lambs marked in the subsequent season. Here the 
weather and price factors determine the number of ewes bred and also the lambs marked. As 
shown in figure 3, the sheep component of the model is closed by a closure factor in the adult 
sheep inventory relationship. 
Prices of the joint products from the sheep sector (lamb, mutton and wool) along with the price 
of beef determine the breeding decisions, which lead to stock build up next period. It also 
determines the slaughter decisions of both lambs and adult sheep, which result in stock decline. 
Weather determines seasonal pasture availability and becomes important not only in the 
breeding and slaughter decisions of farmers but also determines the loss of lambs and adult 
sheep on farms through deaths. In this analysis, weather conditions for sheep farming in New 
Zealand is defmed as the number of soil moisture stress days. It is measured by the 
meterological service and recorded for the different sheep growing regions and weighted 
according to the sheep numbers. 
Output of the joint products from the sheep sector are measured through changes in the 
slaughter numbers in the case of lamb and mutton (adult sheep) and the corresponding average 
slaughter weights, while wool production is determined from sheep wintered and average fleece 
weights (figure 2). These weights are again determined by weather, both current and previous 
season in the case of wool, along with prices of the respective products and a trend variable 
representing the changes in the technology (management) of on-farm production and/or market 
preferences for heavier or lighter animals. 
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The price variables are generally defined in real terms, where they are measured as ratios of 
nominal prices to the prices paid indexes of the respective farming activity in the different 
years. The inventory and slaughter numbers are measured on a June year ending basis and the 
study period for the sheep sector is 1960-1988. But the estimated sheep sector equations 
reported in Section 4 cover 27 years of data from 1962-1988, due to the nature of changes in 
inventory reconciliation and the lagged effects of weather and sometimes prices on the 
endogenous variables represented by the behavioural equations. 
3.2.2 Cattle Sector 
The cattle sector is differentiated into dairy and beef enterprises with separate representation of 
the male and female stock (figure 4). The younger (1-2 years), and older (over 2 years) 
animals are also modelled separately in each case, accounting for promotions within the dairy 
and beef herds and transfers from the dairy to the beef herds of (young) surplus anellor (older) 
culled stock for beef production. The data period for the cattle sector in this model is 
1972-1988 with census data reported on a June year ending basis. 
The calves born on dairy farms account for young dairy heifer and bull calves promoted next 
season to the 1-2 year age category. They also account for bobby calves slaughtered for bobby 
veal production, and a proportionate (6.4% of births) number of calves dying on farms (NZDB) 
while the remaining animals are retained for dairy beef production on beef or dairy farms. 
These dairy beef animals along with the calves weaned on beef farms account for young beef 
heifer and bull/steer calves promoted next season to the 1-2 year age category (figure 4), along 
with the veaner or yearling cattle slaughter this season and death of calves on beef farms 
reported to be around 3% (NZMWBES). 
The dairy calves retained for beef production is the residual in the dairy calves born relationshi] 
and feeds into the beef calves weaned relationship. The total number of young beef heifer and 
bull/steer calves remaining are modelled as the residual in the latter inventory relationship. 
These are then apportioned according to the actual ratios of male to female, under 1 year Beef 
stock, reported in the beef census statistics for each year of the study period. It has been 
recognised by others who have modelled the New Zealand cattle sector (Laing and Zwart, 1983 
that census data on young, especially female. stock tend to under report the number of animals 
in the below 1 year age class relative to the 1-2 year age group. This suggests fewer younger 
stock from which the older stock are derived and is particularly a serious problem in the case 0 
young female stock in the dairy census data. This problem has been corrected to some extent 
by recent changes in 1988 to the census questions dealing with this aspect. This problem in the 
data (1972-87) was overcome by increasing and then offsetting the respective numbers of under 
one year and 1-2 year dairy heifers to establish a more realistic ratio between these two 
inventories. This was carried out to be consistent with earlier periods when the census data wa 
more sensible in this respect. A similar correction was made in the case of beef sector young 
male and female inventory as well. 
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Figure 4: Cattle Inventory 
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The young cattle in the 1-2 year age category representing the dairy and the beef sector were 
also modelled separately (figure 4). The previous period's male and female closing calf 
inventories described before are the promotions, while transfers from dairy to the beef sector ar 
the residuals. Deaths of young dairy heifers (3%) and bulls (2.5%) based on the New Zealand 
Dairy Board (NZDB) estimates are treated as fixed ratios. The slaughter of heifers and steers 
are represented on the beef side with the slaughter component from the dairy industry being 
part of the transfers of young female and male cattle referred to above (table 1). These 
slaughter figures are derived as the residuals in the 1-2 year beef inventory relationships from 
calf promotions and again by using death rates of 3% for heifers and 2.5% for young steers ane 
bulls, based on NZMWBES estimates. The slaughter figures from MAP for heifers and steers, 
based on inspected kill records at the meat works, do not strictly correspond to the 1-2 year age 
category modelled. Therefore, the differences are adjusted in the cows and mature steers and 
bulls slaughter figures respectively, while modelling the adult cattle over 2 years of age. 
Promotions of 1-2 year young heifers, bulls and steers into respective adult dairy and beef cattle 
(over 2 years), both male (bulls) and female (cows), are also modelled. Here again the transfer 
of both adult bulls and cows from dairy to the beef sector are derived as the residuals in the 
dairy inventory relationships. Here a 2.5% death rate is assumed for the mature dairy bulls ane 
a-variable death rate ranging from about 5-8% is used for cows, based on NZDB wastage 
statistics on tested herds. The transfers of adult (over 2 years) bulls and cows from the dairy t( 
the beef sector represent the culled animals contributing to the total slaughter of bulls and cows 
in the beef inventory relationships (table 1). 
The promotions of young beef bulls/steers and heifers in the 1-2 year category are from 
previous year's closing inventory and with the opening inventory of mature (over 2 year) 
bulls/steers and beef cows account for the slaughter of total bulls and steers and cows, in 
addition to fixed death rates of bulls (2.5%) and beef cows (3%). The balance should represen1 
the closing inventory of mature bulls/steers and cows, when the transfers from the dairy herd 
are accounted for (figure 4). This requirement for the closure of the model is not met exactly 
due to the reporting errors in the census data, both intentional and inadvertent. It is not met 
also because of the noise arising from the assumption of fixed death rates owing to a lack of 
information on deaths for the different classes of both dairy and beef cattle, with the exception 
of dairy cows where a variable death rate from NZDB was used. 
One of the most noteworthy items arising from the above analysis is that, a detailed breakdown 
(by age and sex) is now available for transfers from the dairy to the beef herd for _ meat 
production. Summary figures are presented in table 1, along with the best previously available 
estimates from the Dairy Board. 
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Year 
1972n3 
1973n4 
1974n5 
1975n6 
1976n7 
1977n8 
1978n9 
1979/80 
1980/81 
1981/82 
1982/83 
1983/84 
1984/85 
1985/86 
1986/87 
1987/88 
Table 1: Transfers of Daily Cattle to Beef Production 
('000' head) 
Dairy Board 
Estimates of 
Dairy Beef Calves 
405 
235 
150 
210 
200 
220 
310 
366 
300 
251 
409 
530 
640 
596 
648 
650 
Calves 
<1 yr 
312.8 
358.8 
133.8 
87.0 
162.6 
129.1 
208.0 
231.2 
414.7 
356.8 
426.1 
520.5 
658.0 
674.0 
616.8 
606.2 
. Heifers 
and Bulls 
(1-2 yrs) 
72.3 
85.9 
96.1 
73.3 
59.9 
62.1 
57.4 
43.2 
73.6 
45.5 
51.3 
35.9 
71.0 
65.2 
103.5 
46.1 
Cows and 
Bulls 
(>2 yrs) 
397.9 
356.0 
289.5 
309.6 
313.7 
265.2 
297.5 
272.3 
319.3 
245.7 
209.5 
281.6 
290.7 
270.1 
464.9 
362.6 
Total 
Dairy Cattle 
Transfers 
783.1 
800.8 
519.4 
469.9 
536.2 
456.4 
562.9 
546.7 
807.6 
657.0 
686.9 
838.0 
1019.6 
1009.3 
1185.2 
1014.9 
These estimates show the significance of the dairy industry as the source of animals used for 
beef production. It needs to be noted that the analysis only provide information on animals 
transferred, and do not mean that slaughter occurred in that year. Moreover, it is impossible to 
say what proportion of stock were ·sold off dairy farms, because a number of these animals 
could be retained and fattened on dairy farms. Additionally, some dairy calves were 
slaughtered as bobbies, although numbers here have diminished considerably in recent years. It 
is also likely that transfers would diminish in years when dairy returns improve. 
3.3 Theoretical Concepts of Supply Response 
A multi-output characteristic is exhibited by both the sheep and dairy sectors in New Zealand 
and a mUlti-period sequential decision making is involved in all the three sectors modelled. 
This requires a block recursive structure and a dynamic simulation framework to capture the 
inter-relationships between the time periods and also the sectoral outputs. In the application of 
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the theory of capital and investment to livestock supply studies (Jarvis, 1974), the livestock are 
viewed as capital goods and the producers as portfolio managers. Output in future periods can 
be increased only by increasing the size of the breeding flock or herd and/or withholding stock 
from slaughter in the current period. 
When output prices rise, the optimum slaughter age increases as it pays to keep the animals 
longer which leads to a negative short run supply or slaughter response. Another consequence 
of rising output prices is the rise in opportunity cost of pasture land which varies for different 
classes of animals depending on their discounting horizons (Reynolds and Gardiner, 1980). 
This results in a greater decline of the slaughter of breeding ewes, cows, lambs and young steer 
relative to other adult sheep and cattle. 
Some other a-priori hypothesis suggest a positive short-term supply response to increasing wool 
and milk fat prices and a negative response in the case of beef, mutton and lamb supply to own 
price rises in the short run. The longer term response will be positive in all cases, but the time 
required to realise it is indeterminate as it depends on the process of farming expectations and 
the relative returns from the alternative enterprises. The response to increases in returns from 
competing products can also be either positive or negative depending on the time period of 
adjustment. In the very long run however, this cross price supply response will be negative. 
Producers try to adjust production to meet the desired end of year or closing inventory levels 
for each stock category within a framework of stochastic prices and climatic conditions and a 
discrete production decision environment imposed by biological constraints (Reynolds and 
Gardiner, 1980). The coincidence of this desired inventory level (known as the equilibrium) 
and the actual outcome can only happen by chance as producers continue to respond in a 
discrete decision framework to stochastic prices and seasonal factors. A brief description of the 
data sources and some of the data limitations are summarised in Appendix A. 
IV RESULTS OF MODEL ESTIMATION 
The list of endogenous variables modelled and the exogenous factors used as explanatory 
variables in the behavioural equations are provided in Appendix B. Estimated Inventory 
adjustments, turnoff/slaughter and unit production behavioural equations are reported in 
Appendix C as tables Cl (Sheep), C2 (Dairy) and C3 (Beet). 
4.1 Behavioural Equations - Sheep Sector (1962-1988) 
The breeding decisions of sheep farmers are represented through the equations on closing 
inventory of breeding ewes (KE) and the lambs marked (LM). These are determined by the 
size of the available sheep flock (KS), seasonal weather factors in the sheep growing districts, 
both current (WS) and lagged (WSL), real prices of lamb (RPLPP), wool (RPWPP), and 
competing product such as (prime) beef (RPPBPP). In the breeding ewe equation, the opening 
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inventory of the total sheep flock (KSL) is an important variable along with current weather, 
real prices of lamb, prime beef and wool. 
A higher total sheep flock can support a larger breeding stock and greater the number of 
moisture stress days, fewer the number of ewes in condition to be bred (table Cl; equation 1). 
Higher real lamb prices lead to more ewes being mated, while higher wool and prime beef 
prices result in fewer ewes put to the ram. This is due to the substitution of wool for lamb 
within the sheep enterprise and beef for sheep in the sheep/beef farming system respectively. 
Overall. this equation exhibits a high degree of explanatory power with an R Z of 0.949 and F 
statistic of 99.3. The individual co-efficients are also significant at least at the 10 percent level, 
except for weather and real wool prices. 
Lambs marked depend on both ewes bred and the weather in the previous season along with the 
real prices of lamb and (prime) beef (table Cl: equation II). Here again the direction of impact 
of the variables is similar to the breeding ewes equation and the coefficients were significant at 
least at the 5 percent level, except for real lamb prices. Lambs slaughter in turn depends on 
lambs marked, weather, real prices of lamb and mutton (table Cl: equation III). More lambs 
marked can produce a higher lamb slaughter particularly under unfavourable seasonal weather 
conditions (destocking), and/or higher real lamb prices (greater returns). But a higher real 
mutton price on the other hand, reduces lamb slaughter (substitution). The lamb slaughter 
equation also has a high degree of explanatory power with an R-z of 0.939 and an F value of 
102.1. Lamb deaths (table Cl: equation IV) are mostly determined by the number of lambs 
marked (LM) and the weather in the previous period (WSL), which influences the condition of 
the ewes and also the lambs which are born. 
Adult sheep slaughter (table Cl; equation V) depends on the opening inventory of the adult 
sheep flock (KASL), current weather (WS), real price of wool (RPWPP) and the ratio of real 
lamb to mutton prices (RPLMPP). A larger adult flock can support a bigger slaughter number. 
which is in tum further increased under unfavourable weather conditions for seasonal pasture 
availability, due to destocking. The co-efficient for current weather (WS) is larger in the adult 
sheep slaughter (SLAS) equation than the lamb slaughter (SLL) equation and is positive in both 
cases. This reflects the common practice on farms of destocking more adult sheep than lambs 
under adverse climatic conditions. Adult sheep deaths (table Cl: equation VI) are also 
influenced by the size of the adult flock (KASL), current and the previous season's (WSL) 
weather, and real mutton prices (RPMPP). 
Sheep wintered (SHW) for wool production (table AI: equation VII) is also determined mainly 
by the adult sheep flock (KASL), lagged weather (WSL) and lagged real wool prices 
(RPWPPL)_ A larger adult flock leads to more sheep being wintered, subject to the weather in 
the previous season which reduces this number and favourable wool prices in the last season 
which leads to greater number of sheep kept for wool production. 
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Per unit production of lamb, mutton and wool are estimated as slaughter weights and fleece 
weight and are reponed in appendix table AI, as equations vm IX and X. Slaughter weight oj 
lambs (SWL) is determined by weather (WS), real price of lamb (RPLPP) and a trend factor 
(T62) capturing the technology and/or market preferences. This factor is defined as 62 in year 
1962 and as 88 in year 1988, with years in between defined accordingly. Current unfavourable 
weather reduces slaughter weights; so does higher lamb prices, probably due to their earlier 
slaughter. A small but significant negative trend is also observed in lamb slaughter weights. 
Adult sheep slaughter weight (SW AS) is influenced again by current weather (WS). real wool 
prices (RPWPP) and the trend (T62) variable. As for lambs, adverse weather has a negative 
impact on slaughter weights of adult sheep, but to a somewhat greater degree, and higher wool 
prices lead to heavier slaughter weights as they tend to be kept longer for wool production. 
The trend variable was negative in the case of adult sheep slaughter weights also and larger 
than for lambs. Fleece weight of wool (FWL) is also determined by current (WS) and lagged 
(WSL) weather as they come off the sheep wintered (June - August), while the census period ill 
year ending June. Real price of wool (RPWPP) and mutton (RPMPP) and also the trend 
variable (T62) appear to have an impact on fleece weights. Both current and lagged 
unfavourable weather have a negative effect on fleece weights and so does higher real mutton 
prices probably due to earlier slaughter, while higher real wool prices increase fleece weights ru! 
one would anticipate. A very small, but not a significant, negative trend was observed in the 
case of fleece weights as well. 
4.2 Behavioural Equations - Cattle Sector (1973-1988) 
The cattle sector equations cover the dairy and the beef sector and are reponed in Appendix 
tables C2 and C3 respectively. They cover inventory adjustments, turn off/slaughter and per 
unit production of milk fat beef and veal. Total milk fat, beef and veal production are then 
derived from per unit production and cows and heifers in milk and total cattle slaughter 
numbers respectively. 
4.2.1 Dairy Sector 
Inventory adjustments here are related to cows and heifers in calf and/or milk (KCHMD), dairy 
calves born (CVBD) and the closing numbers of young dairy heifers (KYHD) and bulls 
(KYBD) under the age of one year remaining at the end. The dairy breeding stock closing 
numbers (KCHMD) are determined by the total cows and heifers in the dairy herd (KCHTDL) 
at the beginning of the year as well as dairy milk fat prices (PD), manufacturing beef prices 
(PMB) and the dairy prices paid index (PPID). While higher milk fat prices increase the size 
of the dairy breeding stock, higher beef prices and input prices paid in dairy production reduce 
the size of the breeding stock. This equation has a high degree of explanatory power with an 
R-2 of 0.932 and an F statistics of 52.7 and all the estimated co-efficients significant. 
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Dairy calves born (CVBD) equation also exhibits a high degree explanatory power and is 
influenced by the opening inventory of the breeding stock as well as dairy, beef prices and 
prices paid index. Closing numbers of young dairy heifers (KYHD) in tum are detennined by 
the calves born, weather and the real price of prime beef, while young dairy bull (KYBD) 
numbers are mainly a constant, but also influenced by dairy, and (manufacturing) beef prices 
and prices paid. 
Bobby calf slaughter is detennined by the dairy calves born as well as weather and prime beef 
prices. Adverse weather conditions increase bobby calf slaughter while higher prime beef prices 
reduces the bobby slaughter. Slaughter weights of bobby calves are detennined by lagged 
weather which influences the condition of the cows in calf. The average weight of bobby 
calves have also declined since the early 1980's, due to the extraction of heavier friesian crosses 
for dairy beef production. This is represented by a dummy variable (D80) which is 0 from 
1972-1979 and 1 from 1980-1988 and has a negative sign a~ ~.nticipated. There was also an 
overall negative trend in the bobby calf weights observed in Ute;; trend variable 172. 
Milk fat produced per cow is influenced by current weather (WD), price of milk fat (PD), the 
prices paid index (PPID) and the trend factor (172). Adverse weather and higher prices paid 
reduces milk fat production while higher milk fat prices appear to increase production. There 
was also a significant declining trend observed in milk fat production per cow. 
4.2.2 Beef Sector 
Inventory adjustments in the case of the beef sector are related to cows and heifers bred, beef 
calves weaned, and the closing numbers of young beef heifers and bulls/steers under the age of 
one year remaining at the end. Here again the closing breeding stock (KCHPB) number is 
determined primarily by the total cows and heifers in the beef herd (KCHBL) at the beginning 
of the year, weather (WB) in the beef farming regions, prices paid index in beef production 
(PPIB) and a trend factor capturing a general decline in the breeding stock over the sample 
period. Adverse weather in the current period reduces the number of animals bred, while 
higher prices paid tends to increase the number of animals bred to offset the higher cost. A 
statistically significant and large negative trend was also observed, while prices did not appear 
to be important. 
Beef calves weaned (CVWB) are determined naturally by the number of female animals bred 
(KCHPBL) in the previous season, lagged weather (WBL) which detennines the condition of 
the breeding animals in the beginning of the census year and the real price of (prime) beef 
(RPPBPP). Adverse weather reduces the number of beef calves weaned, while higher beef 
prices increase them probably due to better care after birth. There was also a significant 
negative trend in calves weaned. 
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Young beef heifer (KYHB) closing numbers are determined by the number of calves weaned, 
price of prime beef (PPB) and the prices paid index for beef (PPIB). Young beef steers and 
bulls (KYSB) closing numbers on the other hand, are determined by the number of dairy calvel 
retained for beef production (BCVRD) which are mostly males, along with beef prices (PPB) 
and input prices (ppm). While higher prime beef prices increase the number of young beef 
heifers for breeding purposes and future beef production, they reduce the young steer numbers 
probably due to their slaughter in the current period. Higher prices paid for inputs also appear 
to reduce the young male stock but increase the young beef heifer numbers. This is an 
important result capturing the beef herd dynamics in response to changes in output and input 
prices which are modelled separately. 
Slaughter weight of vealers or yearling cattle is determined by lagged weather (WBL), the total 
number of vealers reared and slaughtered (SL V), prices paid for inputs (PPIB) and the trend 
variable (172). Adverse weather and higher input costs appear to reduce vealer weights along 
with the number of vealers slaughtered. But there was a significant positive trend in vealer 
weights during the ample period. 
Slaughter weights of adult cattle (>1 year) modelled represents a combined average weight of 
both younger (1-2 year steers and heifers) and mature (over 2 year bulls and cows) cattle and 
will vary according to their proportion in the total slaughter of adult cattle, in addition to this 
total itslef. As in other livestock categories, adult cattle slaughter weights also depend on 
weather which determines seasonal pasture availability, and prices of both prime and 
manufacturing beef in relation to the price of other outputs from competing enterprises such as 
wool and dairy. 
Higher prime beef prices will lead to more younger animals being slaughtered while better 
manufacturing beef prices will result in more mature bulls and cows being killed. This in tum 
will be relfected in the slaughter weights of adult cattle, where higher prime beef prices reduce 
the average weights while higher manufacturing beef prices increase them. When the 
proportion of young steers to mature bulls slaughter (SLSBT) increase, the average slaughter 
weights decline. When milkfat prices increase the dairy cows are kept longer leading to heavie 
animals being slaughtered. Higher wool prices will reduce slaughter weights of adult cattle due 
the substitution between the sheep and beef enterprises. There was no trend observed in adult 
cattle slaughter weights. 
In addition to average slaughter weights of adult cattle, the slaughter numbers of adult (> 1 year 
cattle was also modelled for the first time by age (1-2 years and over 2 years) and sex 
(heifers/cows and steers!bulls) categories. For each of the category of slaughter, a 
corresponding slaughter pool variable was defined based on the inventory equations (figure 4) 
for the adult (> 1 year) beef cattle. Heifer slaughter (SUIT) is determined by the slaughter poo 
of heifers (SLPH), made up of young beef heifers (KYHB) and the transfer of heifers from 
dairy to beef (THDB), as well as the real price of manufacturing beef (RPMBPP) and price of 
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milk fat (PO). An increase in all these variables increases heifer slaughter. Higher beef prices 
produce an own price response and higher dairy prices suggest a substitution and destocking of 
the beef breeding herd. 
Young (1-2 year) steer slaughter (SLST) is again influenced by the slaughter pool of steers 
(SLPS), which is made up of young steerslbull calves (KYSB) and the transfer of immature 
(culled or surplus) dairy bulls to beef (TIBOB), along with the price of prime beef (PPB) and 
the price of lamb (PL). The responses here are similar to the heifer slaughter, but to a different 
own and competing enterprise output prices. 
Cow slaughter (SLCT) also depends on the slaughter pool of cows (SLPC). made up of the beef 
heifers being promoted from previous period «KHBL), transfer of culled dairy cows for beef 
(TCOB), and the opening inventory of beef cows over 2 years (KCBL). In addition, higher 
prices for manufacturing beef (PMB) and milk fat (PD) have a negative impact on cow 
slaughter due to the perverse own shott-run beef supply response and because of fewer dairy 
cows culled, respectively. Higher prices for lamb (PL) however, will lead to increased cow 
slaughter due to the destocking of the beef breeding herd as. a preference for lamb production. 
Adverse weather also appear to increase cow slaughter again as a result of destocking. There 
was also a significant positive trend in the number of cows slaughtered. 
Slaughter of bulls (SLBT) over 2 years is determined by the slaughter pool of bulls (SLPB). 
made up of immature bulls and steers being promoted from the previous period (KISBL). 
transfer of culled dairy bulls for beef (TBOB) and the opening inventory of beef bulls and 
steers over 2 years (KSBL). In addition. the real price of manufacturing beef, weather and 
prices paid have a positive effect on bulls slaughter. Vealer/yearling slaughter on the other 
hand, is reduced by higher prime beef prices and prices paid and increased by adverse weather 
conditions. 
V SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Progress thus far? 
5.1.1 Conceptual Model 
In this paper we have developed a framework within which it is possible to analyse and project 
aggregate livestock producer responses to changes in prices, costs and seasons. First, we 
presented a theoretical and conceptual model which captured changes in livestock inventories 
and linked these to changes in producer decisions concerning livestock build-up or tum-off as 
well as to opening inventories. The key theme of this approach is that closing inventories are 
being jointly determined with the decisions to build-up, withhold or tum-off stock. 
Consequently, livestock response is characterised by being the outcome of dynamic 
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(multi-period) sequential decision making. The livestock need to be viewed as capital goods 
and the producers as portfolio managers. 
Producers adjust production decisions to meet the desired end of year inventory levels for each 
stock category within a framework of known biological constraints and of highly stochastic 
prices and climatic conditions. It is from this recognition that the need for disaggregation of 
livestock types (by age and sex) and the need for dynamics is derived. However, the whole 
pastoral livestock system is constrained by the available pasture base. Thus the competitive 
nature of dairy, beef and sheep enterprises needs to be accounted for. As well, there are 
complementary and competitive within enterprise interactions such as between wool or lamb an 
the use of dairy animals for meat production (ie, the joint products scenario). 
5.1.2 Data 
By applying the conceptual model to the available data sources, a significantly richer data base 
than used in earlier New Zealand livestock models has been derived. In particular, slaughter 
data for each major age and sex category of each of sheep, dairy and beef livestock are elicited 
By correcting the available statistics for the implied breakdown, greatly improved fits on the 
turn-off behavioural equations are promised. 
A major advance has been the delineating and constraining of separate measures of flows and 
transfers within the flock and herds of New Zealand. First, the residual of the lamb drop whic] 
is promoted to the adult flock in year t+ 1 is derived directly. The proxy for this used to date 
have been ewes and male hoggets on hand at 30 June, and these have shown significant 
differences. Secondly, the transfers from the dairy herd to beef production are derived directly 
for each category and found to be greater than earlier estimates. Finally, within the cattle herm 
the demographic variables for cattle aged between 1 and 2 and over 2 years are differentiated 
for the first time. This advance will enable analysis of the break down of slaughter by type an, 
give basis to understanding trends in the mix and level of output. Further analysis which 
involves a split of total beef to manufacturing and prime beef production is made possible. 
The price variables used in the model have been updated and refined to better reflect actual 
farmgate returns. In order to do this improved MAF estimates of the impacts of assistance on 
output have been utilised. Moreover, disaggregated indices of farm costs (by type of enterprise 
and of seasonal conditions are presented. 
5.1.3 Estimated Equations 
On the basis of the conceptual model and the data available or derived, equations were 
estimated to explain inventory, tum-off, build-up, transfers, and per unit production trends. The 
results presented represent work in progress but are a potential advancement of earlier work on 
livestock numbers and production by Laing and Zwart (1983) and of Shaw (1986). We regard 
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the results as preliminary. Further work is continuing to check the sensitivity of the model to 
changes in specification or improving the specification in some areas. The model will also be 
validated via simulation experiments and tested for dynamic stability. As it is applied it will 
succeed in meeting the objective of improving our understanding of basic response parameters 
and relationships in the pastoral industries. 
5.2 Directions for Further Work 
5.2.1 Model Simulation and Sensitivity Analysis 
The livestock response model is being developed not only to improve our understanding, but 
principally as a tool enabling medium- term forecasting and quantitative analysis of the impact 
of alternative policies and exogenous shocks. In particular, it will be used to answer some 
questions with respect to the effects of the economic liberalisation programme upon the 
agricultural sector. Impacts of exogenous shocks such as drought and of market developments 
such as the expansion of the live exports of sheep and lambs will be analysed. Immediate and 
subsequent years effects will be determined within the context of given scenarios for prices, 
costs and seasons. Overseas demand shifts as typified by the possible reduction in EEC tariff 
levels can also be analysed. 
In this respect, the dynamic aspects of the model are particularly important in the application to 
both forecasting and analysis of policy. Snapshot forecasts of the future are of little use 
without an indication of paths which variables take in arriving at forecast future levels. 
5.2.2 Farm Investment and Input Responses 
. MAFCorp Policy Services has determined that the model(s) developed will be structural models 
with development proceeding in a series of steps or modules. The probable next step is to 
update the understanding of farm investment and input response. Significant early work by 
Laing and Zwart (1983) should provide a good basis for further development. Later steps could 
involve endogenising the price determination by inclusion of export and domestic demand 
models, and of linking with the established models of livestock response at ABARE, Australia. 
It is intended that application of the models will go hand-in-hand with model development. In 
this way, feed back from application of the model can become an important element in future 
development. 
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APPENDIX A: DATA SOURCES AND LIMITATIONS 
I InventOIY of Livestock 
The main source of data for the inventory of sheep and cattle breeding stock and the various age groups of 
male and female livestock numbers was the New Zealand Agricultural statistics. The issues used cover the 
period 1960G1988 and report the results of Agricultural Census surveys carried out by the Department of 
statistics. While the data on sheep numbers have been collected on a June year ending basis by the census 
throughout, the dairy and beef numbers were collected on a June year basis only from 1972. This and the 
dairy calf births data availability from 1972 and the beef calf weaning rates from 1969 lead to the use of 
data from 1972-1988 for the cattle sector. 
IT Births. Deaths and Slaughter 
Birth rates such as lambing percentages and beef weaning rates were obtained from farm surveys conducted 
by the New Zealand Meat and Wool Board's Economic Service (NZMWBES), which was also the source 
of the variable death rates of lambs and adult sheep as well as the fixed death rates for the various classes 
of beef cattle. The Dairy Board was the source of death rates in the Dairy Sector. The source of slaughter 
figures on lambs, adult sheep (including hoggets), calves, vealers, heifers, steers, bulls and cows was the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, which receives and compiles the data on inspected kill at Meat 
Works through out New Zealand. 
III Aggregate Output. Per Unit Production and Live Exports 
The department of statistics Information Network For OffIcial Statistics (INFOS) was the main source of 
information on aggregate production of lamb, mutton, beef and veal while the Dairy Board and the Wool 
Board were the source of aggregate milk fat and wool production respectively. Live export of sheep and 
cattle data is also from INFOS, reported separately as breeding and not for breeding categories and in 
recent years into Dairy and Beef animals. 
Per unit production or slaughter weights of lamb, mutton (adult sheep), bobby calves, vealers/yearlings and 
beef were derived from total production and slaughter numbers of respective livestock categories. At this 
stage of the modelling exercise, beef production is not differentiated into prime and manufacturing beef. 
The grand total of heifer, steer, cow and bull slaughter numbers are used to derive an average aqult cattle 
slaughter weighL The production of milkfat per cow is also derived from total milk fat production and 
cows and heifers in milk. In a similar manner, wool cut per head is derived from total greasy equivalent of 
shorn wool production and the number of sheep wintered statistics from the New Zealand Wool Board 
(NZWB) Statistical Hand books. 
IV Prices. Costs and Weather 
Farm gate prices of lamb, muuon, prime and manufacturing beef were obtained from the New Zealand 
Meat Producers Board (NZMPB) Annual Reports and/or NZMWBES Annual Reviews of the Sheep and 
Beef Industry. Wool and milk fat prices at the farm gate were obtained from the New Zealand Wool 
Board Annual Reports and statements of accounts and the New Zealand Dairy Board Annual Reports 
respectively. Bobby calf prices were obtained from "farm costs and prices" published by MAP Economics 
Division until 1987. 
Farm costs are modelled using prices paid indices computed for sheep. beef and dairy farms separately, 
with a base period of 1981. These indices are computed using the NZMWBES series on prices paid index 
for the different expenditure items on sheep and beef farms and are weighted according to their importance. 
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The corresponding indices for dairy fanus are from the New Zealand Department of Statistics Monthly 
Abstracts. The weather indices for sheep. beef and dairy fanus were also obtained from the NZMWBES. 
They were initially computed by the New Zealand metereological service as the number of soil moisture 
stress days for sheep. beef and dairy fanus around New Zealand. weighted by the population of the 
respective classes of livestock in the various climatic districts. 
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APPENDIX TABLE B: LIST OF VARIABLES IN THE PASTORAL SUPPLY RESPONSE MODEL 
SHEEP SECTOR BEEF SECTOR DAIRY SECTOR 
~ ENDOGENOUS (From Behavioural Equations) 
(a) KB 
-
Breeding Ewes ('OOO's) (a) KCHPB - Cows and Heifers put to the (a) KCHMD - Cow. and Heifers in Calf and/or 
Bull ('OOO's) Milk ('000'.) 
(b) LM - Lambs Marked ('OOO's) (b) CVWB - Beef Calves Weaned ('OOO's) (b) CVBD - Dairy Calves Bom ('000'.) 
(c) SLL 
-
Lamb Slaughter ('000'5) (c) KYHB 
-
Young Beef Heifers <1 year (c) KYHD - Young Dairy Heifers <1 year 
('OOO's) (,000'.) 
(d) DL 
-
Lamb Deaths ('OOO's) (d) KYSB - Young Steers and Dulls (d) KYBD - Young Dairy Bull. <J year 
< 1 year ('OOO's) ('000'.) 
ee) SLAS - Adult Sheep Slaughter (e) SLY - Vealer/yearling .Iaughter (e) SLCV - Bobby Calf Slaughter ('000'5) (,000'.) (,000'.) 
(.f) OS 
-
Adult Sheep Deaths (f) SWV - Slaughter WI of VeaJers (kg) (f) SWCV - Slaughter WI of Bobby Calf (kg) 
('OOO's) 
(g) SHW - Sheep Wintered (Millions) (g) SWAC 
-
Slaughter WI of Adult Canle (leg) (8) MPCOW - Milkfat per cow (kg) 
01) SWL - Slaughter Weight of (h) SLlrr - Heifers (1-2 yrs) Slaughter (h) TCDB - Tranafer of Cows (>2 yra) 
Lambs (leg) (,000',) from Dairy to Beef 
(i) SWAS - Slaughter Weight of Adult (i) SLST 
-
Steers (1-2 yrs) Slaughter (i) TBDB - Transfer of Bull. (>2 yn) from 
Sheep (kg) ('OOO's) Dairy to Beef 
(j) FWL - Reece Weight of Wool (kg) (J) SLCT - Cows (>2yrs) Slaughter ('000'.) (J) THOB - Transfer of Heifers (1-2 yrs) (k) SLBT 
-
Bulls and Steers (>2 yrs) (Ie) TIDDB - Transfer of L8ulls (1-2 yrs) 
Slaughter ('OOO's) 
It ENDOGENOUS (From Identities) 
....... (a) KS - Total Sheep ('000'5) (a) KCB - Beef Cows >2yrs ('OOO's) (a) KCD - Dairy Cow. >2yrs ('OOO's) 
w = KAS + KEWH 
en (1)) KAS 
-
Adult Sheep ('OOO's) (b) KHB 
-
Beef Heifers 1-2 yrs ('OOO's) (b) KHD - Dairy Heifer. 1-2 yr. ('OOO's) 
(1:) KOS 
-
Other Sheep ('OOO's) (c) KSB 
-
Beef Bulls & Steers >2yrs ('OOO's) (c) KBD - Dairy Bulls >2yrs ('OOO's) 
= KAS - KE 
(II) KEWH - Ewe & Wether Hoggets 
('OOO's) 
(d) KlSB 
-
Beef Immature Bulls & Steers 
1-2 yrs ('OOO's) 
(d) KIDD - Dairy I. Bulls 1-2 yr. ('000'.) 
11% EXOGENOUS 
'a) LES - Live Expons of Sheep (a) DCB ('000'5) -
Death of Beef Cows ('OOO's) (a) DCD - Death of Dairy Cow. (,000'.) 
(b) LEL 
-
Live Expons of Lambs (b) DHB 
-
Death of Beef Heifers ('OOO's) (b) DHD - Death of Dairy Heifer. ('OOO's) 
('OOO's) 
(1:) WS 
-
Weather Index for Sheep (c) DSB 
-
Deaths of Beef Bulls & Steers (c) DBD - Death of Dairy Bulls (,000'.) 
(No of days of moisture ('OOO's) 
stress/year) 
(d) PPIS - Prices paid Index Sheep 
(1981=100) 
(d) DISB 
-
Deaths of Immature B&S (,000',) (d) DIBD - Death of I. Dairy Bull. ('000'.) 
(e) PL 
-
Farm gate price of Lamb (e) 
(cts/kg) 
DCVB 
-
Death of Beef Calves ('OOO's) (e) DCVD - Death of Dairy Calve. ('000'.) 
(f) PM 
-
Farm gate price of Mutton (f) LEB 
-
Live Expons of Beef Cattle (f) BCVRD - Dairy Calf Retentions for Beef 
(cts/kg) ('OOO's) ('OOO's) 
(g) PW - Farm gate price of wool (g) WB - Weather Index for Beef (g) LED - Live Expons of Dairy Cattle 
(cts/kg) (No. of days) ('OOO's) 
(h) PPIB - Prices Paid Index Beef (h) WD - Weather Index for Dairy 
(1981=100) (No of days) 
(i) PPB 
-
Farm gate price of Prime Beef (i) PPID - Price Paid Index Dairy 
(cts/kg) (1981=100) 
(j) PMB - Farm gate price of Manufacturing (J) PO - Farm gate price of milk fat 
beef (cts/kg) (cts/kg) 
(k) PBCV - Average Pool price.t Bobby Calves 
($Jhd) 
:A) iNVENTORY ADJUSTMENTS 
APPENDIX TABLE Cl: SHEEP SECTOR BEHAVIOURAL EQUATIONS {1962-1988} R;1 
.E ~ 
BREEDING EWES 
KE -4667.2 + 0.8313 KSL 29.603 WS + 2155.5 RPLPP 2378.3 RPPBPP 0.949 99.3-
0 1.79 
( -1.43°) (18.75-) (-1.269) (1.715°) (-2.359°°) 
153.1 RPWPP 
(-0.32) 
II LAMBS MARKED 
LM 3312.8 + 0.9868 KEL 83.103 WSL + 709.43 RPLPP 1682.6 RPPBPP 0.975 252.7- 2.16 
0.73") (27.1"°") (-5.238-) (0.914) (-2.428°") 
:B) TURN OFF/SLAUGHTER 
III LAMB SLAUGHTER 
SLL = -9662.3 + 0.8554 LM + 29.21 WS + 1389.9 RPLPP 2449.7 RPMPP 0.939 102.1- 1.53 (-3.08-) (16.2-°) (1.25) (0.937) (-1.495°) 
fV LAMB DEATHS 
DL -33.7 + 0.0359 LM + 0.665 WSL 0.774 45.4- 2.50 
(-0.199) (9.488-) (0.362) 
V ADULT SHEEP SLAUGHTER 
SLAS = 5196.4 + 0.0919 KASL + 43.739 WS 463.63 RPWPP 684.2 RPLMPP 0.617 11.5-
0 1.31 
(2.57") (3.085"°) (3.005°-) (-1.792°°) (-2.867") 
...... 
w VI DEATH OF SHEEP 
........ DS -74.9 + 0.0563 KASL + 9.325 WS + 3.815 WSL 142.84 RPMPP 0.853 38.7- 1.25 
(-0.27) (9.985-) (3.068°0 °) (1.366°) (1.295) 
VII SHEEP WINTERED 
SHW = 3.57 + 0.0015 KASL 0.0118 WSL + 0.620 RPWPPL 0.968 265.3- 2.05 (1.21) (24.2°0 °) (-0545) (157) 
:C) fER UNIT fROQUrnOM 
VI1I SLAUGHTER WEIGHT OF LAMBS 
SWL = 16.4 0.0164 WS 0.252 RPLPP 0.027 T62 0.423 7.4- 2.20 (18.5-°) (-2.762-°) (-1.192) (-2.816°") 
)(l SLAUGHTER WEIGHT OF SHEEP 
SWAS = 37.2 0.0569 WS + 0.4009 RPWPP 0.183 T62 0.751 27.1- 1.32 (15.9-°) (3.031-) (1.368"} (-6.793°") 
" 
FLEECE WEIGHT OF WOOL 
FWL = 5.48 0.0073 WS 0.0093 WSL + 0.084 RPWPP - 0.304 RPMPP - 0.004 T62 0.665 11.3- 2.57 (20.8-°) (-3.346-°) (-4.476°°") (2.03°°) (-3.03°") (1.18) 
:D) CLOSURE REQUIREMENT FOR SHEEP 
eRS = 534.4 + 4.823 SLPF + 1550.3 SD86 3516.7 SDUS 0.498 9.6 2.09 (1.78) (2.32) (1.89) (-4.28) 
Values in parentheses are t-statistics, with the astreisks (*) representing the level of significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. The same applies to the F statistics. 
APPENDIX TABLE C2: DAIRY SECTOR BERA VIOURAL EQUATIONS (1973-1988) 
~ INVENTORY AomSIMENTS R1 E OW 
COWS AND HEIFERS 
IN CALF AND/OR MILK 
KCHMD = 384.4 + 0.7409 KCHTDL + 1.309 PD - 0.687 PMB - 1.696 PPID 0.932 52.1' 2.25 (2.0") (9.797"-) (3.303·-) (-1.587") (-2.411-) 
II DAIRY CALVES BORN 
CVBD = 427.4 + 0.5784 KCHMDL + 1.687 PD - 0.753 PMB - 1.544 PPID 0.927 48.9"·' 2.37 (1.9-) (6.229-) (3.962"') (-1.629") (-2.016-) 
III YOUNG DAIRY HEIFERS 
KYHD = -187.5 + 0.2989 CVBD 0.400 WD + 44.284 RPPBPP 0.827 24.8'" 2.53 (-2.4"") (8.289-) (-1.17) (3.915-) 
IV YOUNG DAIRY BULLS 
KYBD = 38.5 + 0.0249 PO + 0.0196 PMB - 0.0559 PPID 0.609 8.8-" 0.91 (51.8-) (2.144") (1.516') (-2.89,") 
B IUR~ OFELSLAUGHTER 
V BOBBY CALF SLAUGHTER 
SLCV 3128.4 0.9166 CVBD + 2.361 WD - 188.0 RPMBPP 0.602 8.6-' 1.63 
~ 
(6.8-') (4.691"-) (1.216) (-2.491) 
w 
00 ... PER UNIT PRODUCUON ~ 
VI SLAUGHTER WT OF BOBBY CALF 
SWCV 31.9 + 0.0318 WDL 3.095 D80 - 0.112 T72 0.821 23.9-" 2.75 (3.4-) (1.416") (-2.558") (-1.315') 
vn MILK FAT PER COW 
MPCOW = -253.3 0.2028 WD + 0.0621 PD - 0.4535 PPID + 5.181 T72 0.822 18.3-' 2.14 (-2.1") (-1.856-) (1.398') (-2.665") (3.049-) 
DAIRY SECTOR PRODUCTION IDENTITIES 
TOTAL MILK FAT PRODUCTION = COWS AND HEIFERS IN CALF AND/OR MILK • MILK FAT PER COW QML KCHMD MPCOW 
BOBBY VEAL PRODUCTION BOBBY CALF SLAUGHTER • SLAUGIITER wr OF BOBBY CALF QBV SLCV SWCV 
Values in parentheses are t-statistics, with the astreisks (.) representing the level of significance at the 10% (.), 5% ( •• ) and 1% ( ••• ) level. The same applies to the F statistics. 
APPENDIX TABLE C3: BEEF SECTOR BEHAVIOURAL EQUATIONS (1973-1988! 
!\ INVENTORY ADJUSTM~N1 
COWS AND HEIFERS RZ E OW 
PUT TO THE BULL 
KCHPB = 11,015.0 + 0.4174 KCHBL - 5.7499 WB + 9.791 ppm 137.6 TI2 0.962 94.1'·· 1.35 (6.1·") (5.044·") (-3.541···) (4.227"·) (-5.581"·) 
U BEEF CALVES WEANED 
CVWB = 1,797.6 + 0.8032 KCHPBL - 1.4748 WBL + 2.054 ppm 23.9 TI2 0.991 415.9··· 2.57 (2.9·") (15.689·") (-2.573") (2.649") (-2.86"') 
at YOUNG BEEF HEIFERS 
KYHB -59.1 + 0.4529 CVWB + 1.057 ppm + 0.534 PPB 0.653 10.4·" 1.36 (-0.24) (3.794·") (2.943·") (1.01) 
CV YOUNG BEEF STEERS 
AND BULLS 
KYSB = 924.6 + 0.704 BCVRD - 0.672 ppm 1.487 PPB 0.713 13.4··· 2.11 (39.8"·) (6.172·") (-1.485·) (-3.555"·) 
B f~R UNIT fRODUrnON 
v SLAUGHTER WT OF VEALERS 
SWV -5265 0.094 WBL 0.461 SLY 0.989 ppm + 9.50 TI2 0.726 10.9··· 2.00 
..... (-2.7") (-0.59) (-3.070"') (-4.505···) (3.67""·) 
w 
\.0 VI SLAUGHTER WEIGHTS OF ADULT CATTLE 
SWAC 274.8 0.0116 SLAC 26.52 SLSBT - 0.3897 WB + 206.2 RPMBPW 
(9.83"") (-1.155) (-2.26") (-2.03") (3.8·") 
133.8 RPPBPO 0.578 5.1·· 3.03 
(-3.7·") 
~ TURN OFF/SLAUGHTER ~ 
VII VEALERIYEARLING SLAUGHTER 
SLY 96.3 + 0.374 WB 0.288 ppm 0.289 PPB + 0.004 SLPV 0.890 31.3··· 1.56 (1.8·) (1.469·) (2.411··) (-2.401") (0.15) 
VIII SLAUGHTER NUMBERS OF ADULT CATTLE - SLAC = SLHT + SLST + SLCT + SLBT 
:A) HEIFERS SLAUGHTER 
POOL 
RZ f mY. 
SLHT = -630.3 + 0.749 SLPH + 73.0 RPMBPP + 1.213 PD 0.899 45.8'" 1.61 (-2.8"') (3.55-) (2.11") (9.99··) 
:B) STEERS 
SLST = -480.3 + 0.588 SLPS + 0.66 PPB + 1.170 PL 0.878 36.9'" 2.42 (-3.6-) (4.58·") (1.94") (2.55··) 
:C) COWS 
SLCT -4644.9 + 0.620 SLPC 0.756 PMB 1.839 PO + 3.768 PL + 2.427 WB (-3.4···) (3.38"') (-0.44) (-1.65·) . (3.374···) (1.16) 
+ 47.1 TI2 0.822 12.6- 1.98 (2.4··) 
....... 
+::> 
o 
:D) BULLS 
SLBT -740.8 
( -2.60 ,) 
YEARLING VEAL PRODUCITON 
QYV 
TOTAL VEAL PRODUCITON 
QTV 
TOTAL BEEF PRODUCITON 
QB 
+ 1.009 SLPB 
(5.3450 -) 
= 
= 
= 
APPENDIX TABLE C3: CONT'D 
+ 84.6 RPMBPP + 2.824 WB 
(1.02) (1.19) 
BEEF OUTPUTIPRODUCTION IDENTITIES 
VEALER/YEARLING SLAUGHTER 
SLV 
BOBBY VEAL PRODUCITON 
QBV 
SLAUGHTER OF ADULT CATTLE 
SLAC 
• 
+ 
• 
0.631 9.5"-
SLAUGHTER wr OF VEALERS 
SWV 
YEARLING VEAL PRODUCITON 
QYV 
1.72 
SLAUGHTER wrs OF ADULT CATTLE 
SWAC 
Values in parentheses are t-statistics, with the astreisks (.) representing the level of significance at the 10% (.), 5% ( •• ) and 1% ( ••• ) level. The same applies to the F statistics . 
